The organisation and regulation of the Public Employment Service and of Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies:the experience of selected European countries – the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom by Finn, Daniel Joseph
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In January 2016, NIACE and the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion 
merged to form the Learning and Work Institute 
  
 
Learning and Work Institute 
Patron: HRH The Princess Royal   |   Chief Executive: David Hughes 
A company limited by guarantee, registered in England and Wales 
Registration No. 2603322   Registered Charity No. 1002775 
Registered office: 21 De Montfort Street, Leicester, LE1 7GE 
 
  
The Organisation and Regulation of the 
Public Employment Service and of Private 
Employment and Temporary Work 
Agencies  
 
The Experience of Selected European Countries – 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the United 
Kingdom  
 
Policy Research Report  
 
Prepared for the Korea Labour Institute 
 
Professor Dan Finn, University of Portsmouth 
 
May 2016
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by National Learning and Work Institute (England and Wales) 
21 De Montfort Street, Leicester LE1 7GE 
Company registration no. 2603322 | Charity registration no. 1002775 
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1036.1204 
Learning and Work Institute is a new independent policy and research organisation 
dedicated to lifelong learning, full employment and inclusion.  
We research what works, develop new ways of thinking and implement new approaches. 
Working with partners, we transform people’s experiences of learning and employment. 
What we do benefits individuals, families, communities and the wider economy. 
We bring together over 90 years of combined history and heritage from the ‘National Institute 
of Adult Continuing Education’ and the ‘Centre for Economic & Social Inclusion’. 
www.learningandwork.org.uk  @LearnWorkUK  @LearnWorkCymru (Wales) 
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made 
without the written permission of the publishers, save in accordance with the provisions of 
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting 
limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency.  
  
3 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Introduction - About This Report 
The Case Study Countries  
Research Design and Methods 
 
1. The Role of the Public Employment Service and Private Employment and 
Temporary Work Agencies in Europe 
1.1 The Role of Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies 
1.2 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies, Labour Market 
Deregulation and Non-standard Employment Contracts 
1.3 The European Union Context – Labour Market Regulation, Public 
Procurement and Employment Policy  
1.3.1 EU Labour Market Regulation and Temporary Work Agencies 
1.3.2 The EU and Public Procurement by Member States 
1.3.3 The EU and Employment and Social Policies – ‘Europe 2020’ 
 
Chapter 2: Activation Policies and Labour Market Trends in the Case Study Countries 
2.1 Work Requirements and Activation Policies 
2.2 Labour Market Trends in the Case Study Countries 
 
Chapter 3: The Organisation and Delivery of Public Employment Services and the 
Role of Private Agencies in the Netherlands 
3.1 Working Age Benefits and PES Organisation in the Netherlands 
3.2 PES reforms in the 1990s and the Development of the Reintegration 
Market 
3.3 The UWV Reintegration Market – Tenders and Block Contracts 
3.4 Individual Reintegration Agreements and the UWV Procurement 
Framework 
3.5 Municipal Delivery of Reintegration Services 
3.6 Welfare to Work Devolution, Municipal Activation Strategies and the 
Participation Act (2015) 
3.7 Coordination of the Work and Income Delivery System and the Impact of 
Public Expenditure Cuts on UWV Employment Services 
3.8 Online Delivery of UWV Employment Services 
3.9 The PES and Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies  
3.10 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in the Netherlands 
3.10.1 The Regulation of Temporary Work Agencies 
3.10.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
4. The Organisation and Delivery of Public Employment Services and the Role of 
Private Agencies in Denmark 
4.1 Unemployment Benefit and Social Assistance in Denmark 
4.2 The Development of the Danish Activation System 
4.3 The Danish Employment Services System: Target-Setting, Accountability 
and Budget Management 
4.4 The Role and Organisation of Danish Jobcentres 
4.5 The PES and Direct Contracts with Private Providers 
4.6 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in Denmark 
4 
 
4.6.1 The Regulation of Temporary Work Agencies 
4.6.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
5. The Organisation and Delivery of Public Employment Services and the Role of 
Private Agencies in Germany 
5.1 The Federal Public Employment Service (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) 
5.2 PES Service Delivery and Intervention Strategies 
5.3 Joint PES and Municipal Jobcentres 
5.4 The ‘Opt-out’ Municipalities 
5.5 The PES and Training and Employment Vouchers  
5.6 The PES and Personnel Service Agencies 
5.7 The PES and Direct Contracts with Private Providers 
5.8 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in Germany 
5.8.1 The Regulation of Temporary Work Agencies 
5.8.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
6. The Organisation and Delivery of Public Employment Services and the Role of 
Private Agencies in the United Kingdom 
6.1 The UK Welfare to Work System and the Service Delivery Landscape 
6.2 The Role of Jobcentre Plus and the Introduction of Universal Credit 
6.3 The Current Role of Jobcentres and Work Coaches  
6.4 Delivering Employment Services – Jobcentres. Targets and Partnerships 
6.5 The DWP Commissioning Strategy and the Work Programme 
6.6 Work Programme Procurement, Prime Contractors and their 
Subcontractor Supply Chains  
6.8 Black Box Contracting and DWP Performance Management and 
Oversight 
6.7 Work Programme Funding and Provider Incentives  
6.8 Black Box Contracting and DWP Performance Management and 
Oversight 
6.9 Work Programme Performance 
6.10 The Revised DWP Commissioning Strategy and Devolution of 
Employment Programmes 
6.11 Private Employment Agencies and Jobcentre Plus  
6.12 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in Britain 
6.12.1 The Regulation of Recruitment and Temporary Work Agencies 
6.12.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
7. Conclusion 
7.1 Lessons for Policy Makers in Other Countries 
7.1.1 PES Performance Management 
7.1.2 Coordinated Service Delivery  
7.1.3 Contracting Out the Delivery of Employment Services  
7.1.4 Decentralisation and th Delivery of Employment Services  
7.1.5 The Public Employment Service and Private Employment and 
Temporary Work Agencies 
 
Annex A: Eurociett Code of Conduct (extracts) 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Private Employment Agencies in the Case Study Countries 
 
Figure 1: Zero-hours Contracts 
Figure 2: LMP Expenditure by Type of Intervention (‘Services’, ‘Measures’ and 
‘Supports’), for the EU15 and the Case Study Countries, 2005-2011 
Figure 3: The Organisation of the Netherlands ‘Work and Income’ System 2015 
Figure 4: The Netherlands ‘Block Grant’ for Social Assistance 
Figure 5: Reintegration Budgets of Dutch Municipalities and PES in € millions 2009-
2012  
Figure 6: The Danish National Framework for Employment Services Delivery, 2015 
Figure 7: The Danish Contact and Activation Regime for the Insured Unemployed, 
2015 
Figure 8: The German Employment Services System 
Figure 9: Organisational Structure - Mannheim Joint-Jobcentre 
Figure 10: National Employment and Skills Support in England 
Figure 11: Jobcentre Plus Regime for Unemployed Claimants  
Figure 12: The Prime Contractor Model for Delivering Employment Programmes 
Figure 13: Work Programme Performance 2011-2015 
 
 
  
6 
 
Abbreviations  
 
General 
 
ALMPs  Active Labour Market Programs  
CV   Curriculum Vitae (résumé) 
CIETT  International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies 
EC  European Commission 
EU  European Union 
ICT   Information and Communications Technologies  
ILO  International Labour Office 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PbR  Payment by Results 
PES  Public Employment Service  
PE&TWAs   Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies  
TWA  Temporary Work Agency  
UB   Unemployment Benefit 
UI   Unemployment Insurance   
   
Germany 
 
BA  German Public Employment Service 
BAP   Employers' Association of Personnel Service Providers 
DGB  German Confederation of Trade Unions 
PSA  Personnel Service Agencies  
IGZ  German Association of Temporary Employment Agencies 
 
Denmark 
 
LO  Danish Confederation of Trade Unions  
DA  Confederation of Danish Employers  
 
United Kingdom 
 
CPA  Contract Package Area (Work Program) 
DBIS   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills  
DWP  Department of Work and Pensions  
EASI   Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate 
ESA  Employment Support Allowance 
GLA  Gangmasters Licensing Authority  
JCP   Jobcentre Plus  
JSA  Jobseekers Allowance 
REC  Recruitment and Employment Confederation 
WP  Work Program 
 
Netherlands 
 
ABU  Federation of Private Employment Agencies 
CWI   Centre for Work and Income 
IRO Individual Reintegration Contract 
7 
 
NBBU  Association of Temporary Work and Placement Agencies 
SFU  Social Fund for the TWA Sector 
SNA   Foundation for Labour Standards 
SNCU Compliance with the Collective Labour Agreement for the TWA 
Foundation  
SUWI  Implementation Structure for Work and Income Act  
SZW  Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment  
UWV Employee Insurance Implementation Agency 
WAADI  Labour Market Intermediaries Act 
 
  
 
 
 
  
8 
 
Introduction – About This Report 
 
This study reviews changes in the organisation and regulation of public and private 
employment services in four selected European countries. It was commissioned by 
the Director General of the Korea Labour Institute (KLI) and the findings have been 
used to inform a major Korean-language report on ‘Change in the Employment 
Service in Korea: Past, Present and the Future’ published in March 2016.1 
 
The KLI and the Learning and Work Institute recognised that the research could be 
of value to policy makers and researchers in other countries and have given 
permission for this revised English-language publication of the full findings from the 
four selected case study countries.  
 
The Case Study Countries  
 
The countries selected for in-depth review by the KLI were the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). Each of the countries was 
purposely identified as offering aspects of policy and practice considered to be 
relevant to policy development in Korea. In particular each country has been at the 
forefront of activation reforms involving organisational change in the Public 
Employment Service (PES) including new inter-institutional arrangements between 
the national PES, employment agencies and lower tiers of regional and local 
government. They have also each introduced major reforms in labour market 
flexibility which has coincided with a growing role for Private Employment and 
Temporary Work Agencies (PE&TWAs). 
 
The report gives an initial overview of developments in activation policies and the 
role of the PES and of the wider international and European regulatory framework 
that helps shape national employment service policies. Each of the four case study 
chapters subsequently addresses three particular aspects of institutional and service 
delivery arrangements: 
 
 The role of the PES and of different levels of government in designing and 
delivering publicly funded employment services for the unemployed and other 
working age welfare claimants. 
 
 Quasi-market arrangements for the contracting out, procurement and 
performance management of publicly funded employment services. 
 
 Partnership and regulatory arrangements concerning the operation of 
PE&TWAs in labour market intermediation, including a brief outline of the 
employment rights of agency workers. 
 
A final concluding chapter synthesises significant policy and design ‘lessons’ from 
the case study countries on PES decentralisation, procurement, contract design, and 
partnerships with contracted providers and on the regulation of PE&TWAs. 
                                                     
1
 The Korean language report can be found at - 
https://www.kli.re.kr/kli/rsrchReprtView.do?key=13&pblctListNo=8654&schRsrchRealmNo=1&schPblc
ateDe=&mainPageUnit=10&searchCnd=all&searchKrwd=&mainPageIndex=1 
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Research Design and Methods 
 
The research involved a rapid evidence and literature review. The review focused on 
quantitative and qualitative English-language studies and reports published since 
2010. This included the existing literature on activation policies and the design and 
delivery of employment services already held by the commissioned expert 
supplemented by findings from a targeted review of published and ‘grey’ literature. 
This involved a search of peer-reviewed articles, with a particular focus on journals in 
labour economics and social and public policy and administration, combined with 
searches of more specialised databases, including those of the European 
Commission, the OECD, IZA (Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn) and the Flex 
Work Research Centre (University of Amsterdam). 
 
The literature review was supplemented with ten phone interviews with expert 
subject matter researchers and PES/Ministry officials from the selected European 
countries. The individual respondents were each questioned about recent policy 
trends and developments and helped identify reports and research literature that 
might otherwise have been omitted.  
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Chapter 1: The Role of the Public Employment 
Service and Private Employment and 
Temporary Work Agencies in Europe 
 
In the past two decades labour markets in European Union (EU) countries have 
experienced rapid change. Developments in employment practices, innovations in 
technologies and in the composition and distribution of jobs have transformed how 
people get jobs and how employers recruit and employ their workforces. In 
particular, the growing diffusion and combination of information and communications 
technologies (ICT) is reconfiguring the ways in which job seekers learn about, apply 
for and prepare for careers and employment opportunities as well as transforming 
the ways in which employment services and welfare benefits are delivered and 
managed. 
 
In response to these changes, and to the higher costs of their unemployment 
compensation and ‘safety-net’ social assistance systems, many Governments in 
Europe have embarked on more or less radical reforms creating more flexible labour 
markets and more active work-based welfare systems. Activation policies include a 
diverse range of interventions and programmes aimed at improving the functioning of 
the labour market, notably by upgrading job search and skills and by matching the 
unemployed and other disadvantaged groups to vacancies. The shared aim of these 
policies has been to improve labour supply and by enhancing the employability of the 
unemployed and other inactive people assist countries in meeting the challenges 
posed by globalisation, falling birth rates and ageing populations.  
 
In European countries activation policies have typically been implemented through 
reconfigured service and benefit delivery systems which have included reforms to 
the PES and to other agencies with responsibilities for benefit claimants, especially 
local government. These institutional and organisational reforms have been of 
considerable importance in shaping the impact of activation policies (OECD, 2013b; 
2015).  
 
In each European country responsibility for publicly financed employment services, 
benefit administration, training programmes and related welfare to work services is 
often divided between different ministries, institutions and delivery agencies. One 
objective of reforms has been to reduce institutional fragmentation and draw together 
delivery agencies so that they co-operate and work to common objectives. In many 
countries this has included a trend to greater decentralisation which has often 
created new inter-institutional arrangements between different tiers of government 
and public agencies. In several countries, such reforms have included the 
development of ‘one stop’, ‘single counter’ or ‘single gateways’ which have facilitated 
access to and coordination between related employment, benefit and other social 
services. These changes often aim to reduce duplication of intake processes, 
facilitate information-sharing, target interventions to suit individual needs and local 
circumstances, and co-ordinate service delivery. 
 
The PES continues to play a central role in the delivery of activation policies. There 
is much variation in how the PES is organised but in each country it typically 
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provides a free job matching service for job seekers and employers, usually 
supplemented by a variety of Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs), with 
enhanced advisory services targeted at people who have greater difficulty in making 
the transition into employment. The PES may directly provide employment 
assistance services or subcontract them to non-profit and for-profit providers. PES 
reforms have often included a diminished formal role for the social partners in 
governance arrangements coupled with the introduction of greater accountability and 
more rigorous forms of performance management. In many countries there has also 
been greater partnership working between the PES and PE&TWAs. In some 
countries this has involved the creation of quasi-markets in the delivery of 
employment services, where national ministries and other tiers of government have 
made use of contracting out or outsourcing, to procure publicly financed labour 
market programmes.  
 
1.1 The Role of Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies 
 
In most European countries job matching, placement and intermediation services 
were traditionally public sector monopolies and where PE&TWAs operated they were 
often strictly regulated. Over the last few decades there has, however, been more or 
less liberalisation of the rules governing PE&TWAs with some countries, such as the 
UK, allowing private providers to operate freely with stricter regulation targeted only 
at particular sectors (such as agriculture). Other countries maintain a comparatively 
stricter regulatory regime, but allow employers, agencies and trade unions to 
develop more flexible approaches within collective labour agreements, as in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany (DGIP, 2013).  
 
Liberalisation of PE&TWAs has been associated with a marked growth in the 
number of agencies and in the scope of their activities, especially in Europe, where 
annual growth rates in the three years before the recession exceeded 8% (DGIP, 
2013, p.10).2 The sector has again experienced growth following the recovery. An 
important contributory factor to the growth of the agency market concerns EU 
enlargement where the PES and private labour market intermediaries play a key role 
in facilitating increased labour migration. 
 
In 2013 for example CIETT, the international federation of PE&TWAs, reported that 
in Europe the number of private agencies known to be operating had reached 
54,297, with some 56,803 branch offices, and they were employing 270,112 internal 
staff directly delivering recruitment and employment services (2015, p.14). CIETT 
estimated also that in 2013 over 8.7 million people had gained access to the labour 
market in Europe in ‘one way or another’ through the employment and recruitment 
industry.  
 
Table 1 shows that about half the agencies in Europe were operating in the selected 
case study countries, with most being found in the UK, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. In each country the sector is typically comprised of a number of large, 
                                                     
2
 A review for the European Commission concluded that while temporary agency work “is 
quantitatively important and rapidly growing” because of variations in definitions and data collection 
practices there is “a lack of basic, reliable and comparable data” on agency work, and that “empirical 
data on the role of private placement agencies is scarce” (DGIP, 2013, p. 15). The data used in this 
report draws on statistical findings that were gathered as part of this European review. 
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highly professional multinational or national agencies and a network of many smaller 
and specialised companies, many of which operate in poorly paid sectors of national 
labour markets (WMP, 2013). The estimated number of agencies reported by 
national federations to CIETT includes those delivering a wide range of recruitment, 
placement and payroll services, albeit temporary agency work still makes up the 
largest source of agency revenue (CIETT, 2015).  
Table 1: Private Employment Agencies in the Case Study Countries 
 
 Number of 
agencies 
(2013)* 
Number of 
agency staff 
(2013)* 
Number of 
temporary 
workers in 1,000 
(2011)+ 
In % of total 
employment 
(2011)+ 
Germany  6,500 55,000 857.9 2.2 
Denmark 807 1136 29.5 1.1 
Netherlands 1,500 20,000 208.7 2.5 
UK 18,180 96,357 114.2 0.4 
EU 27 54,297 270,112 2,903.1 1.4 
Sources:  * CIETT, 2015, p. 15, and + DGIP, 2013, Table 3. 
 
In European countries the PE&TWA sector now often delivers three broad types of 
services, with larger private agencies often active in all three markets: 
 
 Private Employment Agencies: These agencies typically provide more or 
less specialised privately financed job broking or intermediation services 
helping employers and workers to find and fill vacancies either within national 
labour markets but also often across national borders. Some countries have 
more or less rigorous registration and licensing systems for agencies 
delivering job matching and related placement services, others have no 
specific requirements other than requirements that apply to all commercial 
organisations. There is little comparative data available on private placement 
agencies but their national prevalence can be gauged by the proportion of 
workers who contact an agency in their regular job search activities. Findings 
from the European Labour Force Survey show that in 2011 private agencies 
were used most frequently in the Netherlands, where 42% of the unemployed 
used one; 25% in the UK; 15% in Germany; falling to only 2% of Danish job 
seekers (DGIP, 2013). 
 
 Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs): These agencies provide workers for 
employers on a temporary basis. Typically the ‘user company’ has a contract 
with and pays fees to the agency and the worker is not their employee. The 
‘temp’ worker is often employed by the temporary agency and paid agreed 
remuneration only for the work undertaken. In other cases TWA workers are 
employed by the agency on an open-ended contract and often, within this 
contractual relationship, are paid between fixed term assignments, although 
sometimes at a low level of remuneration (as happens in some collective 
labour agreements in Germany and Denmark: OECD, 2013a, p. 89). TWA 
agencies are typically subject to greater national regulation and licensing 
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requirements than recruitment agencies and, in Europe, are subject to pan-
European EU regulation concerning the terms and conditions of temporary 
workers (see later). 
 
 Private Employment Service Providers: Many European countries have a 
long tradition of delivering labour market programmes through grants or 
contracts with non-profit organisations. In a growing number of these 
countries quasi-market reforms have seen an increase in the range of 
employment services and programmes put out to the market. This has 
included also a transition to more transparent and competitive tendering 
processes and the development of performance based contracts. These 
developments have led to an increase in the delivery of publicly financed 
employment services both by large and small for-profit agencies.3 These 
companies tend to be regulated under the terms and conditions of the 
contacts they are commissioned to deliver alongside conventional regulations 
applying to private companies. 
 
National regulatory regimes have been shaped in part by international standards set 
by the International Labour Office (ILO)4 and the EU (ELCJ, 2013). ILO standards 
are optional and have to be ratified by individual countries whereas for EU member 
states Directives are legally binding. The case study countries have a varied pattern 
of ratifying ILO Directives but they must all implement EU Directives, especially 
concerning the employment rights of TWA workers.  
 
An important complement to legal regulation has concerned the role of self-
regulation where PE&TWAs have organised as a sector in voluntary national bodies 
to both promote their interests and establish and benchmark responsible 
employment practices. The coverage of each national body varies but each of the 
four case study countries has a national organisation which is a member of Eurociett, 
the pan-European federation for the sector. As members of Eurociett all the national 
bodies are bound by the federation’s constitution and each has a national code of 
conduct for their member organisations, which adheres to the Eurociett code of 
conduct. This code of conduct elaborates principles of best practice, many of them 
reinforcing European employment regulations, and also commits member 
organisations to promote cooperation between the PES and agencies in order to 
help unemployed people to reintegrate in the labour market (see Annex A). 
 
                                                     
3
 For-profit agencies delivering reintegration services include mainstream private employment 
agencies, such as Manpower, Randstad, Staffline and Adecco, alongside a range of other companies 
that specialise in subcontracting to deliver employment and other ‘welfare to work’ services. This 
includes companies now operating in several countries, such as Working Links from the UK, Maximus 
from the USA, and Ingeus from Australia,  (but now owned by the  US ‘Providence Service 
Corporation’). 
4
 The ILO is a United Nations agency which helps set international labour standards.  The ILO 
traditionally discouraged the activities of fee-charging private agencies but in recognition of the 
increased role they were playing in some member states a new approach was signalled in the 1997 
Private Employment Agencies Convention (No. 181). This convention promotes cooperation between 
the PES and PE&TWAs and outlines principles designed to assist member states to establish 
policies, legislation and implementing mechanisms for the effective registration and licensing of 
agencies. A key objective of the principles is to protect agency workers from exploitation.   
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There are contending views about the value of PE&TWAs, their role in labour market 
flexibility and the types of licensing requirements and regulation they should be 
subject to (CIETT, 2015; DGIP, 2013; van Liemt, 2013; WMP, 2012; Arrowsmith, 
2008). Much of the debate concerns the association of agencies with labour market 
deregulation and with what are regarded, by trade unions and others, as exploitative 
non-standard employment contracts. 
 
1.2 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies, Labour 
Market Deregulation and Non-standard Employment Contracts 
 
PE&TWAs provide essential services for employers and for many job seekers. 
Agency job matching services enable employers to find suitable staff and fill 
vacancies and are most frequently found operating in higher skilled employment, skill 
and labour shortage sectors, and in the recruitment of migrant workers. Contracting 
with TWAs enables user companies to make relatively easy labour adjustments and 
meet short term personnel needs (for example, to manage vacations, illnesses, and 
pregnancy leaves, as well as fluctuations in demand). It also enables employers to 
save money in transaction costs by outsourcing elements of responsibility for 
recruitment and administration. In many countries private agencies now also play a 
significant role in delivering reemployment services offered by larger companies 
when laying-off workers and there has been increased public sector interest in the 
role PE&TWAs can play in the reintegration of the unemployed. 
 
Labour market deregulation has been a key factor facilitating the growth of 
PE&TWAs but it has also made their activities more or less controversial. In each of 
the case study countries long term trends have been driving the increase in agency 
work alongside other non-standard employment arrangements. Large employers in 
particular have increasingly adopted non-traditional employment arrangements such 
as outsourcing, temporary or contingent work, off-shoring and subcontracting. 
Across a wide range of industries, including the public sector, employers have been 
focusing on their ‘core competencies’ and hiring outside companies to provide 
services which were once performed by their own employees, such as cleaning, 
security, logistics, human resources, or IT services (Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 
2015). These trends have been particularly strong in sectors such as construction. 
This sector has been characterised by the emergence of very large international 
companies, pervasive subcontracting, and the pressure for cost reduction by those 
bidding for major construction projects has helped drive the use of self employed and 
agency workers. At the same time labour demand has increased across service 
sector industries, such as hotels and catering, health care and domestic work, which 
employers have often met through flexible and agency workers. Many TWAs 
specialise in meeting the labour needs of these sectors and those of the 
subcontractors employed through supply chains.  
 
In many countries perceptions of the role of PE&TWAs has been mired in wider 
controversies about non-standard employment and the emergence of exploitative 
employment practices on the fringes of the entirely unregulated ‘shadow economy’. 
Many agencies, especially the larger ones, tend to operate in a transparent fashion 
and take care to operate in a legal and ethical manner (CIETT, 2015). However, 
according to a review undertaken for the ILO, other PE&TWAs ‘operate in grey areas 
of what is acceptable or even legal behaviour” and some agencies simply “cheat 
15 
 
their employees and break the law’ (van Liemt, 2013, p. 9).5 Poor perceptions of the 
sector are driven also by the association of some agencies with what are perceived 
to be exploitative, employment contracts, such as ‘bogus’ self-employment 
(Thörnqvist, 2014)6 and the ‘zero-hour’ contracts that have caused much controversy 
in the UK (see Figure 1).  
 
At its most extreme some agencies have been associated with ‘severe labour 
exploitation’. A comparative review in Europe found that such illegal practices, 
amounting to forced labour, especially of migrant workers, were more likely in contexts 
where workers are not directly employed by the enterprise for which they work. It 
concluded that law enforcement and employment monitoring authorities needed to pay 
‘particular attention’ to ‘the activities of employment agencies’ in sectors where such 
practices were more likely to occur (FRA, 2015, p.18).
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These developments have been connected with debates throughout Europe about 
changed employment rights and rising pay inequality (van Liemt, 2013; WMP, 2012). 
This has reinforced demands by trade unions and some political parties for the re-
regulation of employment practices which may be less costly for employers but give 
non-standard workers poorer conditions than those of more permanent full time 
workers. This has helped frame the debate about the regulation of PE&TWAs and to 
some extent masked the positive economic contribution that many agencies may 
play in labour market intermediation (CIETT, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 1: Zero-hours Contracts 
 
Zero-hours working shares characteristics with much casual employment but under 
these arrangements the worker typically signs an employment contract agreeing to 
be available for work as and when required but under which the employer has no 
obligation to provide any work for the employee. The worker is expected to be on call 
and receives compensation only for hours worked (Pyper and Dar, 2015).  
 
A survey into new forms of employment in Europe found that the use of this kind of 
contract has increased over the past ten years in Member States such as Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (Eurofound, 2015). These types of 
contracts are commonly used in retail, fast food restaurants and cinemas, and other 
sectors that experience fluctuations in demand, such as care work, agriculture, 
hotels and catering, education and healthcare sectors. Low-skilled workers in low-
paid jobs are the most likely to be offered zero-hours contracts.  
                                                     
5
 Studies cite cases where individual agencies have been found to ‘violate health and safety 
procedures, falsify wage slips, fail to pay taxes and social security premiums, deduct excessive 
amounts for payment of housing and transport to work’ (van Liemt, 2013). 
6
 ‘Bogus’ self-employment concerns contractual relationships that disguise employer (and worker) 
liabilities that would otherwise be implied in a standard contract in order to circumvent collective 
agreements, labour laws, employment tax and so on. It is an important factor that has driven the rising 
share of independent contractors in many countries who depend on a single employer for their 
income but are legally ‘self employed’ and whose relationship with the employer is solely regulated by 
commercial law (OECD, 2013a, p. 92). 
7
 The review was undertaken by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and found 
evidence that illegal ‘severe labour exploitation’ was taking place in a number of industries across 
Europe, particularly in agriculture, construction, hotel and catering, and domestic work (FRA, 2015). 
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There is no regulation of zero-hours contracts at European level, and their 
implementation varies between Member States. In the UK, for example, a zero-hours 
contract is not a legal term and has no specific legal status. Thus its conditions vary 
from employer to employer. Zero-hours contracts are controversial and there have 
been calls from UK trade unions and employee representative bodies for more 
regulation. The discussions focus on issues such as: 
 
 the acceptability of exclusivity clauses; 
 workers’ access to unemployment benefits; 
 whether unemployed people should be obliged to accept the offer of a zero-
hours contract; 
 whether to financially compensate workers for their additional flexibility; 
 payment for travel time and expenses for short assignments (or for turning up 
to work as requested, and the shift then being cancelled). 
 
In 2015 the UK government introduced new regulations that prevent employers from 
enforcing 'exclusivity clauses' – whereby an employer can stop workers from working 
for other employers – in a zero-hours contract. 
Source: Eurofound, 2015, at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-
relations-dictionary/zero-hours-contracts  
 
1.3 The European Union Context – Labour Market Regulation, 
Public Procurement and Employment Policy  
 
Each case study country is a long-standing member of the EU. This is of greater 
significance than their voluntary relationship with the ILO because the regulatory 
institutions of the EU have powers which help shape individual employment 
contracts, public procurement and the employment policies of individual member 
states. These powers derive from binding treaties which set the framework for a 
single European market in trade and the movement of goods, capital and labour.  
 
1.3.1 EU Labour Market Regulation and Temporary Work Agencies 
 
The EU has powers through which it seeks to both regulate and harmonise minimum 
employment conditions and labour market practices in member states and support 
the right of individuals to move freely and take employment in other European 
countries. National governments, for example, are required to work together to 
coordinate social security schemes across the EU so that workers continue to 
receive their social insurance benefits when they change jobs and work in different 
EU countries. 
 
The aim of common European employment standards has been to prevent ‘unfair 
competition’ between member states in the context of a single market. EU Directives 
are intended to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ where each country might deregulate 
to attract business thereby undermining the living standards of European workers. 
There are contending views on the effectiveness of such regulation, and of its 
economic impact, but the EU now has transnational Directives designed to limit 
working hours, tackle workplace discrimination, make working conditions safer, and 
so on.  
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Member states retain significant control of labour market regulation and there is 
considerable variation in how they interpret and implement European laws. 
Nevertheless EU employment rights can and, in many cases, have been enforced 
through judicial action against government interpretations in European courts. 
 
Many of the employment rights established by the EU affect the regulation of more 
flexible types of working, often referred to as ‘atypical’ working contracts.8 The core 
principle of many of the Directives is to define a general framework applicable to the 
working conditions of non-standard workers in the EU. This aims to guarantee a 
minimum level of effective protection to workers but allow for the development of 
more flexible contractual arrangements between employers and workers.  
 
Under the ‘Directive on Temporary Agency Work’ (2008)9 the application of this 
principle means that ‘temp’ workers have the right not to be treated less favourably in 
their other terms and conditions of employment than comparable full time permanent 
staff. Amongst other provisions the Directive mandates that temporary workers: 
 
 should, for the duration of the assignment at the user company, enjoy 
employment and working conditions equal to those of a worker employed 
directly by that company in the same position; 
 should have equal access to amenities and collective services at work; and  
 should not be charged any recruitment fees.  
 
The user company should also keep temporary workers informed of any permanent 
vacancies and Member States must ensure that any clauses preventing the 
conclusion of a contract of employment or an employment relationship between the 
user undertaking and the temporary worker are null and void or may be declared null 
and void. 
 
The Directive allows much flexibility, however, for variations in interpretation 
concerning, for example, the exact definition of ‘basic working and employment 
conditions’ and individual countries can take advantage of particular exemptions. A 
significant flexibility is known as the ‘Swedish derogation’10 where it is possible for 
TWAs to directly employ their temp workers and pay them between assignments. 
These workers give up their entitlement to equal pay with regular workers at the user 
company but there is no standard set for the minimum amount of hours for which 
they should be paid (DGIP, 2013, p.11). Derogations also allow Member States to 
give agencies the option of concluding agreements with trade unions and employers 
(as in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands) that set arrangements which differ 
from equal treatment, while still respecting the overall protection of agency workers 
(Voss et al, 2013). The Directive does not apply to self-employed workers and this 
                                                     
8
 There is no common definition of an atypical worker, but generally the term is used to describe 
someone who does not work on a permanent basis and covers temporary workers, contract workers, 
agency workers, seasonal workers, term time workers, casual workers, sessional workers and so on. 
9
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0104&from=EN  
10
 This derogation was introduced at the request of the Swedish government and Article 5(2) of the 
Directive states: “As regards pay, Member States may, after consulting the social partners, provide 
that an exemption be made to the principle established in paragraph 1 [principle of equal treatment] 
where temporary agency workers who have a permanent contract of employment with a temporary-
work agency continue to be paid in the time between assignments”. 
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has given rise to controversy concerning the role of ‘bogus’ self-employment and of 
new types of agency working arrangements, such as ‘umbrella companies’ 
(especially in the Netherlands and the UK).11 
 
A further European employment right, given by the ‘Transfers of Undertakings 
Directive’  (2001), has implications for contracting out, including of public services 
such as the delivery of employment programmes.12 The law is complex, and there 
are national variations, but when the Directive applies it protects the contracts of 
people working in businesses transferred between owners, so that they carry with 
them their terms of employment and continuous service from the previous employer. 
The law is designed to protect incumbent workers and prevent potential bidders from 
winning contracts on low tenders based on lower rates of pay, longer hours of work 
or redundancies. 
 
1.3.2 The EU and Public Procurement by Member States 
 
The creation of the European single market has intensified pan-European 
competition in a wide range of national industries. The legislation underpins more 
open markets through a framework of rules designed to promote transparency and 
fairness by removing formal and informal barriers to intra-EU trade and creating 
equal opportunities for firms to submit offers and win contracts. The objectives of 
single market reform have included also the creation of a common market in services 
and the opening up of many sectors previously delivered by public sector 
monopolies. There are exemptions that allow member states to restrict competition 
in the provision of some public and social services. 
 
EU treaties and public procurement law are complex and often controversial, with 
much variation in national interpretation and implementation (Morton, 2012). It is 
important to note, however, that the EU public procurement framework sets the 
context in which national governments, especially in the four case study countries, 
have introduced greater competition in the procurement of publicly funded 
employment services. In each country national and municipal public authorities are 
subject to a dual set of European and national regulations in deciding when and how 
to use procurement and contracting to provide employment services. These 
requirements are more important in countries, such as the UK, where the national 
Ministry has contracted out high-value employment services, as in the UK Work 
Programme. 
 
European law allows public authorities to make use of a number of different 
procedures when negotiating public contracts (the Open, Restricted, Negotiated and 
Competitive Dialogue procedures). Each of these procedures sets a framework 
within which purchasers can develop a contract, negotiate with providers and design 
and let competitive tenders. The rules state that for projects above a certain financial 
threshold (which varies according to service and sector) a contract notice inviting 
tenders must be published in the ‘Official Journal of the European Union’. After the 
                                                     
11
 For criticisms of ‘umbrella companies’ in the UK construction industry see Elliott, 2015; and for 
‘bogus self-employment see Citizens Advice, 2015.  
12
 In the UK the protection of the Directive has applied to public and private sector employees 
delivering contracted-out employment programmes where, after a new tender, the services they 
deliver have been transferred to another private contractor (ERSA, 2011). 
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closing date given in the tender the bids should be opened and assessed, and either 
the ‘lowest cost’ or ‘most economically advantageous tender’ should be chosen. 
There are rules that allow commissioners to include limited social and/or 
environmental considerations when deciding to award such contracts. 
 
1.3.3 The EU and Employment and Social Policies – ‘Europe 2020’ 
 
Responsibility for employment and social policy lies primarily with national 
governments but the EU has set Europe-wide employment objectives and seeks to 
coordinate national practices through inter-governmental coordination. The current 
pan-European objectives for employment and skills have been outlined in the 
‘Europe 2020’ strategy. This sets a target for 2020 of a European employment rate of 
75% amongst those aged between 20 and 64 years and a reduction of at least 20 
million fewer people ‘in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion’.  
 
Each Member State has flexibility to translate the targets, and associated detailed 
guidelines, of the ‘European Employment Strategy’ into national policy but they are 
required to publish ‘National Reform Programmes’ which outline how the measures 
and actions they take help achieve EU objectives. The European Commission 
reviews and reports annually on national progress and may then propose country-
specific recommendations which are then reviewed by national Ministers and the 
European Council and communicated to Member States. This approach to securing 
aspects of European policy harmonisation is referred to as the ‘open method of 
coordination’ and has been characterised as a form of ‘soft regulation’, as against 
the ‘hard regulation’ established by legally enforceable employment Directives and 
single market procurement rules. The transparent process of setting benchmarks, 
and undertaking annual monitoring, comparisons and evaluations aims to generate 
‘peer pressure’ (among Member States) and ‘time pressure’ (through agreed 
milestones) for progress at national level (Ashiagbor, 2005).   
 
The improved performance of Europeans PESs is regarded as a critical factor in 
delivering the EU’s wider employment objectives. In particular, over a long period the 
European Commission has called for the modernisation of PES service delivery and 
has increasingly promoted dialogue and evidence-based benchmarking between 
national PESs and partnership working and cooperation between the PES and other 
public, non-profit and private providers. The EU also created ‘EURES’, a long 
standing network of national PESs which work together to make it easier for 
individuals to find employment in other countries and for employers to recruit people 
from other European countries.  
 
In addition to funding partnership working and ‘mutual learning’ activities a further 
component of European influence concerns the significant amounts of funding that 
the EU distributes to Members States for the improvement of employment, skills and 
social inclusion throughout Europe. These funds are designed to help national 
governments modernise and improve the adaptability of their labour markets and 
make jobs more accessible. They are typically targeted or weighted towards areas or 
industries with the highest unemployment and/or particular disadvantaged target 
groups, typically young people, older workers, women and minorities. Over the 
period 2007-2013 the European Social Fund, for example, made more than €75 
billion available to national and regional authorities for investment in EU policy 
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priorities and this supported employment and skills services for an estimated nine 
million people each year. 
 
Member States have much flexibility in how they distribute European funds but they 
must meet European objectives and national governments and other public 
authorities are expected to provide ‘match funding’ from their own resources, 
especially in the more developed countries. In each of the case study countries 
European funding provides additional support for, and complements national 
employment and skills programmes, but it also adds a further dimension of 
complexity in the procurement and accountability requirements that have to be 
observed by national and regional governments, and met by public agencies and 
contracted employment and training providers. 
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Chapter 2: Activation Policies and Labour 
Market Trends in the Case Study Countries 
 
Each case study country has a distinctive combination of income-replacement 
benefits for people of working age. The main cash benefits include Unemployment 
Benefit (UB), health-related (sickness and disability) benefits, early retirement, social 
assistance, and targeted benefits for other groups such as students and lone 
parents. Each country has social insurance systems covering people in regular 
employment, funded by employee and employer contributions and/or national 
taxation. These provide varied levels of population coverage and of income-
replacement protection against the risks of unemployment and disability or poor 
health. These insurance arrangements are complemented by minimum income 
social assistance systems that provide a means tested ‘safety net’ of income support 
for households who do not qualify for or who exhaust, their insurance-based 
entitlements. These different benefits are delivered by organisations which have 
varied roles in connecting their clients with employment, training and other welfare to 
work services. 
 
In the UK the PES – known as Jobcentre Plus (JCP) - combines responsibility for the 
provision of employment assistance and for taking benefit claims and paying 
unemployment and related means-tested benefits. In the other three countries 
unemployment benefits are administered separately by national or sectoral social 
insurance agencies, with the involvement of trade unions and employers. Minimum 
income social assistance is assessed and paid separately by local government. In 
Germany and the Netherlands the PES provides job matching assistance for all 
claimants and has a varied role in implementing work activity tests and acting as a 
‘gateway’ to employment programmes. In Denmark responsibility for front line PES 
service delivery has now been wholly devolved to local government. 
 
2.1 Work Requirements and Activation Policies 
 
In each country eligibility conditions for UB and increasingly for other out of work 
income transfers have been redesigned to promote job search and employment 
preparation. The strength of these ‘activation’ reforms, such as job search 
requirements, has depended on how well they are integrated in interventions in the 
unemployment spell (OECD, 2013b). Reforms have also been introduced to shift 
target groups from ‘inactive’ benefits, such as disability or early retirement benefit, 
onto unemployment benefits, so that job search and availability-for-work 
requirements apply. This strategy is expected to reduce costs and increase the 
employment rate, rather than reduce the unemployment rate. In some cases, full 
availability for work is not required but participation in work-related, or work-
preparation, activities is required, resulting in complex configurations of benefit 
subcategories associated with targeted activation measures. 
 
The configuration of each country’s benefit system has an important bearing on its 
overall activation stance. In particular the countries selected for review each provide 
unemployment related benefits that are of long duration and, in the case of Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands of relatively high cash value, at least during the initial 
period of benefit eligibility. This means that activation measures for the unemployed 
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need to be comparatively intensive to limit benefit costs and caseloads (OECD, 
2013b).  
 
There are variations in the investments made by the different governments in their 
labour market policies and in the balance between what are often categorised as 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ measures. The European Commission (EC) divides such 
expenditure into three broad categories – ‘services’ (largely funding PES activities); 
‘measures’ (to fund ALMPs) and ‘supports’ (financial benefits paid to claimants). 
Figure 2 outlines trends in these different forms of expenditure in the case study 
countries (and the EU 15) variously between 2005/06 and 2011/12.  The charts show 
that spending on benefits (‘supports’) represents the largest share of expenditure, 
with significant rises following the increase in unemployment that followed the ‘global 
financial crisis’. Spending on programmes, or ‘measures’, is the second highest 
category, with smaller amounts allocated to PES services delivery. 
 
 
Figure 2: LMP Expenditure by Type of Intervention (‘Services’, ‘Measures’ and 
‘Supports’), for the EU15 and the case study countries, 2005-2011, (constant 
prices, Euro, millions) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figure 9 A descriptive analysis of the EU Labour Market Policy Statistics, Analytical Web 
Note 1/2015, European Commission, Brussels. 
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There is no obvious relationship between the level of spending on labour market 
programmes and unemployment levels. Patterns of expenditure reflect policy 
choices in the different countries as well as cyclical unemployment variations. 
Despite methodological limitations comparable data collected by the OECD (2013b) 
does find that levels of investment in PES services and in other active programmes 
are an important indicator of the capacity of national systems to implement activation 
policies. For example, as self-reported job search and occasional interviews alone 
do not constitute reliable evidence of availability for work, front-line PES advisers 
need other options to which they may refer unemployed people, especially when 
fewer jobs are available, which can help offset the disincentive effects of high 
earnings-related and long duration UB.  
 
Although expenditure is an essential indicator, the effectiveness of activation 
measures cannot be equated with expenditure on programmes or ‘measures’. It is 
clear that programmes in the same broad category vary greatly in their effectiveness. 
Indeed in the UK and the Netherlands, and more recently in Germany, more-
effective and less expensive activation regimes have been developed partly due to a 
perception that earlier large-scale training and employment programmes 
‘warehoused’ the unemployed and then recycled most of them back into 
unemployment. 
 
Another important variation, driving differential expenditure levels, has been in the 
extent to which the different governments have followed what have been 
characterised as ‘work first’ strategies, that require workless people to enter 
employment as swiftly as possible, or ‘human capital development’ strategies that 
place greater emphasis on the prior importance of improving the skills of benefit 
recipients so that they may gain access to higher quality employment. The former 
approach is most closely associated with ‘welfare to work’ reforms in countries such 
as the UK and is reflected in the far greater proportion of expenditure it allocates to 
services, with little apparent investment in programme ‘measures’.13 The latter 
approach is associated more with other welfare states in northern Europe, including 
Denmark and Germany, although in the past decade reforms in these countries have 
also placed greater emphasis on more rapid labour market attachment (NESC, 
2011). These strategies and the institutional arrangements through which they are 
implemented are explored in more detail in the case study chapters.  
 
2.2 Labour Market Trends in the Case Study Countries 
 
Standardised European Commission labour market data reveal significant 
employment and unemployment trends in the case study countries in the decade up 
to 2015 (EC, 2016). All four countries had, prior to the global financial and economic 
crisis, relatively good labour market performance with higher employment and lower 
unemployment than the European and OECD average. All also weathered the 
‘global financial crisis’ relatively well, especially Germany and the UK, albeit they 
                                                     
13
 Although this expenditure data, and the longer standing comparable series produced by the OECD, 
provide some useful descriptive comparative benchmarks it is important to stress some limitations in 
cross-country comparability. For example, although the UK PES spends little on skills programmes 
the national picture is somewhat distorted by the non-inclusion of other training and skills expenditure 
which is invested in unemployed people by other Government Departments and tiers of government. 
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each face particular labour market problems. One of the factors associated with their 
capacity to cope with economic shocks, without experiencing the same levels of 
unemployment as in earlier recessions, concerns the reconfiguration and 
effectiveness of their activation systems. In all four countries unemployment rates 
have fallen from their recession-driven peaks reaching - according to data for mid-
2015 – 6% in Denmark; 4.7% in Germany; 6.9% in the Netherlands and 5.6% in the 
UK.  
 
Improved employment rates in the four countries were driven by a number of longer 
term factors including the growth in service sector employment and the increased 
labour market participation of women. These trends have been facilitated both by an 
increase in part time work and by an increase in the proportion of workers employed 
on non-standard employment contracts. These trends have been particularly 
significant in the Netherlands where the proportion of part time workers now exceeds 
50% and where the number employed in the ‘flexible layer’ grew from 23% in 1996 to 
34% in 2009 (van Liemt, 2013). In the Netherlands, and in the other case study 
countries, this ‘flexible layer’ includes agency workers along with the self-employed 
and those on fixed term contracts. 
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Chapter 3: The Organisation and Delivery of 
Public Employment Services and the Role of 
Private Agencies in the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands has undertaken a continuous reform process which has 
restructured its social protection system and helped create a more flexible labour 
market. In this transition the Dutch have activated their benefit system for working 
age people and reformed how employment services are financed and delivered. This 
has included PES reform; devolution of employment service budgets to local 
government; the development of a market in the delivery of reintegration services; 
partnerships with PE&TWAs; and more recently the increased delivery of PES 
services through online digital channels.  
 
Over this period the Netherlands also pioneered a distinctive approach to ‘flexicurity’. 
This combination of labour market flexibility and worker security has been developed 
with the social partners and, amongst other things, has involved a ‘normalisation’ of 
non-standard employment contracts, especially of part time employment, where such 
employees have legal rights that approximate those of regular employees. Although 
the social partners no longer have a direct role in the management of publicly funded 
employment services the country is still characterised by a high level of tripartite 
collaboration between the Government, employers and trade unions and working 
conditions are often regulated through legally enforceable collective labour 
agreements. 
 
Dutch temporary workers are now legally entitled from day one of employment to 
equivalent levels of remuneration as comparable regular workers in the workplaces 
they are employed in. National legal rights, such as equal pay, can however be 
derogated and may be revised by arrangements negotiated by the social partners 
through collective agreements. Until 2015 the use of such derogation meant that 
many TWA workers could be employed on a temporary basis indefinitely. The Work 
and Security Act (2015) has changed the rules so that temporary and TWA workers 
now may more easily qualify for permanent employment security, albeit this still 
applies only after a series of temporary work assignments. It is important to note that 
in the Netherlands workers with permanent employment contracts enjoy a high level 
of job security and may only be dismissed with the approval of the PES (for 
dismissals on grounds of economic conditions or incapacity for work) or with the 
approval of a court for all other reasons. 
 
3.1 Working Age Benefits and PES organisation in the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands employment services and benefits system is steered by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) which is responsible for policy 
development, funding social security benefits and reintegration services. The 
Ministry monitors trends and scrutinises the delivery system to ensure it meets 
political and legislative objectives and it directs the different elements of the system 
through a national framework of policy objectives, targets, reviews and funding 
mechanisms (see Figure 3)  
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There are two distinct systems of income support for working age people. An 
insurance system covers most people in regular employment, funded mainly by 
employee and employer contributions. This provides relatively generous wage 
related benefits to people who cannot work either because they are unemployed or 
they have a long term health problem or disability. There is a parallel municipal 
social assistance system which provides a ‘safety net’ of means tested income 
support for those who do not qualify for, or who exhaust, their insurance-based 
entitlements.  
 
 
Figure 3: The Organisation of the Netherlands ‘Work and Income’ System 2015 
 
 
 
 
The Netherlands has been reforming the delivery of employment services and 
working age benefits since the 1980s. At national level traditionally separate PES 
placement services and social insurance benefit administration were integrated in 
2009 placing the ‘Employee Insurance Implementing Body’ (Uitvoeringsorgaan 
Werknemers Verzekeringen, or UWV) in control of job broking and national 
employment services for social insurance claimants. Local government has 
responsibility for the delivery of employment services for social assistance claimants. 
Since 2004 municipalities have been financed through a block grant mechanism 
which gives them a strong incentive to reduce welfare caseloads. The UWV and 
municipalities either provide employment services in-house or contract out delivery 
to external providers.  
 
In the Netherlands more intensive forms of employment assistance are typically 
referred to as reintegration services. These services may include case management, 
assessment, rehabilitation, vocational and/or job search training, mandatory work 
experience, extended work trials, and job placement and retention services. In the 
delivery system, the different services can be organised or purchased as separate 
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elements or programmes but they may also be organised and purchased as a 
‘trajectory’. When a municipality or the UWV purchases what is called a full 
‘reintegration trajectory’ this includes contracting out the case management service 
and often gives the provider greater flexibility over how to get a participant into 
employment. Until recently the UWV also allowed some claimants to make use of an 
individual budget which, with the agreement of a front line work coach, could be used 
to purchase a personally tailored reintegration trajectory. 
 
3.2 PES Reforms in the 1990s and the Development of the 
Reintegration Market 
 
In the early 1990s management responsibility for PES placement and reintegration 
services for the unemployed was exercised by tripartite boards at central and 
regional level, and there were many separate social insurance agencies each with 
tripartite representation. The Ministry directly funded the PES to deliver employment 
programmes aimed at different target groups of benefit recipients, such as the long 
term unemployed, and each programme had separate regulations and reporting 
requirements. Municipalities were also funded to deliver employment and 
reintegration services for the young unemployed and for social assistance claimants, 
with significant resources being invested in job creation programmes and in 
separately funded sheltered workshops targeted at people with disabilities.   
 
In the mid-1990s the Government began to restructure the delivery system and 
increased activation requirements on the unemployed and other working age 
claimants. There was dissatisfaction concerning the role of the tripartite governance 
system and the low effectiveness of programmes delivered through the PES. In 1996 
the Ministry created a split between purchaser and provider by giving insurance 
funds and municipalities control of budgets for reintegration services. Initially the new 
purchasers were obliged to procure 80% of their reintegration services from the PES. 
At the same time the PES was obliged to establish a transparent internal division 
responsible for delivering and tendering for programmes. New private operators had 
already started to deliver some programmes and the 20% flexibility led to further 
growth in this new market. Some municipalities restructured their own delivery 
agencies, often involving the formation of separate non-profit entities, and continued 
to award these bodies delivery contracts on a preferential basis (Sol and 
Hoogtanders, 2005). 
 
The emergence of a growing sector of PE&TWAs in the regular market and the 
relative flexibility and success of private reintegration providers was contrasted with 
the expense, inflexibility and poorer results of the PES (Vink, 2002). Political 
pressure increased as purchasers sought more freedom and as private providers 
complained about unfair competition. Within two years the obligation on insurance 
funds and municipalities to purchase 80% of services from the PES was removed. 
This resulted in ‘a painful loss of market share’ for the PES division which delivered 
reintegration programmes (Sol, 2003, p. 208). 
 
There was parallel reform in the main PES delivery division that was responsible for 
registration, job matching and referral, delivered through a national network of front 
line offices. The objective was to reduce fragmentation and to create a 'one counter 
system' comprised of a national network of some 130 ‘Centres for Work and Income’ 
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(CWI). These employment-focused offices acted as the claimant’s first point of 
contact and front line case workers, who emphasised job search obligations, 
undertook initial registration, profiling and job matching. In its gatekeeper capacity, 
CWI advisers profiled claimants and then referred those at risk of long term 
unemployment to the UWV if they were entitled to unemployment benefit or disability 
insurance, or to municipalities if entitled to social assistance. Claimants classified at 
low risk of unemployment received only basic CWI job matching services (Tergeist 
and Grubb, 2006). 
 
Welfare reform efforts intensified after the late 1990s with successive changes in 
disability benefit entitlements and assessments, and activation reforms targeted at 
the unemployed and those claiming social assistance. There was also major 
institutional change culminating in the ‘SUWI’ (Implementation Structure for Work 
and Income) Act (2001). This divides the Dutch labour market into 35 regions and 
requires that the PES and municipalities work together with other key stakeholders, 
including PE&TWAs and training and education organisations. 
 
The SUWI legislation marginalised the role of the social partners and created two 
new ‘autonomous administrative bodies’ which, with the municipalities, were to 
comprise the ‘chain of work and income’. The ‘Central Organisation for Work and 
Income’ was made responsible for CWI’s. The UWV was made responsible for the 
administrative functions of the previously separate social insurance agencies 
including assessing benefit eligibility, implementing sanctions and managing 
reintegration budgets. Both organisations were controlled by separate Boards of 
Directors appointed by the Minister. The Ministry retained a supervisory role, in 
particular through its ‘Work and Income Inspectorate’14, and through performance 
agreements and targets that it negotiated with the two new bodies. 
 
The SUWI legislation required the UWV to contract out placement and reintegration 
measures for most types of clients. Municipalities were required also to introduce 
open tendering procedures and contract out up to 70% of their reintegration services 
(but this requirement was dropped in 2006). The central Ministry, the SZW, did not 
act as a purchaser. Its aim was to give the market ‘as much freedom as possible’ 
and keep government intervention ‘to a minimum’ (SZW, 2005, p. 54).  
 
Whilst central Government adopted a ‘hands off’ approach to market development 
there were concerns about the absence of information that could inform purchasers 
and users about the quality and performance of providers. In the absence of a public 
benchmark an association of reintegration providers, Borea, which was formed in 
2000, developed its own ‘quality mark’ for its affiliated companies. The quality 
benchmark was launched in 2002. It was comprised of 13 performance indicators 
related to efficiency and speed in organising services; results; staff competences and 
development; customer satisfaction; privacy and complaint handling. The results 
were independently audited for each company twice a year. Any company failing on 
an indicator had to put an improvement plan in place and a second failure resulted in 
                                                     
14
 In 2012 the three different inspectorates that the Ministry was responsible for were integrated. The 
‘Inspectorate SZW’ now combines the activities of the Work and Income Inspectorate with those of 
the Labour Inspectorate (which regulated working conditions) and the ‘Social Intelligence and 
Investigation Service’ (which was responsible for investigating more serious fraudulent and criminal 
employment practices).  
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withdrawal of the quality mark. The quality mark became influential in contract 
awarding processes but was not officially endorsed.15  
 
3.3 The UWV Reintegration Market – Tenders and Block Contracts 
 
Over a ten year period the UWV, the largest sole purchaser of employment services, 
successively adapted its tender system These changes sought to improve the 
efficiency of contracted provision, personalise support and target intensive services 
at harder to help participants. After expansion following the SUWI legislation, 
however, the tendered reintegration market diminished and the number of newly 
assigned participants in contracted trajectories fell from about 105,000 in 2002 to 
about 67,000 in 2003, falling further to 23,000 in 2005 (Koning and Heinreich, 2010, 
p. 12). 
 
Between 2002 and 2008 the UWV organised some sixteen national ‘tender rounds’ 
to select providers to deliver block contracts for different groups of claimants. Tender 
selection was undertaken by regional officials.  
 
The initial tendering system involved relatively small block contracts designed to 
tackle the barriers of particular groups of unemployed and disabled people with 
prices and outcome payment terms differentiated according to distance from the 
labour market. These ‘no cure, less pay’ contracts typically paid between10% and 
20% of the price on completion of an agreed action plan, a fixed payment of about 
40% six months after commencement and another 40% or 50% after placement in a 
job for two months, with a minimum six month employment contract (Sol, 2008, p. 
77).  
 
Early tender rounds saw the price of trajectories increase, from an estimated €3,500 
in 1998 to €4,700 in 2003 (Struyven and Steurs, 2005, p. 220). The tender process 
also involved high transaction costs for both the UWV and providers, and problems 
were experienced in producing and assessing high numbers of submitted tenders in 
short periods (Sol, 2003). Subsequent changes in UWV purchasing sought to reduce 
administrative burdens, create more stability and increase the emphasis on 
Payment-by-Results (PbR). The share of ‘no cure, no pay’ contracts increased from 
close to zero in 2002 to more than half of the contracts let in 2005 (Koning and 
Heinreich, 2010, p.13).  
 
A renewed emphasis on price competition ensured a reduction in the average cost 
per UWV contracted trajectory which fell to between €2,800 and €3,500 by 2007 
(Finn, 2008, p.33).  Providers and others argued that the fall in prices and increased 
emphasis on outcome payments had a negative impact on the quality of trajectories 
as providers removed costly service elements (de Koning, 2007). There was also 
                                                     
15
 In 2007 Borea, had 150 member companies responsible for delivering more than half of the 
reintegration market. In 2012 the organisation merged with a network of health related providers to 
form ‘Oval’ (www.oval.nl). The quality assurance work undertaken by Borea is now undertaken by the 
‘Blikj op Werk’ Foundation. This was initially set up with Government funding but is now self-financing. 
The Foundation exists to identify and spread best practice in employment and sickness management. 
It undertakes independent and formal licensing of employers and providers in relation to how their 
work practices score on an index of employability – see www.ifa-fiv.org/wp.../03/7-Elkerliek-Hospital-
Work-Ability-Index.pdf  
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consolidation and the market was comprised of a smaller number of providers, which 
enjoyed scale efficiencies and were able to absorb the risks and transaction costs 
involved in procurement and delivery. By 2006, only 47 organisations had tender-
based contracts with the UWV, with ten providers responsible for delivering 75% of 
the market.  
 
In 2006 the ‘Work and Income Employment Capacity’ Act also radically reshaped 
and reduced the reintegration role of the UWV because of the extension of employer 
responsibility for sick and disabled workers. Since 2006 employers have been 
obliged to pay the wages of any sick or disabled employees for two years and are 
responsible for the reintegration of such employees within their company or in other 
employment. If the UWV finds that the employer has failed to discharge their 
reintegration responsibility the employer may be required to continue paying the 
employee’s salary for a further year. One consequence of the legislation was to 
simultaneously reduce the size of the UWV market and stimulate a private market for 
reintegration services, purchased directly by employers or the private insurance 
companies with whom they work.  
 
3.4 Individual Reintegration Agreements and the UWV Procurement 
Framework 
 
A further development involved ‘Individual Reintegration Agreements’ (IROs). These 
individual budgets were introduced following criticisms of UWV provision, which 
highlighted the lack of user involvement in choosing services, inflexible and 
standardised contracted provision, ‘group reintegration’ and poor quality of support 
provided by front line staff. In 2005, the UWV also introduced its own front line work 
coaches to improve service delivery and to better tailor support to individual client 
needs. 
 
IROs were modelled on individual social care budgets and piloted between 1998 and 
2001. They gave claimants a role in deciding the services they received and the 
provider who would deliver it. An evaluation found greater customisation and a 
higher job entry rate than for those using regular services. Eligibility for the IRO was 
initially restricted to those on disability benefits but was opened up to people 
receiving UB. IROs proved very popular, both with clients and with work coaches, 
and by 2007 around two-thirds of the UWV’s clients were using IROs.  
 
An IRO trajectory could last for up to two years and the original maximum price was 
€5,000 (subsequently reduced to €4,000). For users with more significant barriers 
the price could be up to €7,500 (subsequently reduced to €5,000). The contract had 
a ‘no cure, less pay’ funding formula with the provider paid 20% at the start of an 
agreed plan, 30% after six months participation with 50% of the agreed fee payable 
for sustained employment. For those considered ‘very hard to help’, 80% of the 
funding was paid upfront and 20% on results. The average reported price per IRO 
trajectory in 2007 was €4,500, but only half this cost was incurred should the 
participant fail to get employment. In September 2009, a bonus system was added, 
with payments of €1,000 or €1,500 incentivizing providers to get clients into work 
within six months, or to keep clients in work for twelve months (Acevo, 2009). 
 
31 
 
The introduction of the IRO and the flexibility over choice of provider led to an influx 
of many smaller providers, and the number of contractors that the UWV dealt with 
increased rapidly from less than 100 in 2003 to 1,960 by late 2007. About 1,700 of 
these contractors delivered IROs only and some 1,500 were ‘one person-providers’ 
who might service only 10 or 15 participants. Provider registration requirements were 
minimal.  
 
In 2008, the final Government evaluation suggested that, compared with block-
contracted reintegration services, IROs were more likely to result in a job, more likely 
to result in sustainable jobs, and resulted in higher client satisfaction. They were, 
however, more expensive and entailed a lengthier period of support before job 
placement. The IROs were most cost effective for people on disability benefits (in 
crude terms of spending on employment services per job outcome) and least 
effective for disabled jobseekers (Acevo, 2009).  
 
Concern about the quality, costs and effectiveness of both IROs and contracted out 
reintegration trajectories led to a major overhaul of the UWV contracting system. A 
more targeted, nationally determined framework agreement was introduced in 2008 
(Sol, 2008). Under the framework agreement providers had to meet specified 
process and performance requirements to be placed on a UWV ‘approved list’. The 
UWV selected a smaller number of providers in each region whose bids offered to 
provide either complete trajectories, in the form of IROs, and/or specified framework 
services. These services comprised varied types of provision most of which were 
delivered for a fixed price, with only job search and placement being funded on a 
PbR basis. This enabled UWV work coaches to purchase smaller ‘modules’ of 
support personalised according to the needs of their clients. After major budget 
reductions the IRO was subsequently withdrawn and the most recent UWV 
framework agreement specifies the delivery of only two types of services (one 
specifically targeted at getting people fit for work, the other targeted at job search 
and placement). 
 
3.5 Municipal Delivery of Reintegration Services 
 
The municipalities, of which there are over 400, deliver social assistance and 
reintegration services through ‘work and income’ sections in either their own Social 
Services Departments or through those of neighbouring larger councils. 
Municipalities work more or less closely with the UWV and typically municipal case 
workers check eligibility and assess employability and channel eligible participants 
into employment assistance. This assistance is either provided in-house or 
outsourced. Municipalities deliver a wide range of other services which complement 
their local reintegration strategies.  
 
During the 1990s municipalities increased the number of reintegration trajectories 
they purchased, especially after the transfer of PES funds, but the major part of their 
employment assistance budgets were absorbed by relatively high cost public and 
voluntary sector subsidised jobs for the most disadvantaged. Some of the employees 
in these subsidised jobs enjoyed permanent contracts. There were few incentives 
either for participants or providers to use subsidised jobs as a transition to regular 
employment. Municipalities have been responsible also for separately funded 
sheltered workshops organised for priority groups on different disability benefits. In 
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2002 it was estimated that there were 80,000 subsidised jobs and 90,000 people 
with disabilities employed in workshops, costing some €3 billion annually (Vink, 
2002, p.5). From the mid-1990s the municipalities also introduced less costly ‘social 
activation’ or workfare programmes for the hardest to help aimed at promoting 
inclusion through various forms of unpaid community work (van Berkel, 2006).16  
 
Following implementation of the SUWI legislation municipalities enjoyed 
considerable freedom in designing their procurement strategies and, whilst 
influenced by UWV developments, followed no common framework for contracting 
out services. Each developed their own tender process, procedures and contract 
requirements (Vink, 2003). Some purchased whole trajectories; others simply 
purchased individual service elements. There was a trend to performance-related 
contracting. In 2004, it was reported that over 70% of the municipalities had 
introduced some element of ‘no cure, less pay’ contracting. Only 7% of 
municipalities, however, made use of full ‘no cure, no pay’ contracts (SZW, 2005, p. 
47).  
 
The diversity of municipal delivery systems reflected local political preferences, 
labour market conditions and the characteristics of the resident social assistance 
recipients (Corra, 2014). Municipalities varied greatly in their administrative capacity 
to design tenders, assess bids, and monitor delivery. Many took a highly cautious 
and prescriptive approach and both they and the reintegration companies 
complained of the high transactions costs involved. An official evaluation of SUWI 
found that in some circumstances the bureaucratic character of the process and the 
unrealistic, sometimes unreasonable, expectations of municipalities were 
‘obstructing’ market forces (SZW, 2005, p. 57).  
 
After welfare to work funding was devolved (see below) the municipalities were 
successful in persuading the Government to remove the requirement that they 
contract out 70% of reintegration services. Since 2006 they have been able to decide 
which parts of their local provision they wish ‘to make or buy’ either through in-house 
provision or through contracts with external providers. Reports from scrutiny bodies 
indicate that many municipalities brought case management and initial assessment 
back in-house and that they have tended to contract out the delivery of specific 
services, such as job placement, rather than whole reintegration trajectories (Corra, 
2014). The municipalities continued also to be responsible for delivering sheltered 
workshops for the most disabled claimants which were funded by a separate budget 
authorised by specific legislation. In 2008 it was reported that municipalities spent 
about a third of their reintegration budgets on employer subsidies; a quarter on job 
search guidance; a further quarter on subsidised employment; and the remainder on 
education and other services (Faber and Koning, 2011). 
 
A study of municipal subcontracting practices in 2007 and 2008 reported that in both 
those years local councils spent about three quarters of their activation budgets with 
private providers, with an average nominal spend per client of €4,000 - there were 
significant variations in this nominal amount and there was under-spending in the 
more generous districts. The data for 2008 indicated that about 22% of the overall 
                                                     
16
 The recent Participation Act (2015) continues to allow municipalities to require claimants to 
undertake unpaid community work but there remains much variation in who is subject to the 
requirement and the activity they ate required to undertake (Slotboom and Blommesteijn, 2015) 
33 
 
budget was spent with for-profits, whilst 50% was spent with non-profits. It was 
significant that the non-profit providers had lengthier contracts and that many ‘had 
strong ties to the social assistance desks’ and had often been ‘part of the 
municipality services in the past’ (Koning, 2009, p. 8).  
 
3.6 Welfare to Work Devolution, Municipal Activation Strategies and 
the Participation Act (2015) 
 
The evolution of the municipal market overlapped with the devolution of central 
funding for welfare to work programmes and the introduction of a ‘block grant’. Until 
2001 central government reimbursed 90% of municipal social assistance expenditure 
and at this point activation programmes were targeted at centrally determined priority 
groups. In 2001 the proportion of social assistance funding reimbursed by the 
Ministry was reduced to 75% in order to increase the incentive for municipalities to 
place people in employment. This incentive was sharpened further in 2004 with the 
introduction of block grant funding by the ‘Work and Income Act’. The legislation 
required municipalities to provide social assistance to poor people but gave them 
great freedom in service design and delivery. It also stipulated that employable 
welfare claimants are under an obligation to register with the UWV, cooperate with 
reintegration services and to seek ‘generally acceptable’ rather than the previous 
‘suitable’ employment. The system was designed to put ‘work before income’. 
 
The municipal Work and Income Fund has two components. The ‘income fund’ pays 
for means tested assistance and is determined on the basis of economic and social 
indicators (see Figure 4). A separate flexible ‘work fund’ is designed to pay for 
reintegration services and can be used only to pay for such services. If there is a 
surplus in the work fund a proportion may be carried over into the following year but 
any unspent surplus is returned to the Ministry. In contrast, if the municipality pays 
less than it is allocated in the income fund it can use the surplus as it sees fit. The 
risk is that if it overspends on social assistance benefits it has to subsidise these 
payments from its own resources. The municipality thus has an incentive to reduce 
the number of people claiming social assistance but must do so in the context of 
national eligibility rules and welfare benefit levels that are uniform throughout the 
country. Municipal strategies have since focused more sharply on rigorous testing of 
eligibility, fraud reduction strategies, and the introduction of ‘work first’ and ‘workfare’ 
activation programmes (Blommesteijn et al, 2012).  
 
In 2009 there was further devolution and the municipal budget for reintegration 
services was aligned with separate budgets for adult education and civic integration 
into a ‘participation budget’. This move gave municipalities the freedom to decide 
how the participation budget could be spent, but it appears few made significant 
changes in how they distributed the respective budgets (Dorenbos and Froy, 2011, 
p. 16). 
 
 
Figure 4: The Netherlands ‘Block Grant’ for Social Assistance 
 
In the Netherlands, the national budget available for welfare block grants is 
calculated annually on the basis of independent forecasts of eligible individuals. 
Forecasts are based on the number of existing welfare beneficiaries, unemployment 
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trends, and legislative changes that might affect caseload volumes. The macro 
budget is allocated between municipalities according to a regression formula which 
reflects size of municipality and demographic and labour market characteristics, with 
some variation for smaller municipalities (for whom reliable data is not available, so 
previous expenditure level is also used). The formula is updated annually. As the 
allocation is not legally designed to reimburse actual social assistance expenditure, 
municipalities are free to retain any surplus, but strict rules ensure they meet over-
spending from their own resources and they can return to the Ministry for additional 
funding only in exceptional circumstances.  
 
Local strategies, performance measures and targets are set by municipal boards 
which oversee and agree plans for their Social Services Departments. These annual 
plans have to be approved by the municipal council (Dorenbos and Froy, 2011, 
p.17). Although there are few national guidelines policy development and best 
practice is facilitated by the national Ministry (through ‘Implementation Days’ 
organised through a ‘Programme Council’) and promoted through a number of other 
channels, especially through ‘Divosa’, the national organisation of the managers 
responsible for municipal work and income services.17  
 
By 2008 the number of working age welfare beneficiaries was 40% lower than in 
1998 (EJML, 2011). The 2004 block grant and earlier financial devolution was 
estimated to have directly resulted in an 8% reduction in the number of welfare 
recipients by 2008 (van Es, 2010). The cause of this specific impact was attributed to 
tighter eligibility testing and increased off-flows. The cumulative impact of legislative 
and service delivery reforms had also engendered a significant ‘cultural change’ in 
local government with staff now working ‘in a more result-oriented manner’ and more 
focused on preventing fraud and on assisting applicants to enter employment 
(Davidse and Kraan, 2008, p. 9). 
 
In one assessment researchers suggest that despite some problems the Dutch 
funding formula, when combined with a strong cultural commitment to equal access, 
ensured that the system has reaped ‘the benefits of decentralisation while at the 
same time ensuring a high degree of similarity in service standards across the 
country’ (Allers, 2011, p.8). Other analysts warn, however, that while block grant 
funding systems may yield efficiency gains and promote early intervention they also 
risk ‘under provision’, especially as such devolutions are often accompanied by 
significant cuts in the prior levels of central government expenditure (Vermeulen, 
2015). For example, whilst municipalities have increased activation for the flow of 
new claimants many have little provision for long term claimants or for the large 
numbers of people who are exempted from job search requirements on ‘social 
grounds’ (Slotboom and Blommesteijn, 2015). 
 
Another unintended consequence of devolution was a ‘spill over’ effect with a 
marked increase in the number of young people claiming a centrally funded UWV 
benefit (the ‘Wajong’) targeted at those whose disability started before they entered 
the labour market (that is, before the age of 18 years or during their studies until the 
                                                     
17
 A professional association of front line activation staff was also created in 2012 with the aim of 
stimulating the development and implementation of common professional competences and 
standards (Slotboom and Blommesteijn, 2015, p.13). 
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age of 30). The inflow into this benefit more than doubled between 2000 and 2008 
and the evidence suggests that over a third of this increase was the result of 
diversion from municipal social assistance (Roelofs and van Vuuren, 2011). In 2012, 
a claimant population of 190,000 Wajong recipients was added to by a further 36,900 
new claimants, together accounting for about 3% of the working age population 
(OECD, 2014b, p. 107).   
 
This spillover effect was one factor contributing to a further radical devolution reform 
that took effect in January 2015. The ‘Participation Act’ has devolved a combination 
of youth and social care budgets thereby extending the responsibilities of 
municipalities to cover a much larger group of people, all of whom face severe 
barriers to employment. Existing Wajong claimants remain with the UWV but young 
people with some work capacity (about 60% of those previously claiming the Wajong 
benefit) are now only eligible for social assistance. Local councils are now allocated 
a single budget and have greater freedom to determine who gets support and help 
with reintegration.The assumption is that municipalities will be able to secure 
efficiencies and are better placed to deliver integrated services to these clients 
helping them to increase their self sufficiency. 
 
This devolution is linked also with an agreement between the Government and the 
social partners who have committed to create 125,000 extra jobs for people with 
disabilities by 2026 (100,000 in the private sector and 25,000 in the public sector). 
This commitment is reinforced through a 5% employment quota for employers with 
over 35 employees which the Government will evaluate in 2016, with penalties likely 
for non-compliant employers (OECD, 2014b, p. 114).18  There are reports that 
private sector agencies, such as Randstaad, who already provide placement 
services for municipalities are using the new opportunities created by the 
Participation Act to extend their intermediation services (in the municipality of 
Drechsteden, for example, Randstaad has a PbR agreement to place a specific 
number of claimants in employment that lasts for at least six months).  
 
The extension of municipal responsibilities has accentuated a recent increase in 
welfare caseloads that has coincided with a reduction in the funding available for 
reintegration services. The number of social assistance recipients increased by 30% 
between 2008 and 2012 and went on to reach 435,000 at the end of 2014 (Bekker 
and Wilthagen, 2015). Over the same period the former participation budget more 
than halved between 2010 and 2013 (see Figure 5) and the new devolution included 
a major reduction in previous budget levels (Vermeulen, 2015, p.4). 
 
Although there are precise central rules concerning benefit eligibility there are no 
minimum standards concerning employment assistance (Vermeulen, 2015). The 
Participation Act obliges municipalities to draw up reintegration plans for all 
unemployed young people aged 18 to 27 years, and for employable welfare 
beneficiaries over 27 years, but it does not mandate what, if any support should be in 
place for them. There is scepticism also concerning the quality of support that many 
municipal clients will receive. Recent reviews find that municipalities have continued 
to reduce outsourcing and cut spending on wage subsidies and subsidised 
                                                     
18
 The Government will formally evaluate progress in 2015 and has made clear that if necessary it will 
introduce mandatory employment quotas on employers. 
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employment, and further focused support on lower cost interventions, such as job 
matching, coaching, and short courses (OECD, 2014b; Bekker and Wilthagen, 
2015).   
 
 
Figure 5: Reintegration Budgets of Dutch Municipalities and PES in € millions 
2009-2012 (Municipalities, Blue; UWV, Red) 
 
 
Source: Bekker and Wilthagen, 2013, Figure 1. 
 
3.7 Coordination of the Work and Income Delivery System and the 
Impact of Public Expenditure Cuts on UWV Employment Services 
 
In 2002 the Central Organisation for Work and Income took over the PES local office 
network and was responsible for some 130 local CWIs as well as the management 
and coordination of registration, referrals and job broking services. Further 
organisational change was announced towards the end of 2007 and in 2009 the 
independent status of the CWI ended and its services were merged with those of the 
UWV into the WERKbedrijf division. This division is responsible for the delivery of 
front line employment services and its performance is assessed in relation to benefit 
off-flows and satisfaction levels amongst job seekers and employers.  
 
The SUWI legislation requires the UWV and municipalities to cooperate in promoting 
the reintegration of service users and to use a common IT system (called Suwi-net). 
After implementation this led to changes designed to facilitate closer front line 
working arrangements. The most significant reform involved the co-location and the 
coordination of  service delivery for claimants and employers in a national network of 
one-stop ‘Employment Squares’ (Werkplein), of which there were 127 in 2010. 
These shared locations included the UWV and municipality alongside a range of 
other agencies which could include other municipal services, welfare organisations, 
reintegration companies, private employment agencies and TWAs (Dorenbos and 
Froy, 2011). 
 
In practice, a diverse range of local delivery systems emerged, ranging from loosely 
coordinated services to more integrated offices, each of which had locally negotiated 
service level agreements. In the most integrated locations the ‘Employment Square’ 
was co-managed by the local UWV and Social Services Directors who agreed local 
joint targets that were cascaded to co-located UWV work coaches and municipal 
case managers. Coordination of service delivery was, however, hampered by the 
different work cultures of UWV and municipal staff and by the vertical accountability 
and funding rules of the agencies involved (Dorenbos and Froy, 2011). Cooperation 
has since been further hampered by budget cuts and by the withdrawal of UWV from 
many front line locations (Slotboom and Blommesteijn, 2015). 
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After a short term expansion in funding for UWV (and municipal) employment 
services during and in the immediate period after the 2008 recession, the Dutch 
Government introduced a severe austerity programme. This resulted in reductions in 
municipal reintegration budgets but had a more severe impact on the UWV (see 
Figure 5). In the period 2011-15 the UWV budget was halved and the number of staff 
reduced accordingly.19 Allocations for reintegration services for the unemployed were 
virtually eliminated with the remaining resources now largely targeted at those on 
disability benefits (Oosi, 2014). These changes prompted a radical change in UWV 
strategy involving a transition to largely online service delivery with in-person 
services restricted to 35 co-located ‘Locations for Work and Income’. There is little 
information on the types of cooperation that now exist between the UWV and 
municipalities but one review suggests ‘it is safe to say that cooperation is not 
widespread’ (Slotboom and Blommesteijn, 2015, p.12).  
 
3.8 Online Delivery of UWV Employment Services 
 
The imposition of budget cuts shaped and accelerated the implementation of the 
UWV’s core online service delivery strategy. The organisation now aims to ensure 
that 90% of its interactions with insurance benefit claimants will be through digital 
channels. There has been a three phase transition during which more services have 
been changed over to an electronic format culminating in 2015 in nearly all 
interactions and transactions being online. In-person UWV services are now 
available only in 35 regional ‘Locations for Work and Income’ (Slotboom and 
Blommesteijn, 2015).  
 
Unemployed people must register for work and submit benefit claims online through 
the UWV’s werk.nl website where claimants must also submit their CVs and where 
employers can also advertise vacancies. Claimants must develop and agree an 
individual action plan (if necessary with the remote support of an adviser, known as 
an ‘e-coach’). The claimant’s online account, or e-workbook (werkm@p) is the main 
platform for interaction with the UWV, with an interface to a ‘back office’ system 
which enables work coaches to monitor the job search actions taken by the claimant 
and indicate which claimants they should contact and when. If there is no activity 
recorded in the e-workbook or required tasks, including job search, have not been 
undertaken the UWV coach will conduct a personal interview with the claimant. 
Continued non-compliance may lead to sanctions. Sanctions are not automated and 
are always reviewed by coaches, who use a client’s digital history to gather evidence 
and to support any sanction decision. 
 
Work coaches can access clients’ online accounts to review their job-search 
activities and CVs. A ‘CV quality card’ helps coaches to improve the quality of a 
jobseeker’s CV and thus their chance of returning to work. The quality card is an 
automated report using data-mining and compares a job seekers CV and job search 
activities with other job seekers with similar characteristics. Coaches use this 
information during personal counselling interviews to advise jobseekers on job-
                                                     
19
 In 2014 it was reported that the number of people working for the UWV had fallen by 8,000 over the 
previous ten years and, at that point, the agency had 19,200 employees, with more than half of them 
on part time contracts (Oosi, 2014, p.71).  
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search (e.g. occupations, geographical area) and on how to present their experience 
in their CV (OECD, 2015, Box 3.14). 
 
A new online profiling instrument, called the ‘Work Explorer’, assesses factors that 
are predictive of likelihood of work resumption within twelve months (Loxha and 
Morgandi, 2014).20. The questionnaire results identify which barriers need to be 
addressed and helps tailor online or in-person services to be targeted at the 
individual claimant.  
 
Only online services are available in the first three months of unemployment but 
claimants can be required to attend job search workshops, job fairs and other 
events. U B claimants must register with a PE&TWA during their first three months of 
unemployment and unless they have good cause they can be sanctioned for not 
accepting PE&TWA job offers. Since 2011 all recently unemployed people have also 
been invited to UWV centres to participate in ‘speed-dating’ where they meet with 
employers and representatives of different PE&TWAs who may seek to place them 
in vacancies including TWA work. These events can be targeted at particular sectors 
or client groups and may be open to social assistance claimants. Another specific 
initiative concerns a range of activation services for the over 50s which includes 
training vouchers and subsidies. It also includes the payment of fees to agencies that 
are able to place these older UB claimants (an initial fee is paid after three months 
employment with further payments for retention at six months and a year). In the 
Netherlands it is now private agencies that are most likely to give in-person 
employment support to the newly unemployed (van Liemt, 2013, p.4).  
 
Personal face-to-face or telephone interviews take place with the UWV in the 4th, 7th 
and 10th month of unemployment, but only the 10% most disadvantaged claimants 
are given more in-person interventions, such as in-depth work assessments and 
individual and group coaching (OECD, 2015, Box 3.14). After twelve months the 
remaining UWV claimants still eligible for UB must accept ‘any job’ and may have 
access to extra advice and support, including employer subsidies (Slotboom and 
Blommesteijn, 2015). Service users who cannot use online services, even with 
support, can access support at UWV regional centres. Municipal welfare claimants 
are required to register with the UWV but they can only access more intensive 
individualised services through the municipality. 
 
There is little information yet available on the impact of these service delivery 
changes although the reported satisfaction levels of claimants and employers have 
increased as the functionality of the system has improved (UWV WERKbedrijf, 
2011).  
 
3.9 The PES and Private Employment and Temporary Work 
Agencies  
 
In the Netherlands cooperation between the PES and PE&TWAs commenced in the 
1980s and private agencies are now embedded in the service delivery system where 
                                                     
20
 The ‘hard’ factors include age, job tenure and knowledge of the Dutch language. ‘Soft’ factors 
include client view of their prospects of a return to work, health perception, active job search behavior 
and physical and psychological work capacity. 
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they act both as labour market intermediaries and as contracted providers. TWA 
employment is also seen as a worthwhile outcome for many of the unemployed, both 
as a source of paid employment and as a route into more regular jobs. By 2008 
some 60% of the unemployed reported searching for work both through and with 
private agencies, and about a third of unemployed people registered with the PES 
who entered employment did so via agency jobs (EJML, 2011). 
 
Initially, PES policy makers were sceptical about TWAs but changed their approach 
as the sector expanded and as unemployed jobseekers started seeking employment 
through TWAs. The first PES strategy involved using the temporary agency formula 
to produce better results for unemployed claimants. The PES sponsored its own 
TWA, called ‘START’, in the late 1970s. By the 1990s the agency was the second 
largest TWA in the Netherlands. START was managed as a non-profit enterprise. Its 
main aim was to place disadvantaged jobseekers into temporary jobs. START was 
eventually privatised but the experience of working with TWAs gave the PES 
operational knowledge of their working methods and prepared the ground for a more 
cooperative relationship between the sectors (EJML, 2011).  
 
After the 2002 SUWI reforms the PES share of vacancies declined and the CWI 
sought to increase its market share. One element of the strategy involved using 
European funding to work with private agencies. Under this programme the agencies 
were paid a subsidy for registering vacancies with the PES system and mediating 
actively between CWI-registered clients and those vacancies. After 2002 UWV and 
municipal services for more disadvantaged jobseekers were outsourced, creating the 
reintegration market described earlier. This market attracted some PE&TWAs, who 
set up minor divisions to become contracted providers, but most of the for-profit and 
non-profit contractors involved have been specialist reintegration companies.  
 
The UWV now perceives PE&TWA vacancies as part of the regular labour market 
and ‘speed-dating’ and registration with private agencies is a central element of the 
new PES delivery system. Private agencies routinely publish their vacancies on the 
UWV internet portal where jobseekers may be automatically matched and agencies 
can search for suitable candidates. In 2013 it was estimated that around 70% of the 
vacancies on werk.nl had been placed by agencies. These included TWA 
employment as well as more regular vacancies being filled by private agencies. 
 
The current relationship between PE&TWAs and the UWV is underpinned by a 
formal cooperation agreement, the so-called ‘Flex service point’. This provides a 
collective forum which is serviced by a two-person team in the UWV head office (one 
with a UWV and one with a private agency background). The team facilitates 
collaboration between the sectors and is tasked with identifying trends, opportunities 
and problems that need action or discussion and with organising regular meetings 
between the partners. Co-financing for the service desk is provided by the UWV and 
by both the national federations and by six of the largest TWAs (van Liemt, 2013).  
 
3.10 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in the 
Netherlands 
 
PE&TWAs have a combined role both as placement intermediaries and as 
employers of temporary workers who are placed on assignments with user 
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companies. The combined sector accounts annually for over a quarter of all job 
starts and it is estimated that in 2013 since 15,000 TWAs entered employment 
contracts with about 700,000 people (albeit some of these individuals were recruited 
to more than one job during the year). Over the course of the economic cycle 
between 2% and 4% of the labour force is employed in TWA jobs (EJML, 2011).  
 
There is a high degree of self regulation in the Netherlands and primary legislation 
concerning the rights of TWA workers allows the social partners to vary conditions 
through collective agreements. The most significant agreements are negotiated by 
two federations representing private agencies. The ‘Dutch Federation of Private 
Employment Agencies’ (Algemene Bond Uitzendondernemingen, or ABU) was 
founded by six agencies in 1961. The ‘Dutch Association of Temporary Work and 
Placement Agencies’  (Nederlandse Bond van Bemiddelings- en 
Uitzendondernemingen, or NBBU) was created in 1994, has more members (895) 
than ABU (500), but a smaller market share (25% against 65% for ABU) (van Liemt, 
2013). NBBU members are small and medium sized agencies while ABU is seen to 
represent the larger national and international agencies. A third ‘Continuflex’ 
agreement has been negotiated by a smaller organisation but is little used (IDEA, 
2015, p.104).  
 
The two main federations have worked collaboratively with the Ministry over a long 
period and have helped establish legislative and governance arrangements that seek 
to promote high standards in recruitment and temporary work activities. There has, 
however, been concern about how some smaller agencies operate particularly in 
high risk sectors prone to exploitative and illegal working practices. As in the other 
case study countries these concerns became more intense following the expansion 
of the EU and the role that a growing number of legal and illegal agencies have 
played in exploiting vulnerable workers, many of them from Eastern Europe 
(Renooy, 2013). 
 
3.10.1 The Regulation of Recruitment and Temporary Work Agencies 
 
The growth of the TWA sector started at a comparatively early stage in the 
Netherlands. Pre-war legislation from 1930 had prohibited for-profit employment 
services but was replaced by a licensing system in 1972. In the 1980s and 1990s the 
reputation of TWAs improved and their role expanded in a context where policy 
makers sought to develop a less regulated and more flexible labour market. These 
parallel developments were fostered through two important legislative changes.  
 
The Flexibility and Security Act (1999), or the ‘Flexwet’, has been the cornerstone of 
the Dutch approach to flexicurity and was passed only after much negotiation with 
the social partners. The provisions on temporary employment aimed to provide both 
the flexibility that most employers and some workers want balanced by longer term 
employment security for established workers. The law led to a ‘3x3x3’ rule which set 
the pattern of assignments after which temporary workers would be given full 
employment security. In effect an open-ended contract existed after three years or 
three consecutive contracts unless there was an interruption of more than three 
months. The regulations also contained what was called the ‘agency clause’ which 
allowed (in practice) most agency workers to be employed indefinitely on short term 
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contracts (with only some 5% of TWA workers employed on permanent contracts in 
2015). 
 
The ‘Labour Market Intermediaries Act’ (WAADI) (1998) abolished the 1972 licensing 
requirement and other restrictions, such as a ban on agency work in the construction 
sector, but maintained many basic protections derived in part from ILO Conventions. 
This included the prohibition on charging job seekers fees for placements and the 
ban on the use of TWA staff to replace other workers involved in strikes. The 
legislation continued the dual responsibility and liability of agencies and user 
companies for the payment of taxes and social insurance contributions (Arrowsmith, 
2006). This dual responsibility continues to operate and applies also to other aspects 
of national legislation concerning basic employment rights, such as health and safety 
at work and being paid correctly, including observance of the minimum wage. The 
agency and employer also have a dual responsibility to verify immigration status and 
ensure that TWA workers have a legal right to work in the Netherlands (ELCJ, 2013). 
 
This WAADI legislation was revised in 2012. The latest provisions include the 
principle that from day one TWA workers should be paid the same wages and 
allowances as other workers, but allowed for this to be varied where there was a 
collective agreement (this meets the equal treatment principle in the EU Directive). 
The legislation also gives the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment the power to 
declare the provisions established in a collective labour agreement as generally 
binding throughout the sector (which currently applies to the ABU agreement for 
2012-17: Renooy, 2013, p. 15 – see below). 
 
The 2012 legislation reinforced the requirement for Dutch agencies, and other 
agencies operating in the Netherlands, to register with the national Chamber of 
Commerce (Renooy, 2013). This requirement was introduced following concern 
about the role played by unregulated temporary agencies that had facilitated a large 
influx of migrant workers following EU expansion. Fines for lack of or incomplete 
registration are high: from €12,000 per employee for the first offence to €36,000 per 
employee for a third offence. User companies of non-registered agencies also risk a 
fine. It was reported that 19,000 TWA agencies had registered by September 2012 
(Renooy, 2013).  
 
The TWA federations play an important role in self-regulation and, with the support 
of the social partners, seek to ensure that the provisions of TWA collective 
agreements are observed. Self-regulation includes certification by the ‘Foundation 
for Labour Standards’ (SNA) which indicates that the TWA pays tax and at least the 
minimum wage. The quality mark is based on the Dutch Standardisation Agency 
‘NEN 4400-1’ standard. It was instituted by the TWA sector and the trade unions and 
its use can protect user companies and subcontractors against costly claims.21 Upon 
joining, ABU-affiliated companies must be SNA-certified. NBBU-affiliated agencies 
are given six months to become SNA-certified. The SNA undertakes inspections and 
in 2012 some 6,000 inspections resulted in the revocation of certificates held by 386 
TWAs (Renooy, 2013, p. 36).  
                                                     
21
 TWA workers can claim their unpaid wages and holiday allowances from the user company if their 
agency employer is unable or unwilling to pay these. However, user companies contracted with 
agencies certified with the SNA quality mark avoid liability for the payment of outstanding payroll 
taxes and VAT of the company that actually supplied the staff.  
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In 2007 the TWA federations and the trade unions established the ‘Social Fund for 
the TWA Sector’ (SFU - Stichting Fonds Uitzendbranche) which collects 0.2% of all 
wages paid in the sector and distributes them between three separate co-managed 
activities. This includes (van Liemt, 2013, Box 5; Renooy, 2013, p. 36): 
 
 The ‘Compliance with the Collective Labour Agreement for the Temporary 
Agency Workers Sector Foundation’ (SNCU – Stichting Naleving CAO voor 
Uitzendkrachten). This foundation was created in 2004 and is known as ‘the 
CLA police’. It monitors compliance with TWA collective agreements and 
provides employers and employees with information on the rules of the 
agreement in order to improve compliance. The SNCU can impose fines and 
demand reparatory payments from companies that breach the agreement. In 
2011 it undertook 461 investigations which resulted in recovery of €6.45 
million in unpaid wages and in fines of €3 million. In 2013, SNCU had a 
budget of €2.7m, partly financed by the SFU and partly by the fines imposed.  
 
 The ‘Training and Development Fund for the Temporary Work Sector’ 
(Stichting Opleiding en Ontwikkeling Flexbranche) promotes training to 
improve the skills of TWA workers and agency staff themselves. A principal 
activity consists of assisting companies with applications for EU subsidised 
training programmes. 
 
 The ‘Working Conditions in the Temporary Work Sector Fund’ (Stichting Arbo 
Flexbranche) aims to improve working conditions, reduce sickness-related 
absenteeism and increase reintegration of workers in the TWA industry. The 
emphasis is on prevention and the agency seeks to highlight best practices, 
and provide suggestions on how to better manage employee’s health. This 
activity is of particular importance in a context where TWAs are responsible 
for the reintegration of their permanent employees during the first two years of 
sickness absence (OECD, 2014b, p.98) 
 
A more recent development concerns the provision of accommodation for migrant 
workers. An independent monitoring agency now certifies and ensures that members 
of the two federations (ABU and NBBU) who employ temporary migrant workers and 
provide them with accommodation comply with the standards determined in the 
collective agreement. 
 
Other sector based collective agreements may have an impact on the position of 
TWA workers, including restrictions on the proportion of TWA workers. Other 
agreements, as in the construction sector, recommend that user companies only 
deal with agencies that have been SNA certified (ELCJ, 2013). 
 
The Ministry also has a specialist inspection team for the TWA sector which is part of 
the combined Inspectie-SZW. The Inspectorate concentrates primarily on sectors 
where there is a high risk of illegal employment, tax evasion and/or exploitative 
labour practices, such as fee-charging, underpayment of workers, bogus self-
employment and poor record keeping. These are generally labour intensive 
companies in sectors with peak seasonal demands such as retail, cleaning, 
construction, agriculture and horticulture (Renooy, 2013). The Inspectorate has 
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varied instruments it can use when it uncovers violations including verbal and/or 
written warnings; prohibition notices; administrative fines; and criminal prosecution. It 
also collaborates and exchanges information on findings with the SNCU, tax 
authorities, municipalities, and law enforcement agencies; and liaises also with 
authorities in Central and Eastern Europe countries where many exploited labour 
migrants originate. The Ministry also sponsors awareness raising and campaigns to 
make the public, workers and employers more aware of legal and regulatory rules 
and how to make complaints about violations (including a hotline that can be used to 
make reports on fraudulent TWA agencies).  
 
In addition to concerns about rogue agencies and exploitative working practices 
there is continuing debate in the Netherlands about new forms of employment 
relationships which seek to avoid regulatory oversight. There are particular concerns 
about what are called payroll or umbrella companies and contrived self-employment 
where legitimate TWAs face unfair competition and temporary workers may be 
excluded from their employment rights. 
 
3.10.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
National legislation sets a framework of employment rights and obligations for TWA 
workers. Many of these regulations, such as those concerning health and safety at 
work, or the payment of tax and social insurance liabilities, apply to all Dutch 
workers. Equal treatment regulations apply to many of the working conditions of 
TWA workers who from day one, for example, should be paid the equivalent hourly 
wage, shift premiums, overtime rates, work related expenses and period-linked 
salary increases of comparable workers. This requirement does not apply if the temp 
worker has a permanent contract with the agency determined through a collective 
labour agreement. There are also some specific groups of temp workers who may be 
exempted from equal pay for up to 52 weeks. The exempted groups include school 
leavers; labour market returners; job seekers who were previously receiving social 
assistance; the long term unemployed; holiday workers; and so on. The conditions of 
both the permanent TWA workers and the exempted groups are covered by the 
agency-related collective labour agreement (see below). 
 
The Work and Security Act (2015) made a significant change in the ‘3x3x3’ and a 
temporary contract can now only be extended twice in two years before the employer 
must offer a permanent contract, providing no break between assignments is greater 
than six months.22 The legislation seeks to reduce the differences between flexible 
and permanent contracts and also includes changes to Dutch dismissal laws and 
entitlement rules to UI (for example, reducing the maximum UB payment period from 
38 to 24 months). 
 
TWA collective agreements tend to cover five year periods and the ABU agreement 
for 2012-2017, as amended by the 2015 legislation, is generally binding and covers 
most workers in the sector (except those covered by NBBU or other collective 
agreements). The agreement specifies payment rates which cover ten job grades 
                                                     
22
 In 2015 it was reported that there has been controversy over implementation of the new rules with 
some Dutch employers dismissing temporary and TWA workers before they qualify for permanent 
employment status – see  http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/labour-
market-law-and-regulation/netherlands-unexpected-problems-with-work-and-security-act  
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varied according to the nature of the work, the level of knowledge required and the 
extent of the independence exercised in the job role (special rules apply in the 
construction sector).  
 
The ABU agreement outlines three types of contracts under which the TWA worker 
may be employed by their agency. These include contracts under the ‘agency 
clause’; an assignment or secondment agreement for a definite period; or an 
assignment or secondment agreement for an indefinite period. These contracts, and 
some working conditions, are in turn shaped by a phasing system which determines 
the status of the worker after particular durations of employment. The further the 
worker advances through the phases the more rights they obtain and the more 
‘permanent’ their relationship with the agency becomes (ABU, 2015). 
 
Workers generally start in the first ‘agency clause’ phase and are usually only paid 
wages for the hours worked, unless the TWA has agreed other arrangements. The 
employment is terminated when the user company no longer wants the worker, 
subject to a short notice period, or terminated immediately if the worker is not fit for 
work. The worker can terminate the assignment by giving 24 hours’ notice. The great 
majority of TWA workers are covered by these arrangements but the period of this 
employment cannot last longer than 78 weeks worked for and with the agency before 
a permanent contract must be offered.  
 
In the following phase agency workers are employed on time-definite assignments 
and are entitled to longer notice periods. The agency is obliged to find alternative 
work if a user company decides to end the arrangement early or to pay the worker 
90% of the wage for the duration of the assignment or until they terminate the 
workers contract.  
 
In the final phase TWA workers on an indefinite assignment enjoy job security and 
can only be dismissed after the agency has sought to find equivalent alternative 
assignments (for which the worker has to be available). In cases of contract 
termination the agency needs the agreement of the UWV if the grounds for dismissal 
concern economic conditions or worker disability, or the agreement of a court if it 
concerns other reasons (such as worker attendance or competence).  
 
The ABU agreement also sets holiday entitlements which are linked to previous 
weeks worked. The agreement also allows for TWA worker wages to be subject to 
‘reserve deductions’, which contribute to cover holiday and sickness pay and 
pension and other entitlements that are organised through the co-managed funds 
described previously. 
 
The ABU agreement makes clear that although the user company is responsible for 
the workplace management and supervision of the temp worker the TWA is the 
employer (ABU, 2015). The agency must inform the worker about their hours of work 
and timekeeping. If the user company does not automatically notify the agency of the 
hours the worker has undertaken, the worker has to get the time sheet they submit to 
the agency agreed and authorised by the user company.  
 
All TWA workers must be given a written or digital wage slip that specifies the wage 
total; gross hourly wage; number of hours worked; deductions from wages; bonuses; 
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and how much has been accrued in ‘reserve deductions’. Before starting 
employment the TWA worker must be told whether they are employed on ABU 
remuneration or on the user company’s pay scales. 
 
Some special rules apply to TWA workers recruited outside the Netherlands 
concerning accommodation standards; safety; work instructions and, where needed, 
access to social counselling (ABU, 2015).  
 
If the temp worker has any dispute about their working conditions the ABU 
agreement indicates that they should first seek to resolve this with their agency. If 
the matter cannot be resolved the worker can submit a complaint to the ‘Dispute 
Committee’ for the TWA sector. This includes representatives from the agencies and 
the four trade unions involved in the sector agreements. The committee will seek to 
resolve the issue and their decision is legally binding. The party which makes the 
request to the committee must pay an upfront fee of €49.  
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Chapter 4: The Organisation and Delivery of 
Public Employment Services and the Role of 
Private Agencies in Denmark 
 
Over the past two decades there have been multiple reforms to the Danish benefit 
and employment services system (EC-CR, 2015; Raisanen et al, 2012). This has 
included a reorganisation of the role of local government and after a period of co-
location with the PES culminated in 2009 in the devolution of responsibility for front 
line Jobcentres municipalities. During this reform process there was also a phase 
where Ministers placed a high emphasis on contracting out employment services to 
‘other actors’ but these decisions are now left to the discretion of municipalities.  
 
The wider Danish labour market system comprises a ‘flexicurity model’ with three 
mutually supportive elements (Arndt and Hörisch, 2015). One factor concerns 
flexible rules for ‘hiring and firing’, which make it easier for employers to dismiss 
employees during downturns and hire new staff when circumstances improve (about 
25% of Danish private sector workers change jobs each year). The second factor 
concerns income security in the form of a guarantee of UB at a capped but relatively 
high level wage replacement level paid for up to two years. The third element 
concerns guaranteed participation in employment services aimed to support an early 
return to work. The flexicurity model is broadly supported by the social partners 
headed by the two main organisations - The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO) and The Confederation of Danish Employers (DA). 
 
Denmark spends about 1.5% of GDP on employment services and ALMPs, the 
highest percentage amongst OECD countries, providing considerable capacity and 
resources for active measures.23 It is estimated that on average about 400,000 
people of working age receiving unemployment related benefits can participate in 
short or longer term employment measures each year (Mploy, 2011). 
 
The Danish employment services delivery system is now comprised of three tiers, 
which includes the national Ministry, an intermediate regional tier, and a network of 
94 integrated Jobcentres. The system is designed to support strong national 
direction and accountability whilst allowing local flexibility. Each tier of the system is 
supported by consultative Councils that include employer and trade union 
representatives alongside other relevant actors, including organisations representing 
people with disabilities. The Danish reform process continues and in 2015, following 
recommendations from an expert committee, there was further change in the 
activation system and in the role of the regional tier of administration.  
 
4.1 Unemployment Benefit and Social Assistance in Denmark 
 
Legislation determines national rules on benefit eligibility criteria, activation 
requirements and sanctions. Although reforms have created a devolved and more 
                                                     
23
 The comparatively high Danish spending levels are inflated in the OECD data by the inclusion of 
educational allowances paid to participants in training programmes. In other countries equivalent 
income transfers are classified as ‘passive’ benefit payments. 
47 
 
integrated employment services system UB and means-tested social assistance 
continue to be administered separately, requiring more or less complex delivery and 
partnership arrangements. In particular, there have been difficulties in aligning 
municipal Jobcentres with the 29 separate social insurance funds (known as A-
Kasse), most of which are connected to one or more trade unions (each fund must 
have a minimum membership of at least 10,000). Some of the funds are sector and 
employee specific; others are sector specific but also recruit self employed people 
working in the sector.  The other funds are multi-sector and most also recruit self 
employed people.  
 
Each UI fund is formally an independent association, where the members elect a 
board, which is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the fund. The election of 
each board is shaped by the respective trade unions and professional associations 
but they have only limited influence on their schemes because of strict national 
regulation of the system (including benefit and contribution levels). Collectively, the 
UI funds are represented by a national organisation, which seeks to influence policy 
and protect the interests of the funds and their sponsoring trade unions. 
 
Membership of UI funds is voluntary although most workers are members of a 
scheme. The funds are financed through a combination of member contributions and 
government subsidy. An unemployed person must have been a member of a fund for 
a year and meet specified contribution requirements in order to qualify for UB and 
they must meet activation requirements. Benefits levels are generous compared to 
other OECD countries and are paid for two years at 90% of the previous wage up to 
a ceiling (so that it is close to a flat rate payment for most full time workers). 
 
Unemployed people who do not qualify for UI, or who exhaust their entitlement, may 
be entitled to means-tested social assistance payment which is administered and 
partly funded by local government. The duration of social assistance is not time-
limited, but a claimant has to be available for and seeking employment and 
participate in activation programmes they are referred to. If not, social assistance 
payments may be reduced or terminated. 
 
4.2 The Development of the Danish Activation System 
 
In the 1990s Denmark had a system characterised by generous and long duration 
wage related UB (which could last for up to nine years) complemented by expensive 
ALMPS. These programmes largely delivered income maintenance because 
participation helped claimants re-qualify for UI benefits (Raisanen et al, 2012). 
Unemployed social assistance claimants faced few activation requirements and few 
participated in employment programmes. Criticisms of the system grew when 
unemployment increased in the 1990s. Successive governments have since 
undertaken reforms designed to secure a more effective balance between income 
support entitlements and obligations to seek and take employment. Modified 
activation requirements have also been extended to people on disability benefits. 
 
Radical system reforms were introduced in 2002 by a Liberal-led government. 
Benefit generosity was reduced and activation requirements increased. A key 
element of reform concerned ‘municipalisation’ of employment assistance where the 
Government proposed to progressively transfer control of the PES (including 
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employment services for insured workers) to local government. The aim was to 
create a ‘single gateway’ to employment assistance for insured and uninsured 
workers, increase activation of social assistance claimants and better integrate 
employment assistance with other municipal services. The decentralisation of 
employment services to local government was intended to re-orient them towards 
quicker transitions to employment and to reduce the influence of the social partners 
(Jørgensen and Schulze, 2012). Ministers drove the reorientation of employment 
assistance through central funding arrangements with local government. At the same 
time Ministers required the PES and municipalities to contract out the delivery of 
some employment services (see below).  
 
In 2005, the Government policy statement ‘A new chance for all’ announced a 
concerted push to remove inconsistencies in activation for insured and uninsured 
unemployed workers (Raisanen et al, 2012). A new profiling system was intended to 
reduce exemptions from activation to a small minority of social assistance clients and 
in 2006 the duration of UI benefits was reduced from four to two years. 
 
Efforts to improve the activation role of local government were facilitated by major 
structural reform. In 2007 the number of municipalities was cut from 271 to 98. The 
reform was intended to improve the efficiency and capacity of local government to 
undertake their responsibilities, including their new role in employment services. The 
layer of county level government was also rationalised by the creation of four 
administrative regions governed by elected boards. In 2007 local government was 
also given greater responsibility for Jobcentres, many of which were initially co-
managed with the PES, culminating in full devolution in 2009 when over 2,000 PES 
employees were transferred to local and regional government.  
 
The reforms included the development of a new institutional framework for the 
delivery of integrated employment services (see Figure 6 which outlines the structure 
of the Danish system in 2015). The system has been designed to ensure national 
control and steering of activation policy, secured through a high degree of central 
accountability, combined with integrated management frameworks which give local 
government a considerable degree of flexibility at local level. There are contending 
views on how well the system delivers these objectives and there has been further 
reform as problems were encountered, employment levels varied, and as lessons on 
effectiveness have been learned. 
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Figure 6: The Danish National Framework for Employment Services Delivery, 2015 
 
 
 
Source: Danish Labour Market Policy - National Performance Management, Jan Hendeliowitz, Chief 
Policy Advisor, Ministry of Employment, October 16, 2014. 
 
4.3 The Danish Employment Services System: Target-setting, 
Accountability and Budget Management 
 
At national level, the Danish Minister for Employment has overall responsibility for 
employment policy and the activation system. Each year the Minister sets three or 
four high-level targets for the system. Over the past few years the targets have given 
priority to reductions in the number of people unemployed for more than three 
continuous months (measured by outflows from unemployment); a reduction in the 
number of young people aged under 30 years claiming benefits; and reductions in 
the number of immigrants or the children of immigrants claiming benefits. 
 
National legislation and regulations set the objectives and accountability framework 
for the system and include minimum measures for service delivery. These measures 
include the frequency of contact with unemployed claimants and their right to be 
offered active employment assistance and access to ALMPs after a specified 
duration of unemployment. The system has given high priority for Jobcentres to 
ensure that these activation guarantees are delivered.  
 
Municipalities are required to develop an annual employment plan which reflects 
national goals although there is some flexibility if the target is less relevant to the 
locality in question (Mploy, 2011). The plan will contain an analysis of local 
challenges and circumstances as well as set objectives and outline operational 
priorities. It also will contain an outline budget for Jobcentre operations, employment 
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measures and benefit expenditure. When developing their plans municipalities are 
required to consult with local stakeholders and with their local employment council 
and the regional office of the Ministry. The municipality may also supplement 
national standards with their own priorities and targets. They can also coordinate the 
implementation of employment objectives with other services, cooperate with local 
partners and other municipalities, and target services at particular employers (Mploy, 
2011). These additional municipal objectives will reflect the political priorities of the 
local administration and the views of the local employment council. 
 
The ‘Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment’,24 which is part of the 
Ministry, is responsible for ensuring that minimum standards are met, and for 
monitoring the system and assessing whether the combined efforts of the localised 
delivery system are meeting national objectives (Hendeliowitz, 2014). It also has a 
role in developing new approaches and interventions, disseminating research 
findings and identifying and sharing best practice.25 At the regional level the Ministry 
is supported by administrative regional units which supervise the Jobcentres and 
each year negotiate local targets and priorities with municipalities and subsequently 
monitor performance.  
 
Each year the municipality is required to complete a performance audit of the impact 
and outcomes of their employment services. This is reviewed by the Regional 
Employment Council who can make recommendations for improvements. The 
regional offices have also been required to hold a minimum of four annual dialogue 
meetings with municipal and Jobcentre managers (albeit the meetings can be held 
with several Jobcentres at the same time). The meetings examine Jobcentre 
performance, how it may be improved and how best practice might be developed 
(Mploy, 2011). In the event of poor performance the focus is on analysing causes 
and developing remedial measures, for example, through bringing in external 
consultants, developing joint activities, and then agreeing an action plan with 
measurable results. The regional office must follow up and ensure compliance with 
such a performance improvement agreement. Ultimately, if poor performance 
continues, the regional office can recommend further action, including financial 
sanctions, to the Ministry. 
 
Critically the Danish performance management system is underpinned by a publicly 
accessible national database with real time information on the delivery and outcome 
of services (www.jobindstats.dk). This internet portal enables local, regional and 
national managers to assess and analyse the performance of each Jobcentre 
against ministerial goals and other targets and benchmark their results against 
clusters of comparable municipalities.  
 
                                                     
24
 In 2014 the agency took on the functions of the previous ‘National Labour Market Authority’. The 
primary role of the agency remains moving people from unemployment and social security benefits 
into employment and education but it now also has responsibility for work permits and for the Danish 
‘Green Card’ system. Under the reorganisation the number of regional offices was reduced from four 
to three. 
25
 The agency has focused increasingly on identifying and disseminating evidence on ‘what works’ 
and, amongst other things, an internet portal gives access to the results from evaluations, at  
www.jobeffekter.dk 
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The budget allocation and financing system for employment services also shapes 
the performance and accountability of municipalities. In Denmark local government is 
funded largely by local income tax and central government transfers. Expenditure on 
benefits and active measures for the unemployed is financed through central 
government refunds. Each year the Ministry informs the municipalities on the amount 
available which ‘comprises a rate per unit per full time person’ receiving public 
benefits, which may be adjusted if unemployment increases. The key incentive 
mechanism is that the Ministry will only refund a proportion of the municipality’s 
expenditure on the unemployed. This funding mechanism first applied to social 
assistance claimants but was extended in 2010 when municipalities became 
responsible for payment of UI benefit (the maximum duration of which was also 
reduced from four to two years). These municipal refund payments are subject to 
performance. The financing is complicated but between 2010 and 2014 central 
government paid the municipality 75% of benefit when an unemployed person was in 
activation; 50% when the person was passive; and nothing if the person was not in 
activation when they were supposed to be (Andersen, 2011, p.30).  
 
It was found that this financing mechanism created a strong incentive for the 
municipalities to get unemployed people into relatively ineffective low cost activation.  
The financing system was simplified from February 2015. The reform covers nearly 
all types of benefits (UB, social assistance, early retirement, etc.) making central 
compensation to municipalities the same for all types of benefits. For the 
unemployed the reimbursement system is now sequenced as follows. Between 
weeks 1 and 4 in the unemployment period the municipalities receive 80% of the 
benefit from central government; between weeks 5 and 26, 40%; between weeks 27 
and 52, 30%; and after week 52, only 20%. If an unemployed person ceases to claim 
benefit for a year (in a period of three years) the funding sequence recommences. 
The difference in compensation when an unemployed person is passive or in an 
activation measure has been abolished. The reform has been phased in, to prevent 
too much disruption, and there are contrasting views on the impact it is likely to have 
on service provision, especially when transitional financial protection is removed 
from 2018. 
 
By contrast, central Government funding for expenditure on Jobcentre administration 
and case management is included in a general block grant. Each municipality is free 
to determine staffing levels and the resources allocated to pay for case management 
but is accountable for delivering the services and targets agreed in the local 
employment plan. As a control measure central government caps the overall amount 
of expenditure that municipalities can spend on administration which means that the 
Jobcentre is competing locally with other policy areas and priorities to secure their 
operating expenditure. 
 
The budget system is highly complex but generally the municipalities obtain a 
financial benefit when an unemployed person becomes employed as spending on 
public benefits is reduced and local tax revenues are increased. Despite criticism 
reviews of the financing system suggest that it encourages municipalities to give a 
high priority to employment services both because of the scale of expenditure, its 
political visibility and because performance levels may generate additional revenues 
or may entail financial liabilities.   
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4.4 The Role and Organisation of Danish Jobcentres 
 
There are 91 Jobcentres in Denmark which means that nearly all 98 municipalities 
(apart from the smallest) have their own office which acts as the organisational focus 
of the local activation system. One critical difference to other countries, such as the 
UK, is that Danish Jobcentres have no direct responsibility for assessing benefit 
eligibility, paying out benefits or directly imposing sanctions. These tasks remain the 
responsibility of the separate UI funds for the insured unemployed and for the social 
welfare offices of municipalities. The suggestion is that this enables Jobcentres to 
focus on employment support and build a better relationship with unemployed 
people. Nevertheless, unemployed people who claim benefits are required to register 
with the Jobcentre and case workers are expected to ensure the individual is 
available for work and participates in activation measures. If the claimant fails to do 
so the case worker should notify the relevant benefit authorities. 
 
The primary aim of the Jobcentre is to facilitate speedy transitions into employment 
or to assist people overcome the barriers preventing them from working. Jobcentre 
staff register, interview and initially screen job seekers and other working age 
claimants and allocate them to one of four ‘Match Groups’ according to their work 
capacity and likelihood of obtaining employment. These categories range from those 
able to take a regular job within three months through to those with serious barriers 
which mean they can neither work nor take part in employment measures. Where a 
person has no future capacity to work they may be referred to disability pensions. 
More specifically, Jobcentres are typically required to ensure all job seekers have a 
CV and a job plan, have a contact interview at least every three months, and that 
they then take up mandatory employment programmes after a particular period of 
unemployment (or full time training or education in the case of low skilled young 
people). 
 
Jobcentres are managed through the goals and targets agreed in local employment 
plans. In one survey 84% of Jobcentre directors reported that they negotiated targets 
and performance requirements with their political and administrative managers 
(Mploy, 2011). A similar number of Jobcentres had opted to set out their own 
supplementary targets in addition to incorporating the Ministerial goals in their 
employment plan. Overall, 39% of Jobcentre directors reported they had high 
flexibility in management of goals and performance in employment measures, while 
46% felt that they had moderate flexibility. 
 
Municipalities now have control of how they staff their Jobcentre and deliver 
employment services and assistance. During the process of devolution local 
managers had to bring together the cultures of different staff coming from the PES 
and the municipality, with some remaining PES staff until 2009 (Lindsay and 
McQuaid, 2009; Walker and Sankey 2008). It appears that in many localities both 
groups of staff moved into new or different premises from those previously occupied 
by the two services. In most Jobcentres managers and staff who previously worked 
for the PES focused on employers and on claimants who were closer to the labour 
market, whilst municipal staff, often social workers, served the groups furthest from 
the labour market. Specialist cross-cutting teams had responsibility for particular 
priority groups, especially young people. Although organisational and cultural 
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differences were significant issues in the early period it seems that following full 
devolution differences dissipated (Mploy, 2011). 
 
Despite service delivery improvements there has been criticism of Jobcentres and 
how they work with the unemployed. Much of the criticism concerns ‘meaningless 
activation’, generated by legal targets and financial incentives, and the poor quality 
of workfare programmes targeted at the long term unemployed. There has also been 
criticism of the ways in which Jobcentres failed to meet the needs of local employers. 
Negative perceptions of the system culminated in 2013 in the establishment of an 
expert group (led by Carsten Koch, an ex-Minister) to undertake a high-level review 
of the system (EC-CR, 2015). The first report, published in 2014, recommended 
changes in the system for the insured unemployed so they are no longer required to 
participate in one activation measure after another (Kvist, 2015, p.9). In 2015 this led 
to changes in financial incentives (described earlier) combined with greater 
integration of the work of Jobcentres and UI funds within what is intended to be a 
more individualised service delivery system (see Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7: The Danish Contact and Activation Regime for the Insured Unemployed, 
2015 
 
 
Source: Danish Labour Market Policy - National Performance Management, Jan Hendeliowitz, Chief 
Policy Advisor, Ministry of Employment, October 16, 2014 
 
The committee published a further report on services for social assistance claimants 
in 2015. Under the new system social assistance claimants are expected to agree a 
contact plan within a week and be allocated a case worker responsible for 
coordinating services and developing a job search or cross-discipline rehabilitation 
plan. This approach built on an earlier reform to disability benefits which had 
previously introduced cross-disciplinary rehabilitation teams whilst at the same time 
intensifying activity and integration measures targeted at those aged under 40. 
Social assistance claimants aged under 30 have also now been divided into two 
groups with skills training or education mandatory for the unskilled; and work activity 
mandatory for those with qualifications. The Koch Commission has also 
recommended the development of more employer based integration services 
targeted at the long term unemployed and disadvantaged social assistance 
claimants (Kvist, 2015),  
 
4.5 The PES and Direct Contracts with Private Providers 
 
The Danish PES contracted out some services before 2002 but in that year there 
was a step-change after the Liberal-led Government committed to expand the role of 
‘other actors’ in the delivery of employment services. The label ‘other actors’ was 
used because the government wanted the involvement both of for-profit agencies 
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and of the non-profits that had previously delivered PES services, in particular trade 
union or union-affiliated training institutions and UI funds. The unions were 
supportive and saw this as an opportunity to regain influence and resources for their 
institutions (Larsen and Wright, 2014). 
 
Between 2002 and 2005 the regional PES was given flexibility to organise the 
process of contracting out, deciding what types of service and which groups of 
insured unemployed would be targeted; the contract design and payment model; and 
managing the tendering, contract award and performance management process 
(Bredgaard, 2008). The only obligation was that at least 15% of the insured 
unemployed should be in services fully or partly provided by ‘other actors’. Service 
providers were allowed ‘freedom of methods’ in working with clients, as long as they 
complied with the contract and legal obligations. Over a short period many different 
models for contracting out were tested.  
 
The new market expanded quickly and by 2005 it was estimated that around 46% of 
the insured unemployed were placed with an estimated 159 recognised activation 
providers, two thirds of which were for-profit providers (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2008, 
p. 356). One factor driving growth was that PES offices used their flexibility to 
contract with external providers to meet administrative targets on the number of 
activation contacts they had to undertake with the unemployed.  There was concern 
about the quality and effectiveness of provision and the Minister introduced 
constraints. These stipulated that from 2005 contractors could only be used ‘where 
they make a difference’ (not on administrative tasks), and that all contracts should be 
performance-based, with 75% of payment depending on proven employment 
outcomes which lasted at least 13 weeks (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008).  In a short 
time the market diminished, with the proportion of the insured unemployed 
contracted out falling to 22% in 2006, and to 10% in 2009 (unemployment also fell in 
this period). There was a ‘shake out’ of providers, with many non-profit organisations 
unable or unwilling to take on the risk of PbR contracts. Trade union affiliated 
providers and training institutes had delivered about half of provision in 2005 but by 
2009 this share had fallen to 10%. Contracted employment services are now largely 
delivered by for-profit providers (Larsen and Wright, 2014). 
 
Another factor behind the contraction of the market was devolution. In 2002 
municipalities had also been encouraged to contract out some 10% of their 
reintegration services. It was hard for the Ministry to enforce this because of local 
government autonomy and the requirement was dropped in 2005. In the following 
early phase of PES devolution the economic incentives for municipalities 
encouraged them to use ‘other actor’s and this prompted an increase in contracting 
out. After 2008 municipalities were able to authorise private-sector providers to 
perform certain mandatory activation tasks, for example formulation of job plans and 
submission of offers as well as approval of on-the-job training and wage subsidies. 
This allowed providers to take on elements of Jobcentre activities and, where there 
was a lack of capacity, it gave the municipality an incentive to do so because central 
government refunded 50% of expenditure for placing people in activation measures 
(whereas the municipality had to pay 100% if it did not place the person in 
activation). However, budget cuts after 2009, and policy changes after 2011, 
including an amendment to the refund provision, significantly reduced municipal 
incentives to use external providers (Larsen and Wright, 2014).  
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Until 2014 there was still a mixed system but national tenders, which were typically 
targeted at specific groups, such as unemployed graduates or older workers, are 
now being phased out. Under these national tenders local Jobcentres had to refer 
target group claimants to the providers who were included in a national framework 
agreement. Such contracts typically paid an upfront fee of 25% with 75% of the 
agreed payment paid after the participant had been in employment of over 20 hours 
a week for six months. The aim was to ensure that services were delivered by 
specialised providers for these targeted groups. 
 
Local jobcentres now have freedom to design their own tenders and in several 
regions Jobcentres have combined to design their own tender and procure services 
together, although such joint tenders must meet national procurement standards. 
There is much variation in the use of private providers ranging from some Jobcentres 
which do not contract out services to the most radical model, developed by the 
municipality of Gribskov, which has outsourced its Jobcentre entirely to a private 
provider (Mploy, 2011, p.59).  
 
4.6 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in Denmark 
 
In 1990 the Danish Government ended the PES monopoly control of job broking and 
since then private placement agencies and TWAs have been free to operate. The 
proportion of TWA workers in the Danish labour force is amongst the lowest in 
Europe, although there has been an increase from an estimated 0.3% of the labour 
force in 1999 to about 1% in 2015 involving some 1,000 registered agencies. There 
are also few examples of other atypical working practices such as zero hour 
contracts or casual day labour (Hansen and Neilson, 2010). Data from the European 
Labour Force Survey shows also that few Danish people report using private 
employment agencies to search for employment (DGIP, 2013).  
 
The low coverage of non-standard employment contracts partly reflects the Danish 
flexicurity model which gives greater flexibility in standard employment contracts 
(Madsen, 2015). Danish trade unions had also opposed temporary agency work, as 
well as other types of ‘atypical’ employment, on the grounds that temp workers would 
undermine the wage and working conditions of regular workers. Gradually, however, 
trade unions have accepted different types of flexible employment and have 
negotiated with employers on how to include TWA workers in the collective 
bargaining system. Over the past decade each of the larger trade unions has 
established entities to serve temporary workers and freelancers (DGIP, 2013). These 
entities provide information on workers’ rights and access to services, such as, legal 
representation. In 2008 trade unions estimated that approximately half of TWA 
workers were members, but no reliable statistical data is available (Hansen and 
Andersen, 2008). 
 
Temporary agency work is most common in sectors such as storage, construction, 
health care, teaching and agriculture, and these sectors are covered by collective 
agreements on general organisational, sector specific and/or company level. By 
2008 it was reported that 80% of TWA workers were covered by collective labour 
agreements. Most of the regulation covering TWA workers is found in sector-specific 
agreements with protocols on the use of TWA workers (Hansen and Andersen, 
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2008). National labour laws have had a complementary role to ensure coverage for 
the minority of temp workers not covered by collective agreements. The social 
partners have also typically transplanted European Directives on working 
arrangements into their collective agreements (Madsen, 2015).  
 
There has been recent controversy on the role that agencies play in the recruitment 
and employment of migrant labour from new EU Member States. The number of 
companies employing workers from these countries has increased and most of the 
migrant workers are employed in agriculture, the construction sector and the service 
sector (including travel and cleaning). This development, coupled with concern about 
illegal employment, prompted an inquiry by the Government leading to a report in 
2012 (DGIP, 2013). The report reviewed ‘social dumping’26 and the challenge it 
posed for the Danish labour market model. It led to a number of changes in the 
application and enforcement of existing rules. This included the registration of foreign 
employment agencies and the introduction of an authorisation system for TWAs to 
ensure they paid wages and working conditions comparable to those for standard 
workers.  
 
In July 2013 the ‘Temporary Agency Workers Act’ extended the right to ‘equal 
treatment’ to all Danish agency workers, although it  exempts those employment 
sectors covered by collective bargaining agreements. It was anticipated that the 
legislation would, where necessary, be followed by revisions to collective 
agreements to ensure that the principle of equality between temporary and 
permanent workers is implemented (DGIP, 2013).  
 
4.6.1 The Regulation of Temporary Work Agencies 
 
In general private employment agencies and TWAs are only required to comply with 
commercial laws that apply to all businesses, such as producing an annual 
accounting report. Establishing a company to operate an agency essentially involves 
registering the company’s purpose, expected income level and ownership structure. 
There are a few exceptions. In the transport and health sectors public bodies issue 
official licences or certificates and specific rules apply to TWAs. In the health sector, 
for example, an agency must employ at least one licensed nurse, who is responsible 
for hiring other nurses and managing contracts with health providers. In the transport 
sector drivers must be approved by the ‘Public Traffic Agency’, which ensures that 
drivers hold the appropriate transport licence (DGIP, 2013). Foreign companies 
‘posting’ employees in Denmark must also register as a ‘Foreign Service Provider’ 
for immigration control purposes.  
 
There are around 1,000 employment agencies in Denmark and they vary in size and 
in their share of the market. The average size is small - only 300 agencies have over 
five employees. In this context the larger agencies have sought to establish industry 
standards through self regulation and in 2011 set up the ‘Temporary Work Agencies 
Certified in Denmark’ (Vikarbureauer Certifiserede i Danmark). This merged two 
                                                     
26
 The term social dumping’ is often used in European policy debates to point to ‘unfair competition’ 
between countries with very different wage and social protection levels. On one level it concerns the 
movement of employment to a low-wage country or area but in the context of the debate on TWA 
workers in Denmark it concerned the role of agencies in recruiting or employing lower paid migrant 
workers. 
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existing associations and is connected with the Danish Chamber of Commerce 
(Dansk Erhverv). The association represents and provides services to agencies but 
a key aim of the merger was to create a strong common industry standard and code 
of conduct.  
 
The quality mark and approval process for the agency certification standard is 
managed by a separate independent association (VikarBranchen) and subject to 
external assessment by PWC, the auditing company (DGIP, 2013). To be approved 
an agency has to provide a service certificate prepared by the Danish Commerce 
Agency, proving their business registration. Further they must use an external 
auditor, provide proof of professional standards in managing confidential personal 
information and have a mandatory certification of training in employment law to 
ensure a knowledge of legal requirements and collective agreements. Members 
must observe provisions of collective agreements and social legislation and also 
commit to an ethical obligation to protect the members' reputation among customers, 
agency and public institutions. If a member agency violates the terms of the code of 
conduct or does not meet the regular controls, the company risks losing their 
certification. 
 
4.6.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
The employment circumstances of TWA workers are shaped by a combination of 
national legal regulations and the varying terms outlined in collective labour 
agreements. Danish employment laws ensure that all workers have certain basic 
rights in relation to working hours, breaks, rest periods, night work and vacations. 
Collective agreements have also ‘normalised’ the conditions of TWA workers and 
over time these conditions have become  equivalent to regular workers in terms of 
wages, pensions, holidays, sickness benefits, maternity  leave, and so on (DGIP, 
2013). There are, however, still disputes about which collective agreement applies to 
particular workers (and derived from this which pay and working conditions apply) 
(Andersen 2011). Trade unions also seek to shorten the period of employment 
before TWA workers gain full access to the benefits enjoyed by regular employees 
(Hansen and Andersen 2008). 
 
The physical employment conditions of agency workers are regulated in the same 
way as that of regular employees and the user company remains responsible for 
health and safety, insurance and injury coverage (ELCJ, 2013). The Danish ‘Work 
Environment Authority’ undertakes more or less regular control visits to ensure 
workers rights and working conditions meet legal standards, especially those 
concerning their health and safety. The agency has varied sanctions if legal 
standards are not being met, related to how serious breaches are. Sanctions range 
from issuing improvement notices, through to fines and, ultimately, the closure of 
premises. 
 
TWA workers who are outside collective agreements are covered by the terms of the 
‘Temporary Work Act’ (2013) which also sets a benchmark for trade unions and 
employers to match. Under the equal treatment principle an agency must ensure 
that, at a minimum, a TWA worker stationed in a user company has the same terms 
and conditions of employment as would have applied under legislation, collective 
agreements or other binding general provisions if the TWA worker had been 
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employed directly by the user company. This equal treatment applies to working 
time, overtime, breaks, rest periods, night work, holiday, public holidays and pay, but 
does not necessarily apply to age-pension contributions if the TWA worker is 
compensated through other remuneration (but the TWA worker cannot be placed in 
a less advantageous position). 
 
Under the Act, the user company must inform the TWA worker of vacancies so that 
the individual is on an equal basis with other employees in relation to obtaining 
permanent employment in the user company. Moreover, the temp worker must have 
access to collective facilities and benefits in the user company on equal terms with 
the user company's own employees, unless there are objective reasons for treating 
the agency worker differently. 
 
The Act prohibits temporary agencies from successively stationing a TWA worker 
with the same user company without a justifiable reason. This prohibition is intended 
to ensure that no circumvention of the user company's seniority-based terms of 
employment, if any, take place. Moreover, on request to the employment agency, a 
TWA worker can receive information on the terms and conditions of employment to 
which he or she is entitled while stationed at the company. 
 
Clauses prohibiting (or preventing) a TWA worker from taking up employment with 
the user company after being stationed there are invalid. However, the agency may 
request reasonable payment for services rendered to the user company in 
connection with the stationing, employment and training of a TWA worker. 
 
Lack of compliance with the Act by either the agency or the user company may be 
penalised through fines and non-financial penalties in accordance with the nature of 
the violation. TWA agencies are treated like any other business regarding formal 
complaints of breaches of regulations and collective agreements with cases 
adjudicated and settled through civil courts or by the Labour Court. 
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Chapter 5: The Organisation and Delivery of 
Public Employment Services and the Role of 
Private Agencies in Germany 
 
In the past decade there has been a significant increase in the German employment 
rate and unemployment according to the national administrative calculation has 
fallen from the very high levels experienced in the early 2000’s. These changes have 
been facilitated by reforms in labour market policies that were recommended by the 
‘Hartz Commission’ and implemented in federal legislation between 2002 and 2005 
through what is known as ‘Hartz I to Hartz IV’.27 The reforms included labour market 
deregulation, including some changes in the regulation of PE&TWAs, and a 
transformation in the out of work benefit system and the management and 
organisation of the PES. 
 
Before 2005 the UI fund provided a wage-related UB for the short term unemployed, 
with a gradually reducing amount of unemployment assistance for those who were 
long term unemployed. Local municipal governments provided separately funded 
means tested social assistance for the poor and uninsured. During the 1990s 
unemployment caseloads increased putting pressure on the PES and local budgets. 
Support for unemployed people was fragmented, the PES was seen as ineffective 
and municipal caseloads included an increased number of those on unemployment 
assistance whose benefits were ‘topped up’ to social assistance levels.  
 
In 2005 the final ‘Hartz’ reform led to a new framework for the integrated provision of 
benefits and labour market services to the long term unemployed and other 
employable social assistance recipients. The German benefit system is now 
comprised of a BA administered wage-related UI benefit, which normally lasts for up 
to a year for those who qualify, and a safety-net means-tested benefit – ‘basic 
income support for jobseekers’.28 UI is funded by social insurance contributions but 
basic income support is now solely funded by the federal government and in much of 
Germany is administered through a network of local Jobcentres some of which are 
operated jointly by the PES and local authorities and others of which are solely run 
by the municipality. ‘In effect’, the Jobcentres ‘now form a second tier of Germany’s 
PES, organisationally (and, in most locations, also physically) separate’ from the 
employment offices which serve insured jobseekers (Knuth, 2014, p.244). 
 
In 2014 an annual average of almost 5 million jobseekers were registered with the 
BA, of whom about 2.9 million were registered as unemployed. About a third of 
unemployed jobseekers received services from the BA’s own front line offices, and 
                                                     
27
 The Hartz Committee was established in 2002 in response to persistent high levels of 
unemployment and in the wake of a ‘scandal’ where an audit found that BA recording practices 
exaggerated their job placement statistics. The audit found that only 30% of some 3.9 million job 
placements registered by the BA had been recorded correctly. A third had some evidence of BA 
involvement but did not meet the audit requirement, and there was no basis for the other third 
claimed. The conclusion was that BA offices were responsible for only 18% of job placements in the 
German labour market, not the 51% previously claimed (Finn et al, 2005). 
28
 Although it is a household benefit all adult recipients of basic income who are able to work for three 
or more hours a day or for 15 hours a week must be available for and seeking work. This had the 
effect of further increasing unemployment which reached a peak of 11.2% in 2005 (Klueger, 2015). 
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some 68%, mostly basic income recipients, were registered as unemployed with 
Jobcentres (Kreuger, 2015, p.5).29 
 
5.1 The Federal Public Employment Service (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit) 
 
Germany is a federal state and responsibility for employment policies and economic 
development is divided between the national government and regional states. 
Responsibility for the design and implementation of activation policies, employment 
services and labour market programmes is largely shared between federal and local 
government (see Figure 8). The 16 regional states have less direct influence but 
have significant powers to shape governance and legislation especially through their 
participation in the federal upper chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat. 
 
National legislation sets the broad outlines of German employment policy and 
specifies labour market policy instruments to be applied nationally by the PES 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, abbreviated as BA). The BA is the central body 
responsible for labour market intelligence, the UI system, and the delivery of 
employment assistance and labour market programmes for most of the unemployed. 
It also has a direct role in the licensing and regulation of PE&TWAs.  
 
 
Figure 8: The German Employment Services System 
 
 
Source: Christensen et al (2014), p. 16. 
 
The BA operates under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social 
Affairs but is a quasi-independent agency, and enjoys some policy autonomy derived 
from its institutional setting and its responsibility to levy, manage and administer 
insurance funds (Mosley, 2012). The BA continues to have strong representation of 
employers and trade unions in its governance arrangements and it exercises much 
                                                     
29
 The German BA defines a person working under 15 hours and job seeking as unemployed. Note 
also that 57% of the 4.39 million people claiming basic income in 2014 were not unemployed. Of 
these some 430,000 were not counted as unemployed as they were participating in ALMPs (Kreuger, 
2015). Another group were in low paid employment, including ‘mini jobs’. Between 2005 and 2011 the 
number combining earnings and basic income increased from 872,000 to 1.4 million of whom about 
55% worked less than 15 hours a week (Jobelius, 2012).  
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discretion in its operational business and its resource allocation for labour market 
programmes.  
 
The BA is composed of a headquarters in Nuremberg and ten regional directorates 
which work closely and coordinate labour market policies with the policies of regional 
governments. The number of BA full time equivalent staff was some 108,000 at the 
end of 2013 (Krueger, 2015, p. 5).There are 156 large regional offices (each with 
200 to 400 staff), a network of smaller branch offices, and approximately 404 local 
Jobcentres most of which are co-managed by the BA and municipalities (about a 
quarter are managed solely by municipalities, see later). In 2006 the OECD 
estimated that some 40% of the staff employed in front line offices could be broadly 
considered as delivering services in job placement and counselling (Tergeist and 
Grubb, 2006). 
 
At the time of the Hartz reforms the management structure of the BA was 
modernised, giving it a greater focus on ‘management by objectives’ aimed at 
improving customer service and securing faster job placement. A three-member 
management board oversees the BA, with three-person Executive Boards also 
responsible for management at regional and district levels. Significantly, the 
influence of the social partners has been reduced with the tripartite advisory 
committees abolished at the middle level, and those at central and local levels losing 
their power to propose budgets.  
 
The BA is accountable to the Federal Government and negotiates separate annual 
performance agreements for UB and basic income claimants which specify priority 
groups and targets for employment assistance. The BA has its own internal 
performance management system which is ‘highly detailed; formalised and target-
driven’ and also includes procedural standards (Jantz et al, 2015, p.953). 
Target setting incorporates elements of dialogue, with some targets set 
autonomously at the regional level, and national ‘framework targets’ reported to be 
only one element in a more consultative style of performance assessment 
(Weishaupt, 2011; Nunn, 2012). Each year the BA’s offices and the joint Jobcentres 
are required to assess their local labour markets and jobseeker populations and to 
publish an annual integration and labour market plan which outlines local strategies 
and targets (Kreuger, 2015). 
 
The performance of each district is monitored monthly and Jobcentre performance 
benchmarked across comparable labour markets. Regular BA performance dialogue 
takes place at ‘every management level’ (Kreuger, 2015, p.11). Tripartite committees 
also monitor local PES management and provide insight into the needs of local 
employers and employees.  
 
PES performance is judged on verified job entry sustained for a minimum of seven 
days (Nunn, 2012, p. 45). The PES performance management system is designed 
also to deter the agency from ‘parking’ harder to place clients until they transition out 
of insurance benefits to the tax funded basic income support. A benefit duration 
measure means that the number of claimants exhausting their insurance entitlement 
has a negative impact on measured BA performance. Nevertheless there is criticism 
of the target-regime for inducing elements of ‘creaming’, reducing local flexibility and 
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for not providing ‘incentives for long-term oriented integration strategies (Jantz et al, 
2015, p. 954). 
 
5.2 PES Service Delivery and Intervention Strategies 
 
A central element of the post-Hartz reforms was the reorganisation of BA offices into 
new customer-oriented service centres which would serve as ‘one-stop shops’ for all 
labour market services. The design of these front line offices typically includes a 
reception area, a self-service zone with access to online jobsearch, and an advice 
and placement zone where job placement and case management take place 
(Kreuger, 2015). An initial benefit claim is made by phone or online and pre-profiling 
takes place on the basis of age, level of qualification, and so on, and a claimant is 
then allocated a 15/30/45 minute slot with a counsellor. Counsellors work most with 
those hardest to help and specialist Job Placement Officers concentrate on working 
with employers in particular sectors.  
 
PES intervention strategies are based on jobseeker profiling undertaken at the first 
interview. An IT system segments claimants into six different profiles on the basis of 
their characteristics. Each profile is linked to a specific service strategy but 
counsellors have some discretion in how they treat individual claimants (Kreuger, 
2015). After profiling claimants have to enter ‘integration agreements’ which set 
down the activities expected from jobseekers and the job search or integration 
strategy to be followed. 
 
After the Hartz reforms the new focus on activation was accompanied by a stricter 
BA cost-benefit and impact calculation of the effectiveness of ALMPs, which 
corresponded with a reduction in the previous levels of investment, especially in 
training and public sector job creation schemes, both for the short term unemployed 
and for those receiving basic income.30 As part of a drive to decentralise decision-
making and allow more flexible use of funds PES managers have been given greater 
discretion to determine their own local ALMP policy mix (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006).  
 
There has been a long term decline in spending on ALMPs (apart from a short period 
in 2008-09) reflecting policy choices and a decline in unemployment. Nevertheless in 
2013 BA ALMP expenditure amounted to nearly €8.4 billion and a monthly average 
of 858,000 jobseekers participated in ALMPs delivered directly by the BA or by 
Jobcentres. The duration of participation was about four months. About 2.3 million 
people completed an ALMP in the year to July 2013 and 38.4% were in formal 
employment six months after completion (Kreuger, 2015, p. 7). It has been 
suggested that in order to meet performance targets front line officials select 
participants who are closer to the labour market. There has also been a significant 
fall in expenditure on labour market integration measures for basic income recipients 
which was reduced by €2.5 million, or 42% between 2010 and 2013. (Hanesch at al, 
2015). 
 
                                                     
30
 In 2004 the BA started to evaluate the impact of ALMPs through a project called Treatment Effects 
and Prediction (TrEffeR). This compares the six monthly employment outcomes of a representative 
group of non-participants with participants for each programme. Its objective is to provide regular 
impact data to inform decisions on the use of specific programmes for particular target groups 
(Kreuger, 2015). 
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5.3 Joint PES and Municipal Jobcentres 
 
Local joint agencies, previously known as ‘ARGE’, deliver ‘one-stop’ services in what 
are commonly called Jobcentres in much of Germany. The agencies are responsible 
for administering basic income and work-related requirements and for delivering 
employment support and assistance, including access to services provided by local 
government. Political conflict between the then Government, opposition parties and 
municipalities, concerning the respective roles of the PES and local government, 
means that initially 69, and now 105, ‘opt-out’ municipalities assumed full devolved 
responsibility for basic income claimants (see below). This thwarted the Hartz-related 
ambition of providing integrated employment and social support with services now 
delivered through 306 jointly operated Jobcentres and 105 municipal Jobcentres.  
 
The joint Jobcentres are externally a single organisation but are staffed by 
employees and are accountable separately to the PES and municipality. About 
56,000 PES staff work in the Jobcentres alongside an estimated 18,000 municipal 
employees (Krueger, 2015, p. 5).  
 
There is variation in organisational and procedural structures but joint Jobcentres are 
established on the basis of a formal agreement between the local authority and the 
local BA. The appointment and powers of the chief executive of the joint Jobcentre 
are regulated by the agreement between the contracting parties. There are some 
mandatory requirements, such as providing an appeals procedure, but there is 
considerable discretion on the organisation of work processes. The local authority, 
for example, can carry out their responsibilities directly or delegate them to third 
parties. Each partner normally bears the costs of the services they provide in the 
joint centres (Mosley, 2005).  
 
The BA is responsible for administering basic income and for financing and 
implementing active measures and the municipality is responsible for the 
administration and financing of some 75% of rent subsidies and of traditional social 
services (e.g. debt advice, drug and psychological counselling, child care provision). 
It is estimated that the federal share of basic income-related spending is 80%. The 
transition to basic income meant that municipalities were no longer responsible for 
partial financing of social assistance, but their continued responsibility for financing 
rent allowances was in part designed to give them a continuing incentive to support 
the successful implementation of reintegration measures (Mosley, 2005). There is, 
however, much variation in the levels of municipal investment in discretionary social 
integration services and in their coordination with Jobcentre employment services 
(Hanesch et al, 2015).  
 
Federal resources for employment services and labour market programmes can be 
used flexibly and the national budget is allocated on the basis of a formula based on 
the number of claimants in the previous period. Local joint agencies are also allowed 
to transfer funds between their programme and administrative budgets. Federal 
basic income support payments are, however, a separate entitlement with no cap on 
the budget which is responsive to local demand from eligible claimants. The 
introduction of a performance variable in the federal distribution formula is 
considered to be politically unacceptable. Mosley suggests that the outcome means 
there is little financial incentive for the joint agencies (or ‘opt-out’ municipalities) to 
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improve performance and ‘a decline in the number of claimants may lead to reduced 
funding for active programmes and personnel’ – ‘good performance may cost you or 
your colleagues their job’ (2010, p.6, p.7).  
 
Joint Jobcentres have their own management and governing board, in which the 
PES and municipal partners are equally represented (see Figure 9, which describes 
the organisational structure of the Jobcentre in the city of Mannheim). The formal 
agreement obliges both sides to engage in an ongoing process of coordination and 
negotiation of their business strategy. Mosley suggests that while this relationship is 
more than simple co-location (as in the Netherlands) it is highly dependent on good 
working relationships between the PES and municipalities. This relationship is 
constrained, however, by the ‘strong influence of the PES with its centralistic 
organisational culture’ which ‘greatly complicates decision-making in the Jobcentres’ 
(Mosley 2010, p. 5).  
 
 
Figure 9: Organisational Structure - Mannheim Joint-Jobcentre 
 
 
Source:  Hörning, 2011 
 
Performance management and service delivery in the joint Jobcentres is embedded 
in the federal PES system of national targets and service standards, and monitored 
through their integrated IT system. Centrally disaggregated local targets must, 
however, be approved by the joint Jobcentres governing body. The local PES 
director has the responsibility of winning approval and of mediating any conflicts. 
Crucially the special status of the joint Jobcentres gives ‘the local PES management 
itself more leverage to assert local discretion in dealing with the PES hierarchy’ 
(Mosley, 2010, p. 9). Nevertheless there has been friction between the national PES 
and joint Jobcentres with central regulation reported to be restricting the capacity of 
local agencies to adapt national employment programmes to the local needs of basic 
income claimants. This centralising tendency has been reinforced by the approach of 
Parliamentary scrutiny bodies and the German audit office that are critical of the loss 
of transparency and oversight involved in moving away from clear national rules and 
standardised programmes and practices. 
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The national PES has helped shape the model adopted in most joint Jobcentres 
where service delivery ‘strongly resembles’ that provided in BA offices for the insured 
unemployed. Key features include the separation of benefit administration and 
employment assistance and the differentiation of client services according to their 
assessed distance from the labour market. Each active claimant is allocated an 
individual counsellor and must agree an individual reintegration plan.31 More 
employable jobseekers are assigned to placement counsellors; while young people 
or adults with greater barriers are assigned to specialised case managers. In 
contrast with opt-out municipalities joint Jobcentres were characterised by higher 
uniformity and standardisation across different regions, and by the more frequent 
use of sanctions (ZEW, 2008). Some problems are reported to arise because there 
is no single local chain of command and only limited integration of PES and 
municipal IT systems and client data. It has also taken significant effort to develop a 
common service culture with tensions reported between the different approaches of 
BA counsellors and those of qualified social workers. 
 
5.4 The ‘Opt-out’ Municipalities 
 
The 105 ‘opt-out’ municipalities do not participate in the PES national performance 
management system and define their own local goals and operational targets in 
relation to funding agreements and negotiation with their regional government. 
These municipalities have developed service delivery models separately and without 
access to the national PES IT infrastructure and support function available to the 
joint Jobcentres. Municipal advisory boards, with representation from the social 
partners and other welfare agencies, oversee local delivery. 
 
Although ‘opt out’ municipalities are subject to national financial and audit controls 
their freedoms around monitoring service delivery mean that data definitions vary 
and comparison between opt-out municipalities or with the PES is difficult. Despite 
these organisational differences it appears that in practice similar goals are pursued 
under both models, with the municipalities giving somewhat less weight to rapid job 
placement and slightly more to maintaining or improving employability (Mosley, 
2010, p.10). The municipalities also largely separate benefit administration and 
advisory services, with ‘only very few’ opting for integrated case management 
(Mosley, 2010). Opt-out municipalities were reported to make little use of competitive 
contracting when purchasing employment and training services whereas joint 
Jobcentres are required to use regional PES procurement centres. 
 
There are no required quality standards concerning the delivery of employment and 
social reintegration services in both municipal and joint Jobcentres although there 
are efforts to improve quality and outcomes in both services. One recent review 
suggested that where a municipality has sole control cooperation with other 
municipal services is more effective but cooperation with the PES is ‘more difficult’. 
By contrast where the Jobcentre is operated jointly cooperation within the Jobcentre 
is better but functions less well with the other municipal services (Hanesch et al, 
2015). 
                                                     
31
 German legislation on basic income requires a broad ratio of job advisors to clients of 1:75 in the 
case of young people aged under 25, and 1:125 for adults. The legal safeguard does not apply to 
conventional UB recipients. 
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5.5 The PES and Training and Employment Vouchers  
 
Following the Hartz reforms several types of contractual arrangements between the 
BA and private providers were developed, acting as complementary options for the 
reintegration of the unemployed rather than as a full alternative to the public 
provision of employment services (Eichorst et al, 2008). Major innovations included 
the introduction of a training voucher, a job placement voucher, and an experiment 
with so-called ‘Personnel Service (i.e. temporary work) Agencies’. There was also a 
significant reform in how BA offices subcontracted the delivery of programmes and 
services which previously had been procured directly by district-level offices and 
were often awarded to non-profit organisations with strong links with the social 
partners.  
 
The BA introduced training vouchers for the unemployed in 2003 in combination with 
a new licensing system for an estimated 20,000 providers who were delivering skills 
programmes. Training vouchers are issued by case workers only after an 
assessment and matching process between participant characteristics and 
programme types which indicates likelihood of success (based on the expected 
reemployment probability). The voucher specifies the objective, content, and 
maximum duration of the course. The validity of training vouchers varies between 
one week and three months and can only be redeemed if used at a provider within 
daily travelling distance of the participant’s home address (Huber et al, 2015).  
 
Certified training courses are listed in an online tool (Kursnet) provided by the BA; 
staff are not allowed to given any advice on choice of provider: and providers are not 
allowed to reject applicants (to prevent creaming). The aim of the voucher system is 
to give unemployed people greater involvement in the decision about which provider 
to choose and to increase competition amongst providers. The new licensing rules 
for providers also introduced minimum performance requirements where providers 
risk losing their licence to accept vouchers if an expected 70% of participants do not 
get jobs or remain off benefits for six months. Although training programmes remain 
a major part of ALMP provision in Germany the increase in successful completion 
and job placement rates has been accompanied by a marked fall in the number of 
participants and training providers.  
 
Separate job placement vouchers were introduced in Germany alongside 
liberalisation of the regulation of private agencies and, in the absence of fee-
charging for individuals, they were designed to give private agencies and other 
intermediaries an incentive to place the unemployed. There have been various rule 
changes over the past decade but in principle all individuals claiming UI benefit for 
more than six weeks are eligible for a voucher; a restriction not applied to basic 
income claimants. The voucher is delivered through the BA and an eligible individual 
can request a voucher or a caseworker can offer the voucher to (selected) 
individuals. The recipient can then sign a placement contract with a private 
placement agency. The voucher lasts for three to six months but can be renewed. 
The agency can claim an initial payment of €1,000 after an employment placement is 
sustained for six weeks and a further €1,000 after six months unemployment or 
€1,500 for the long term unemployed. If employment terminates after less than three 
months, the agency has to reimburse the initial payment (Kreuger, 2015). 
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Usage of the job placement voucher has not been as extensive as anticipated and in 
2014 the BA only redeemed the first payment of some 29,676 vouchers compared 
with the 283,959 which had been issued (Kreuger, 2015, p. 13). It is suggested that 
a ‘considerable part’ of the claimed voucher market is by non-profit organisations 
often in combination with the delivery training measures (DGIP, 2013). 
 
5.6 The PES and Personnel Service Agencies 
 
The ‘Personnel Service Agencies’ (PSA) recommended by the Hartz Commission 
were unsuccessful. These agencies were designed to more quickly integrate jobless 
people into the regular labour market by means of a new form of placement-oriented 
temporary job in which they were hired out to employers by a PSA. Participants were 
initially recruited on a short probation contract and paid the equivalent of their benefit 
payment; subsequently they were paid the same rate as for other temporary workers 
in the sectors in which they were employed. If no work was available the PSA was 
expected to provide support for vocational training. Unemployed people referred to 
the PSA had to participate or face a benefit sanction.  
 
The BA developed tenders for the PSAs and invited private agencies and other 
organisations to bid to run them, with over half the PSA contracts being awarded to 
TWAs (WMP, 2012). A national network of 400 PSAs attached to BA employment 
offices started operations in 2003 and by the end of 2003 they employed about 
30,000 unemployed people as temporary staff. It was anticipated that the PSAs 
would place over half their temporary workers in regular jobs, although only 43% 
were placed in the first year. PSA costs were comparatively high and they were 
controversial. The PSAs were discontinued in 2005 after evidence emerged that 
participants did not receive training in the time they were not in assignments and 
evaluation results, for 2003 and 2004, found that PSA participants were less likely to 
be in regular employment than a control group (WMP, 2012, p.94).  
 
The experiment with PSAs failed but after an initial period characterised by poor 
practices by TWAs non-contractual relationships between the BA and TWAs has 
matured. Since 2007 formal cooperation agreements have been developed between 
the BA and private agencies at federal and regional level. These have included 
mutual commitments that have given agencies access to BA vacancy databases and 
improved the quality of the vacancies they register. The BA now perceives agency 
work as a normal part of the labour market with data suggesting that around 40% of 
job offers available in Jobcentres are reported by agencies (WMP, 2012).  
 
More formal dialogue has also been established between the national BA and 
PE&TWAs including annual meetings with the relevant federations and some of the 
largest agencies. Recent dialogue has, for example, included the design and delivery 
of new forms of assessment and provision targeted at meeting the employment-
related needs of the recent influx of asylum seekers and refugees. 
 
5.7 The PES and Direct Contracts with Private Providers 
 
Traditionally the public financing of private contractors in Germany was mainly grant 
based and carried out within the logic of administrative law. Private providers – 
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usually after close communication with the local branches of the BA – proposed 
measures in line with the national and legal framework of policy instruments and the 
local BA branch would decide which proposals were eligible. Grants went formally to 
the individuals that used the services or directly to the providers and there was little 
use of funding to directly incentivise performance (Lange, 2007; Bruttel, 2005). 
 
In 2003 the application of public procurement law was made mandatory for 
contracting integration and placement services and, in 2005, the BA concentrated 
procurement in its regional offices. One intention was to limit the direct contractual 
links between local offices and providers which were perceived to have resulted in 
higher prices. Whilst providers who bid for tenders still had to meet basic quality 
standards, greater emphasis was put on price competition and more BA contracts 
were let on a ‘no cure, no pay’ or ‘no cure, less pay’ basis. One study reported that 
the average cost for placements by third parties was €600 in 2004 and €725 in 2005 
(Schneider, 2008, p. 57). Another study reported that the median incentive payment 
for placing long term benefit claimants, varied between €950 and €1,260 per 
assigned job seeker according to age, gender and other factors. Many of these 
participants triggered additional and varying ‘expense allowances’ paid to the 
provider and worth between 7.5% or 12.5% of the potential incentive payment 
(Bernhard and Wolff, 2008, Table 2, p. 11). 
 
Procurement reforms were introduced alongside reductions in the number of places 
purchased. Kaps (2010, Table 1) reports that in 2004 some 635,000 people 
participated in commissioned placement services, with a further 17,500 in 
‘integration measures’ (where contracts were more flexible but higher risk because of 
‘a bonus-malus-payment scheme’). In 2007 the number of commissioned places fell 
to just under 245,000 whilst integration places increased to 95,500. In 2008 
commissioned places increased to over 443,000 whilst integration places fell to just 
over 8,000. Kaps gives no explanation for these variations.  
 
Schneider (2008) reports that in 2006 the number of participants in contracted out 
reintegration measures averaged about 112,000, with a budget of about €120 
million. There were some 16,000 contracts let, typically of six or twelve months, and 
with between 50 and 150 participants (Schneider, 2008). Schneider concluded that 
the changes in procurement had led to a reduction in the number of local providers, 
the emergence of ‘supra-regional providers’ and a decline in competition. He reports 
that in 2006 competition for tenders in many areas did not exist and the BA received 
only a single provider offer for two thirds of the contracts it awarded.  
 
There were other developments in contracting for services. Some joint Jobcentres 
who mainly use the regional procurement frameworks of the BA experimented with 
contracts and providers. In 2006 in Nuremberg, for example, the joint Jobcentre 
commissioned the for-profit provider Ingeus to deliver a pilot to test if a programme, 
based on the UK PbR Employment Zone model, could assist basic income claimants 
(Jordan, 2008).  
 
Following several non-experimental evaluations which found little difference in the 
effectiveness of services provided by public and private placement services, in 2008, 
the BA started the ‘Pinguin’ project (Krug and Stephan, 2013). The programme was 
designed to test whether intensive placement services for hard-to-place unemployed 
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individuals could be delivered as effectively and efficiently in-house as through 
contracted out providers. In the selected pilot areas harder-to-place UB claimants 
were randomly assigned to a private provider or to regular PES services after four 
months of unemployment. In 2009 over 220,000 claimants were assigned into the 
programme. 
 
The two year contracts with private providers had a multi-tier payment structure 
comprised of a fixed payment component per unemployed person, ranging from 
€700 to €990 euro, and two performance payment components paid after three or six 
months unemployment, ranging from €150 to €1,500 euro each. Successful 
placement was defined as at least 15 hours a week in employment liable to social 
insurance contributions. Providers agreed to minimum performance standards and 
the BA could recover upfront payments if the minimum standard was not achieved. 
 
To avoid creaming, private providers could not refuse to enrol unemployed people 
referred to them, and claimants faced sanctions if they did not participate. The 
provider had to see participants at least fortnightly but otherwise had flexibility in how 
they delivered services.  
 
The evaluation findings showed that in the initial period of treatment the individuals 
who received conventional PES services had fewer days of unemployment and more 
days of employment than those with private providers, but these effects disappeared 
over the 18 month observation period (Krug and Stephan, 2013). The analysts 
pointed out that employment rates for both approaches did not exceed 20% and 
counselled caution in how the differential results should be interpreted suggesting, 
for example, that other contextual factors might have influenced the result, such as 
the difference in the transfer arrangements between public and private providers and 
the start-up challenges that had to be met by private providers.  
 
Notwithstanding the evaluation results the BA continues to contract out a wide range 
of reintegration and training provision and in the more recent period is reported to 
have adjusted its procurement regulations to secure a better balance between the 
quality of services offered and the price expected by providers. Some case study 
evidence found, for example, that before this adjustment in approach procurement 
was price driven, accounting for between 65% and 75% of the marks awarded when 
judging bids (Greer et al, 2011, p.17).  
 
5.8 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in Germany 
 
In Germany federal legislation regulates the activities of PE&TWAs but many 
important terms and conditions of TWA employment can be varied by collective 
labour agreements.  
 
The compulsory licensing of private employment agencies, which provide job 
matching services, was deregulated in 2002, as part of the Hartz reforms. Since then 
such agencies are required only to register under social protection law which 
requires them to have a written contract with clients stipulating job matching services 
and to protect the confidentiality of client data (DGIP, 2013). The legislation also 
prohibits fee-charging of individual job seekers for placement. The PES is 
responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of these regulations.  
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At the time of reform the legislature requested that the federal Ministry of Labour and 
the associations for private agencies initiate a dialogue on quality standards, leading 
to the adoption of voluntary minimum standards in December 2003. These standards 
include requirements around the financial viability and probity of the agency; the 
professional competences of its staff; and transparent conditions of service provision 
(adequate premises, data protection, and so on). Enforcement of these standards is 
the responsibility of the industry association although there is ‘ongoing dialogue’ 
between the associations and the Ministry to ‘further adjust and develop these 
standards’ (WMP, 2012, Box 5). Apart from the use of job placement vouchers it 
appears that the private job matching market remains comparatively small and 
specialised with a significant presence in executive search and in transnational 
recruitment and placement of migrant workers (DGIP, 2013). 
 
The TWA sector expanded significantly after Hartz-related reforms. The number of 
agencies increased by over 30% after 2005 with 17,700 registered in 2013 (DGIP, 
2013, p.34). The number of TWA workers increased from 282,000 in 2005 to about 
825,000 at the end of 2014, albeit such employment fell for a period following the 
global financial crisis (Kreuger, 2015). Data on the tenure of temp jobs shows that 
about half of these temp jobs lasted less than three months, with 8.7% lasting less 
than a week (DGIP, 2013, p.35). The data also suggests a ‘stepping stone’ effect 
and in the year to April 2014, for example, more than half the 405,000 jobseekers 
who ended a period of unemployment through TWA work were still employed 
between six and twelve months later (Kruger, 2015, p.11).  
 
The legal foundation for temporary agency work in Germany is the ‘Temporary 
Agency Work Act’ (1972) which, with other legislation, sets basic requirements on 
how workers should be treated (BA, 2012). Many restrictive provisions were, 
however, deregulated within the framework of the Hartz reforms. These changes 
lifted restrictions on the maximum length of placement; the so-called synchronisation 
ban (which prohibited limiting the length of the employment contract to the duration 
of the placement at the user company); the restriction of temporary employment to 
the construction industry; the special limitation on long term placement; and a re-
hiring ban (Spermann, 2011). The legislation instead established a legal principle 
that temporary workers should receive equal pay and treatment from the first day of 
employment unless they were covered by a collective agreement. One other 
permitted deviation was for TWA workers who were previously unemployed, and was 
designed in particular for the Hartz-proposed PSAs. This rule stipulates that during 
the first six weeks of temporary employment after an unemployed person takes a 
TWA job the person must be paid a net wage at least equivalent to what they would 
have received in UB (Stettes, 2008). 
 
An immediate consequence of the new legislation was that separate collective labour 
agreements were swiftly negotiated with the main trade union federations by the 
industry associations then representing the TWA sector. The most important 
collective agreements are between the DGB (the German Confederation of Trade 
Unions) and the two TWA industry associations. The larger ‘BAP’ association 
(Employers' Association of Personnel Service Providers) suggests that about three-
quarters of all TWA employees are working according to its collective agreement; the 
‘IGZ’ (German Association of Temporary Employment Agencies), which represents  
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mainly small and medium-sised member companies, claims one third of TWA 
workers are covered by its agreement (WMP, 2012). There are also a comparatively 
small number of collective agreements covering TWA workers which have been 
negotiated by unions and agencies in particular sectors and in some individual 
workplaces. It is estimated that 95 % of the TWA sector is covered by collective 
bargaining agreements (WMP, 2012) 
 
In Germany there has been intense debate about the growth of non-standard 
employment and the impact that temporary work, ‘mini jobs’32 and other 
developments have had. Some analysts suggest that the regulatory changes have 
promoted labour flexibility and higher employment. Others argue the changes have 
undermined pay levels, conditions of employment and led to the displacement of 
permanent full time jobs. In response, the current Coalition Government, elected in 
2013, committed to introduce a national minimum wage (implemented in January 
2015) and to re-regulate TWAs. It is reported that the German Labour Minister plans 
new legislation which will limit the maximum duration of TWA temporary employment 
to 18 months and require that temporary workers be paid the same as full time 
employees after nine months employment. 
 
5.8.1 The Regulation of Temporary Work Agencies 
 
TWAs must obtain, renew and pay for an operating licence from the BA and risk 
financial and legal penalties if they do not do so (DGIB, 2013). In 2012 the one year 
cost of a licence was €750. The licence is issued by the BAs regional office and its 
terms apply to the company and to the individual owners. To qualify the agency must 
prove it has health and other insurance cover for its potential employees, and must 
show its financial viability. The agency is required to provide a surety of €2,000 per 
temporary worker or at least of €10,000. The one-year licence may be extended 
upon request and if it has been extended three times, it is possible for the company 
to obtain an unlimited permission. No specific professional qualifications are required 
from the agency. 
 
If a TWA hires out workers without a valid licence, any contract with the user 
company is invalid and any temporary worker placed with them by the agency is 
treated as the user company’s employee for the duration of the assignment.  
 
Licenced TWAs have to submit reporting information to the BA twice a year. The 
data required includes the number of agency workers listed according to sex, 
nationality, occupational group and type of occupation practiced before joining the 
TWA. The agency must report the time and duration of working contracts signed with 
                                                     
32
 The expansion of TWA jobs took place alongside the growth of ‘mini jobs’, which had been enabled 
by the Hartz reforms and represent the most common form of non-standard employment in Germany. 
Mini jobs allow workers to earn up to €450 per month and not pay tax and social security 
contributions. Employers pay a social security contribution of 20% (which covers health insurance, a 
contribution to the pension fund and a marginal wage tax) and also have to fund additional accident 
insurance (costing about an additional €60 per year). All part time workers, including those in mini 
jobs, should enjoy the same terms and conditions pro rata as equivalent full time employees with the 
same employer.  In September 2010 7.3 million people, or one in every five employees, held mini-
jobs, an increase of 1.6 million from 2003. About a third of workers take mini-jobs alongside their 
regular employment. Mini-jobs are largely made up of marginal part time employment and most are to 
be found in the low-skill segments of service sectors, led by catering, hospitality and construction. 
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each agency worker. It must also give a sector breakdown of the number of 
assignments made and the number of user companies (DGIP, 2013).  
 
The BA monitors TWAs, and the agencies are also subject to scrutiny and inspection 
by the customs and border authority, especially the department monitoring illegal 
employment (DGIB, 2013). It was reported that between 2005 and 2008 the BA 
carried out 5,713 onsite inspections that were targeted more often at newly 
established agencies. They resulted in 3,819 administrative fine proceedings, mostly 
concerning the incorrect application of agreed labour commitments and inadequate 
wage records. In cases where the TWA fails to observe rules regarding social 
insurance law, recruitment from foreign countries, the employment of migrants, 
regulations regarding employment protection or duties stemming from labour law, a 
licence can be denied or withdrawn and the agency and its owners can be subject to 
fines and other legal penalties (DGIB, 2013). There are more severe penalties, 
including the possibility of imprisonment, for agencies that employ illegal migrant 
workers. 
 
There is no voluntary code of conduct for TWAs, as there is for recruitment agencies, 
but there is an independently audited quality mark – ‘Qualitätssiegel Zeitarbeit’.  
Agencies can be awarded the standard if they operate according to a DGB-collective 
bargaining agreement or comply with the legal equal-pay principle and act according 
to other legal requirements and arrangements.33 The agency pays a fee and is 
subject to continuous monitoring and an annual audit to ensure compliance with 
agreed standards. At the time of the research it was estimated that there were 130 
companies with approximately 40,000 employees adhering to these TWA standards 
(WMP, 2012, para 6.7.2). 
 
5.8.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
German law on TWA workers is based on the principle of equal treatment, and is 
therefore in compliance with the EU Directive. Continuing controversy about the 
treatment of TWA workers and concerns about possible displacement of permanent 
workers did, however, create pressure for improvements in collective agreements. In 
2010, for example the TWA association agreements introduced a common hourly 
minimum wage, which varies slightly in different regions (BA, 2012). This was 
important because Germany did not have a national minimum wage until January 
2015 (now set at €8.50 an hour). The minimum wage reform was followed in 2012 by 
industry association and sector-specific agreements which gave pay rises and 
established a phased system of sector-based premiums, which increase in relation 
to duration of employment in a user company, and over a period of time, give a 
gradual approximation to equal pay conditions.34  
                                                     
33
 These requirements include no salaries below the poverty line; granting voluntary additional 
payments such as premium charges; correct classification of employees in pay scales; compliance 
with occupational health and safety provisions; proper payroll processing; no service contracts for 
work to circumvent collective bargaining agreements or the minimum wage; promotion of training 
opportunities for TWA workers; and so on (WMP, 2012, para 6.7.2). 
34
 In 2012 the metalworking collective agreement set the following premiums. After six weeks all 
temporary agency workers irrespective of their wage level receive a premium of 15%;  20% after three 
months; 30% after five months; 45% after seven months; and after nine months the premium will be 
50% of the agency reference wage according to the DGB –BAP/IGZ collective agreement (WMP, 
2012). 
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The sector based agreements build on earlier equal treatment agreements 
negotiated with particular employers. The first example, agreed in 2007, concerned 
IG Metall and Adecco which stipulated that temporary workers assigned to Audi 
receive the same pay as that paid to permanent employees. Despite these 
improvements, a number of studies show a significant pay gap still exists - estimated 
at between 15% and 20% - between TWA workers and comparable permanent 
workers, partly because most assignments are short term so that duration premiums 
do not apply (WMP, 2012). 
 
In general TWA workers earn wages according to the pay grade in the applicable 
collective labour agreement, and continue to do so during illnesses, vacations, and 
non-placement. The employment relationship is subject to all usual social 
contributions (i.e. pension, health, unemployment, accident insurance contributions), 
and TWA workers are entitled to elect, and to stand for election to, a works council if 
they exist in the agency they work for. They are also entitled to vote in the election 
for the works council at the user enterprise if they have been working at the 
establishment for longer than three months (but they cannot stand for election).  
 
Agencies are legally required to issue their workers with a written document setting 
out their basic terms and conditions of employment within one month of starting 
employment. Amongst other things the document should contain a short job 
description; the composition, level and due date of pay, including all supplements, 
bonuses, and premiums; the agreed weekly or monthly working hours; and the 
number of days of annual leave (BA, 2012). An agency is not allowed to forbid a 
worker from entering an employment relationship with the user company once their 
employment contract with the agency has ended. About 70% of TWA workers are on 
open ended contracts with their agencies (WMP, 2012). 
 
Legally, TWA workers can be used to replace striking workers but they are entitled to 
refuse to work at a user company that is directly affected by industrial action, and the 
agency must inform its employees of this right (BA, 2012). The established works 
council of a user enterprise must be informed about the use of TWA workers and can 
object under a very limited number of circumstances. In such a case, the user 
enterprise can apply to the local labour courts for an injunction overriding the works 
council’s objection. 
 
The overwhelming majority of TWA workers in Germany are included in the social 
security system, although the typically lower wage level and higher fluctuation in 
employment contracts will affect their contributions and subsequent level of 
entitlement to social protection. Nevertheless it was reported that in June 2011 some 
95,256 TWA workers were marginally employed and exempted from social security 
contributions. Indeed because of low pay, 7.2% of social security contributing TWA 
workers and 11.7% of the marginally employed TWA workers were actually paid 
additional in-work social benefits to augment their wages (WMP, 2012). 
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Chapter 6: The Organisation and Delivery of 
Public Employment Services and the Role of 
Private Agencies in the United Kingdom 
 
The British welfare state has changed radically. Recent governments have shared a 
common aim to create a flexible labour market underpinned by a ‘work first’ benefit 
regime that is complemented by tax and benefit policies designed to‘make work pay’. 
The rights and responsibilities of most working age adults receiving out of work 
benefits have been redefined and work-related conditionality has been extended to 
cover a more diverse group of claimants, including lone parents, spouses and people 
with disabilities and/or health-related problems. Welfare to work policies have been 
introduced at the same time as employment rights have been redefined and non-
standard employment contracts, including temporary agency work, now apply to 
many UK workers. 
 
Welfare reform has been coupled with organisational changes that have greatly 
altered the national agencies and contracted service providers responsible for 
delivering and administering cash benefits and employment services. This has 
included the creation of a modernised PES, called Jobcentre Plus (JCP), and the 
development of a quasi-market in the delivery of employment services. Contracted 
out employment services in Great Britain are now mainly delivered by for-profit prime 
contractors through PbR contracts. The development of the Work Program (WP) in 
particular included a series of innovations in the design, procurement, and delivery of 
outsourced employment services that have influenced subcontracting practices in 
other countries (for example, Ireland. Malta and Australia).   
 
6.1 The UK Welfare to Work System and the Service Delivery 
Landscape 
 
The UK has one of the most centralised systems of government in the OECD. 
Ministers and senior civil servants in London control the main levers of welfare to 
work policy and the design and delivery of cash benefits and tax credits is largely 
centralised. The national Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is responsible 
for JCP which combines the functions of job broking, referrals to employment 
programmes and the administration of income-replacement benefits paid to 
claimants out of work. The DWP also procures most contracted out employment 
programmes nationally with only limited ‘freedoms and flexibilities’ exercised by local 
Districts. In England publicly funded skills training is the responsibility of another 
Department – the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) – which 
delivers its programmes through a separate delivery network (see Figure 11).35 DBIS 
is responsible also for the oversight of most labour market legislation including that 
concerning PE&TWAs. 
 
                                                     
35
 The devolved governments in Scotland and Wales have separate responsibility for policy for skills, 
childcare, health, local government and regeneration, but DWP retains responsibility for Jobcentres 
and welfare to work programmes. In Northern Ireland the functions of the DWP are devolved and are 
delivered separately through the Department of Social Development and Department for Employment 
and Learning. 
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In contrast with most other OECD countries local government has played only a 
limited role in the design, commissioning and delivery of employment services for 
working age claimants. Many British local authorities have, however, developed a 
leading role in regeneration policies and job creation, especially in areas of high 
unemployment, and have developed related skills and employment programmes to 
ensure local residents can access job opportunities. Local councils also have 
responsibility for a range of other social services which play an important role in 
supporting residents to obtain cash benefits and employment. These services 
include childcare provision, welfare rights advice and the funding of specialised 
social inclusion services that work with highly disadvantaged groups, such as the 
homeless, refugees, and so on.  
 
Local authorities have recently been given new incentives to combine their efforts, 
especially in city-regions, and in England to promote economic growth with 
employer-led ‘Local Enterprise Partnerships’ (LEPs). In 2011 39 LEPs were 
established by the DBIS following the closure of a statutory network of Regional 
Development Agencies. The LEPs cover a self-defined ‘functional economic 
geography’, have the support of employers and local government, and are tasked to 
provide strategic leadership and set out economic priorities for their areas. An 
important part of their remit is to ensure the skills system supports local economic 
growth and they are also expected to work with local employers, the DWP and 
learning providers to help workless people into jobs (Ward, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 10: National Employment and Skills Support in England 
 
 
 
 
The Government has devolved some budgets and powers to LEPs and these 
partnerships formulate local growth strategies (CLG and DWP, 2014, p.4). The 
Government has also introduced a competitive process whereby partnerships have 
bid for local ‘City Deals’ and now ‘Growth Deals’. These ‘deals’ or agreements give 
partnerships or combined local authorities new ways of influencing and shaping local 
employment and skills provision including the integration of their efforts with those of 
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the DWP (see later). LEPs are, however, ‘steered’ primarily by the DBIS and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government.   
 
The UK public sector system is complemented by privately financed PE&TWAs and 
an extensive network of non-profit and for-profit organisations that deliver publicly 
funded employment and skills programmes. Most employment programmes are 
funded directly by the DWP but some are funded separately by local government 
and partnerships often with the support of funding from the European Commission. 
Some specialised non-profit welfare to work services are financed by charitable 
grants and donations. Many non-profit organisations specialise in providing 
employment opportunities for groups such as young people, women, ex-offenders or 
people with disabilities. A wide range of for-profit organisations also deliver publicly 
financed employment services, especially the WP (see later).  
 
6.2 The Role of Jobcentre Plus and the Introduction of Universal 
Credit 
 
In 2002 the Government created the DWP and JCP. This reform merged the work of 
two national Departments which previously had separately been responsible for 
employment services and welfare benefits. The policy aim was to create an 
integrated work first activation system and from its inception the agency has had four 
key aims: to provide effective advice and support for claimants looking for work; to 
administer and pay working age benefits accurately; to ensure that claimants fulfill 
their responsibilities to look for work; and to support an efficient and flexible labour 
market by offering a free recruitment service to employers and matching unemployed 
people to suitable job vacancies. 
 
In 2002 the new agency inherited a network of 1,500 offices and 90,000 staff 
delivering services to some 4.5 million working age claimants. Between 2002 and 
2006 JCP implemented a new service delivery model where benefit claims and 
payments were administered through a network of ‘telephone contact’ and ‘benefit 
delivery’ centres, with benefits paid directly into each recipient’s bank account. Front 
line services were delivered through a national network of some 800 employment-
focused Jobcentres. The layout and organisation of front-line Jobcentres were 
modernised and the new open plan Jobcentres provided a more modern, 
appointment based service, supplemented by touch screen Jobpoint terminals 
through which service users could find job vacancies. The direct cost of JCP’s 
modernisation was £1.9 billion, some £300 million below the original budget, and in 
this period full time equivalent staff numbers fell to about 69,000 (NAO, 2008).  
 
Since 2010 the DWP and Jobcentres have experienced major reductions in their 
staffing and service budgets while implementing new Government programmes. The 
front line Jobcentre network has been rationalised and JCP’s regional tier of 
management was removed, with 37 large districts reorganised into seven ‘regional 
groupings’. In October 2011 further streamlining of management costs saw JCP’s 
earlier quasi-independent ‘agency status’ abolished and management of the network 
is now undertaken directly by the Department.  
 
JCP has continued to modernise service delivery through greater use of digital 
channels for managing communications, benefit transactions and job search. This 
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has included ‘nudging’ more claimants to make online claims for their benefits 
alongside the introduction of ‘Universal Jobmatch’36 - an online vacancy database 
and recruitment website on which benefit claimants are required to register and 
upload their CV . Universal Jobmatch’s advisory function allows Jobcentre advisers 
to monitor individual job search activity; analyze CVs; identify skills or training gaps; 
and search, save and send targeted vacancies directly to claimants.  
 
The DWP has since undertaken a process of converting its offices into ‘Digital 
Jobcentres’, involving a redesign of existing space and the removal of earlier 
Jobpoints and phones. In redesigned Jobcentres claimants are able to use on-site 
computer facilities or their own WiFi or Web Access Devices to make benefit claims, 
set up a Universal Jobmatch account and search for employment.  
 
The new service delivery system is expected to deliver existing benefits, services 
and programmes, and manage the transition to the full introduction of a single 
working age benefit, called Universal Credit (UC). This benefit will gradually replace 
existing benefits for the unemployed (called Jobseekers Allowance, or JSA) and for 
people with work-limiting health problems and disabilities (currently Employment 
Support Allowance, ESA; or Incapacity Benefit, which ESA is gradually replacing). 
The timetable for UC introduction has been delayed with large-scale implementation 
now anticipated to accelerate later in 2016 with full coverage of all eligible claimants 
secured by 2021.  
 
The gradual introduction of UC, and austerity-driven cuts in welfare payments, are 
having a major impact on the service delivery relationship between JCP and local 
government. DWP is implementing a ‘digital by default’ approach to making and 
managing benefit claims and it is envisaged that some 80% of UC claimants will 
manage all benefit related aspects of their claim online. DWP accepts that a 
significant group of claimants will experience transitional or longer term difficulties in 
meeting the behavioural and financial requirements of the new UC system. It 
published a framework jointly with the Local Government Association (representing 
all English local authorities) and the expectation is that each local authority will 
engage with their local DWP Partnership Manager and bring together organisations 
with the appropriate skills to provide local ‘Universal Support’ services. This support 
will include access to a more intensive face-to-face service for the most vulnerable 
households, with a strong emphasis on the co-location of relevant services, and will 
comprise assistance with digital inclusion, personal budgeting support, and ‘bringing 
people closer to work’. 
 
6.3 The Current Role of Jobcentres and Work Coaches  
 
In 2015 new benefit claims are made on-line or via telephone. Most claimants are 
required to attend a ‘Work Focused Interview’ with a Jobcentre Work Coach 
(previously called Personal Advisers), usually within three to four working days. The 
                                                     
36
 Universal Jobmatch can be accessed on a computer and any internet-enabled device or mobile 
phone. In 2014 it was reported that 6.1 million jobseekers and 525,000 companies were registered, 
and on average 5.7 million job searches were undertaken each day. There was controversy over the 
introduction of mandatory Universal Jobmatch registration for benefit claimants and criticisms of the 
quality of some automated job matching (although this has improved as the quality system has been 
refined). 
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task of the coach is to assess employability, identify barriers and provide 
employment assistance. This may include matching and submitting the individual to 
vacancies. Claimants are then subject to activity requirements related to their 
benefit, with unemployed claimants subject to full conditionality. 
 
At the new claim stage the interview with unemployed people is aimed at agreeing 
job goals, the claimant’s availability for work, and job search activities. For claimants 
not subject to job search requirements, such as people with ill-health or with very 
young children, the discussion concerns how the claimant might prepare for work 
and steps they might take to improve their employability. 
 
From 2014 the terms of the personalised agreement have been set out in what is 
called a ‘Claimant Commitment’. This outlines more fully the claimant’s 
responsibilities and includes a personal statement from the individual setting out 
what they will do to prepare for and find work based on a discussion with an adviser. 
The commitment is reviewed regularly and is backed by a strict compliance regime 
to ensure the claimant meets their obligations. 
 
Beyond the new claim stage, unemployed claimants are required to attend fortnightly 
reviews to show their job search activity and discuss any changes in circumstances. 
This review process is designed to encourage continuous job search, ensure that 
claimants meet benefit conditionality, and discourage fraud. The aim is that ‘job 
ready’ unemployed people should seek work themselves and make use of ‘self-
service channels’, such as Universal Jobmatch.  As the length of time someone is 
unemployed increases, they have less and less choice over the sort of work they can 
decline and they are required to carry out mandatory activities that advisers believe 
will increase their employability. If unemployed people have been unable to find work 
for a period of nine to 12 months, they are referred to the Work Program (WP). Some 
groups, like young homeless people or ex-offenders, can be referred to the WP as 
soon as they start claiming benefit. Jobcentres are also the referral route to ‘Work 
Choice’, a smaller, specialist prime provider delivered programme for people with 
significant disabilities. 
 
The current claimant journey through the employment services system is set out in 
Figure 12 which shows how the requirements placed on an unemployed claimant 
escalate the longer the period spent out of work. 
 
There will be further change in the PES service delivery model as DWP implements 
new policies and adjusts to planned reductions in its budget. In particular the full roll 
out of UC will be accompanied by a new ‘Work Coach Delivery Model, which will 
formally end the practice of specialist disability, lone parent and young people 
advisers and lead to mixed caseloads – with Work Coaches expected to advice 
claimants with a range of needs and conditionality requirements.  
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Figure 11: The Jobcentre Plus Regime for Unemployed Claimants 
 
 
 
6.4 Delivering Employment Services – Jobcentres. Targets and 
Partnerships 
 
The mainstream welfare to work delivery system is now comprised of a national 
network of Jobcentres alongside a mixed network of for-profit and non-profit prime 
contractors who deliver separately commissioned programmes targeted at the long 
term unemployed and other disadvantaged groups. Despite expenditure cuts the 
Government still spent some £2 billion on active labour market support in 2012-13 
making it by far the largest provider of welfare to work and employment support 
services in local areas (HMG, 2014, p.48). Most of the budget is spent on Jobcentre 
operating costs and the related advisory services and programmes they deliver. 
 
DWP has made major organisational changes since 2010 and suggests that these 
have enabled the organisation to secure the efficiency gains of a national 
procurement and contracting system whilst giving Jobcentres and prime contractors 
‘freedoms and flexibilities’ which facilitate coordinated local service delivery and 
better engagement with local authorities.  
 
The introduction of what is called the ‘Jobcentre Plus Offer’ gave DWP District 
Managers some flexibility in delivering the activation regime allowing front line 
advisers some discretion over the frequency of interviews required and the 
employment support made available to claimants. This approach is supported by a 
‘Flexible Support Fund’, which replaced earlier more targeted discretionary funds. 
The fund can be used by advisers to provide individual support directly to 
jobseekers. Managers can also use it to fund local partnership working and to 
procure small scale programmes for specific target groups. The fund was allocated 
£136 million in 2014/15 but only £72 million was spent which was attributed to the 
fund’s low profile and uncertainty about how it could be used which in turn ‘allowed 
opportunities for partnerships with local authorities and agencies to be missed’ 
(McGuiness and Kennedy, 2016, p.3). Little is known about the outcomes secured 
through this discretionary funding. 
 
The local flexibilities of Jobcentres continue to be exercised within a clear national 
(vertical) accountability framework where front line staff must contribute to meeting 
DWP’s national targets (Wilson and Gallagher, 2013). These are to ‘move people off 
benefit, into employment, as quickly as possible’ and reduce the monetary value of 
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fraud and error. The first target is measured only through off-benefit flows (measured 
at 13, 26, 39 and 52 weeks) with JCP tasked to ensure some 88.5% of those 
claiming JSA cease claiming within a year. These targets are supported by varied 
internal operational ‘scorecards’ that include other indicators through which 
managers steer the system and drive staff behaviour. 
 
JCP is effective at meeting its formal targets and even during the recession, around 
75% of JSA claimants were moving off benefits within six months of a claim and 90% 
by twelve months. However, this measure does not provide a complete picture of the 
performance of JCP. Off-flow simply means that an individual has ended their 
current claim – it does not necessarily mean that a claimant has found work. A 
cohort analysis of benefit leavers in 2011 found, for example, that only some 68% 
got work of whom 41% were employed full time, 18% part time and 9% were self-
employed. Another 14% had claimed another out-of-work benefit and 18% were 
neither working nor claiming (Adams et al, 2012).  
 
Early positive evaluation results of the more flexible JCP regime have since been 
overshadowed by concerns of perverse target-driven behaviour, such as preferential 
treatment for those claimants thought most likely to contribute to meet short term 
targets, the application of inappropriate sanctions and putting unfair pressure on 
people to drop their benefit claims (WPC, 2014). The implementation of the core 
benefit regime and concerns about the ‘off-benefit’ target has also been a source of 
tension between DWP, Jobcentres and local partners and in many high 
unemployment areas weakens the willingness of other organisations (such as health 
services) to engage closely with DWP provision (WPC, 2014).  
 
Local Jobcentres continue also to deliver or refer service users to a range of 
nationally designed support measures - pre-employment training and work 
experience placements; Work Clubs; self-employment support; and the WP. Whilst 
some options are sourced locally most of the services are procured through a 
national framework with more expensive provision, such as mandatory work 
experience, delivered through prime contractors. The national framework excludes 
many smaller local providers (see below). 
 
A further development has concerned changes to push the employment and skills 
systems together, especially in England (Simmonds, 2012; Devins et al, 2011).  JCP, 
for example, now screens claimants for basic and English language skills and can 
mandate people to attend courses and it delivers ‘sector based academies’ with 
training providers targeted at improving the skills and job prospects of younger 
claimants. Much local adult skills provision is, however, funded by a Skills Funding 
Agency and continues to be commissioned separately from welfare to work 
programmes, as does training and advice provision for young people and adults. The 
result is that the commissioning and delivery of skills and employment support 
remains highly complex involving different Departments funding programmes with 
varied eligibility criteria, targeting and rewarding different outcomes, and delivering 
across differing geographical areas. 
 
Mainstream welfare to work provision for the unemployed remains tightly focused on 
implementing the centrally defined activation regime but DWP Districts and 
Jobcentres have been given limited ‘flexibilities and freedoms’ allowing them to seek 
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better ways to deliver and coordinate services and to support and work with local 
partnerships.  
 
DWP District Managers and specialist JCP ‘Partnership Managers’ are able to 
engage strategically with local stakeholders, councils and the LEPs, with DWP often 
providing information on benefit changes, the nature of the local labour market, the 
profile of workless claimants and the nature of demand from employers. DWP 
Districts are expected also to support the integration of employment and skills 
provision and to coordinate partnership priorities with the activities of WP prime 
providers and their subcontractors (DWP, 2011). The commitment to partnership 
working is largely voluntary, however, and local authorities, and now LEPs, have no 
direct role in the design or commissioning of JCP support and only limited influence 
on how resources are deployed to meet local needs (Wilson and Gallagher, 2013).  
 
Local innovations in service delivery have been strongest when working with groups 
not covered by mandatory national requirements and not well served by mainstream 
provision. This includes programmes targeted at ‘troubled families’, people on 
disability benefits and more disadvantaged young people. Two significant service 
delivery developments concern outreach and co-location. DWP employment 
advisory services are now delivered from over 1,100 external locations, including 
community centres, prisons, and so on. Experiments in co-location have tested 
different approaches to partnership work where, for example, skills, careers, financial 
services and Jobcentre employment support are delivered alongside each other. It is 
likely such co-location of services will be further developed to include the delivery of 
UC-related services and to enable the DWP to further reduce the number of 
Jobcentres (as part of the Government’s austerity-driven public expenditure 
reductions). 
 
6.5 The DWP Commissioning Strategy and the Work Programme 
 
Until 2007 JCP regional offices were largely responsible for the competitive 
procurement and management of a wide range of categorical employment 
programmes. These were designed in detail by the DWP and targeted at different 
groups, including the young and long term unemployed. As in many other countries 
outsourced employment services provision was delivered by an extensive network of 
non-profit, public and for-profit organisations (amounting to some 2,000 British 
providers in 2004). In 2006 JCP commenced an early version of ‘prime contracting’ 
which enabled it to reduce transaction costs and rationalise the provider network 
delivering the then Government’s ‘New Deals’ for the unemployed.37  The new 
contracts also introduced an element of price competition and PbR job outcome 
payments. In place of 1,000 individual contracts the New Deals were subsequently 
delivered through 94 prime providers, of whom 53 were for-profit, 27 non-profit and 
14 public sector organisations (DWP, 2007). These prime contractors were given 
                                                     
37
 The New Deal programmes included support from a JCP personal adviser targeted at priority 
groups, especially the long term unemployed and lone parents. The adviser would work with 
participants, meeting with them as frequently as every two weeks. If the adviser could not place the 
participant they could refer them to more intensive support ranging from short job search or training 
courses to six months subsidised work experience. These more intensive forms of support were 
usually delivered by contracted providers. 
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some flexibility but were managed by JCP and still expected to deliver a centrally 
designed programme utilising subcontractors where necessary.  
 
By 2007 there was, however, dissatisfaction with JCP control of the mainstream 
contracting process and the poor performance of centrally designed programmes. 
After being commissioned to review the welfare to work system the Freud Report 
(2007)38 suggested little change to JCP services for the short term unemployed but 
proposed major changes in how employment programmes should be commissioned 
and extended to include people on disability benefits. Freud proposed a funding 
model where large prime providers would invest their own resources in services up-
front and would be paid from the future benefit savings that would accrue from 
placing claimants into sustained employment. This risk transfer would align DWP 
and provider incentives and enable the Department to ‘uncap’ and extend activation 
programmes to cover many more workless people, especially those receiving 
disability benefits. 
 
The then Government welcomed Freud’s proposals and subsequently DWP (2008) 
published an overall ‘Commissioning Strategy’ outlining how the welfare market 
would be reformed and how the Department would in future procure programmes.  
There were three innovative elements to the proposed contracting model which in 
2010 became central features in the design of the Work Programme (see Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12: The Prime Contractor Model for Delivering Employment 
Programmes 
 
Key features of the approach to commissioning employment programmes after 2008 
included: 
 
Prime providers and supply chains: The system was made attractive to larger 
scale, well capitalised prime providers who would be awarded long term and higher 
value contracts and would have responsibility for marshalling and managing an 
appropriate blend of subcontractors to deliver services for a wide variety of 
participants.  
 
Payment by Results funding: Contract incentives and payment systems would be 
designed to reward long term employment retention with job outcome payments 
based on sharing with providers the benefit savings accrued when a participant 
sustains longer term employment. Payment systems would be differentiated 
recognizing that helping some claimant groups is more costly than helping others. 
Because the prime provider is paid primarily in arrears after they have secured job 
outcomes the organisation has to arrange finance to enable them to invest ‘up front’ 
and bear a greater share of the risk, on the basis of an income stream they expect to 
derive from future outcome fees.  
 
Service standards and the black box: In return for accepting more risk prime 
                                                     
38
 David Freud, the author of the Report, was subsequently appointed as a Conservative member of 
the House of Lords and from 2010 has been a Minister of State at the DWP helping develop and 
enact the Government’s welfare reform agenda. 
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providers are given greater flexibility to design their own service delivery system with 
little centralised prescription. These ‘black box’ contracts give providers freedom to 
use their expertise to do what they consider needs to be done to secure sustained 
job outcomes. 
 
Within this new procurement strategy the Department recognised its role in market 
stewardship and ongoing dialogue and partnership with and between providers. In 
particular the DWP had already funded and facilitated the establishment of the now 
independent industry representative body, the Employment and Related Services 
Association (ERSA). This association brings together both prime providers and many 
subcontractors and seeks to develop the capacity and professionalism of the sector, 
whilst also representing the views of providers in dialogue with the Department and 
other public sector purchasers. Members of ERSA sign up to a code of practice. 
Compliance is voluntary and auditing minimal, but this sets out an ethical framework 
and principles guiding how providers should deliver services.  
 
6.6 Work Programme Procurement, Prime Contractors and their 
Subcontractor Supply Chains  
 
In 2010 the newly elected Coalition Government replaced most existing programmes 
with the large-scale PbR ‘Work Programme’. The programme was to be delivered by 
large scale prime contractors and targeted at the long term unemployed and people 
on disability benefits assessed as capable of some work activity. Participants would 
be placed with providers for up to two years and it was estimated that the prime 
contractors would provide services for up to 3 million people over the five year 
contract period. 
 
After an initial consultation period WP prime contractors were selected by the DWP 
through a two stage process during which potential providers had to show how they 
intended to subcontract services and manage their supply chains.  
 
The first phase of selection involved qualifying for entry into a ‘framework 
agreement’.39  Applicant organisations had to demonstrate a track record of 
delivering large and complex contracts; capacity to deliver across the region(s) for 
which they had bid; and demonstrate their financial strength, including a minimal £20 
million per annum turnover, to deliver primarily PbR contracts. DWP selected 35 
prime providers from the 91 organisations that applied.  
 
The framework selection process was followed by ‘mini-competitions’ for WP delivery 
in 18 ‘contract package areas’ (CPA), each covering large populations (with London, 
for example, divided into only two CPAs). 40 separate contracts were available to 
ensure two or three providers competed in each area. WP bids were assessed in 
terms of cost and quality.  
 
Eighteen organisations were initially awarded prime contracts. This comprised 15 
private for-profit organisations, 1 quasi public sector organisation, and 2 non-profits 
(both of which have strategic relationships with for-profit companies).  In addition to 
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 Formally the ‘Preferred Suppliers for the Employment Related Support Services Framework’, see 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/erss-preferred-suppliers.pdf 
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the commercial employment agencies Reed Personnel, Pertemps and Working 
Links, another private agency, Staffline, entered the market through an acquisition 
and it has now acquired other prime contractors, including A4e, making its renamed 
‘People Plus’ subsidiary the largest WP contractor.40 
 
Prime providers were free to design their own delivery systems and were able to 
select their own subcontractors but they were expected to work with supply chains 
with the capacity to meet the needs of the different groups eligible for the programme 
in the locations for which they were selected. Supply chains also had to be selected 
in compliance with safeguards intended to protect the position of non-profit, 
specialist, community based and other ‘third sector’ providers which have been 
associated with a record of innovation and of working with the ‘hardest to help’ 
populations and localities.  
 
The DWP does not prescribe subcontracting arrangements for primes but the 
Commissioning Strategy contained a ‘code of conduct’ which was designed to 
influence their behaviour. The values expressed in the code focus on best practice in 
supply chain management and equitable treatment for smaller providers. 
Subsequently DWP, in partnership with providers, developed a ‘Merlin Standard’ as 
the assessment and enforcement tool that now regulates compliance with the code 
of conduct (see www.merlinstandard.co.uk).   
 
6.7 Work Programme Funding and Provider Incentives  
 
The DWP and central Treasury negotiated a unique inter-Departmental funding 
arrangement for the WP which supplements core departmental funding (up to £2 
billion between 2011-12 to 2014-15) with additional Treasury funding released as 
claimants stop claiming benefits (NAO, 2012). This arrangement was contingent on 
Treasury agreement to a WP funding model that was intended to ensure higher 
levels of performance. 
 
The WP funding model includes differential prices, with participants divided into nine 
payment groups, based on age and the benefit the person is receiving when they 
start with the provider. The payment groups’ act as a proxy for the relative 
employability of participants with higher prices paid to support those furthest from the 
labour market.  
 
The payments made to WP contractors have comprised four elements: 
 
 An ‘attachment’ or start payment. This was a small fee of £400 or £600 paid 
when a claimant referred from the DWP is successfully enrolled on the 
programme. The attachment fee helped with initial cash flow and ceased to 
be paid for new participants from 2014. 
 A job outcome payment. Paid when a claimant has been in work for either a 
continuous or cumulative period of employment, of 13 weeks for harder to 
place groups and 26 weeks for most JSA claimants (with the payment varying 
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 The companies acquired by Staffline include EOS, Avanta and A4e - 
http://www.staffline.co.uk/staffline-acquisition-a4e/  
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from £1,200 up to £3,500). The value of job outcome payments for JSA 
claimant groups is reduced in the later years of the contract. 
 A sustainment outcome payment. A further monthly payment for keeping a 
claimant in employment, with up to 26 monthly payments possible for the 
hardest-to-place groups (varying from a maximum possible payment for the 
‘easiest’ group of £2,210, to a maximum possible payment for the hardest 
group of £9,620). 
 An incentive payment. For jobs delivered beyond a given performance level 
- defined by the DWP as 30% above the number of claimants who would have 
found employment without WP support. 
 
The WP ‘Invitation to Tender’ set clear performance targets, in terms of the number 
of people getting jobs and keeping them, and when making bids prime providers 
were able to offer higher levels of performance and offer ‘price discounts’ on some of 
the payments. There has been much criticism of the basis on which these original 
performance assumptions were set with some observers arguing also that the DWP 
gave too much weight to price discounts when it awarded the contracts (WPC, 2013; 
NAO, 2012). 
 
After the programme commenced prime contractors have been required by the DWP 
to meet the minimum performance levels set in each CPA or be subject to detailed 
performance improvement plans and ultimately risk losing a contract should results 
not improve.41 A further innovation, adapted from the Australian system, was ‘market 
share shifting’ where from mid-2013 DWP was able to move some 5% of new 
referrals within each CPA from low to high performers.  
 
6.8 Black Box Contracting and DWP Performance Management and 
Oversight 
 
The ‘black box’ approach to the design of WP services does not apply to 
performance, programme delivery and post-contract supply chains. DWP monitors 
prime contractor performance and if an organisation wishes to make changes in the 
service delivery system outlined in their bid or in their supply chains they must justify 
them to the Department with significant alterations requiring contract variations. 
Prime contractors do, however, have greater operational flexibility and the scrutiny of 
service delivery is ‘light touch’ in relation to earlier programmes. In particular, there is 
less detailed oversight of quality and participant experience which in previous 
programmes had been undertaken by an independent inspectorate.42  
 
Contract management is undertaken by a relatively small cohort of performance and 
account managers and other officials who have particular supervisory 
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 While many prime providers have been subject to performance improvement activity, especially for 
the hardest to place groups, only one contract has been terminated. This was held by Newcastle 
College Group, coincidentally the only public sector entity to act as a WP prime provider. Technically 
this provider did meet minimum performance standards but because these were flawed DWP used 
another contractual right to be able to ‘break’ the contract with NCG (NAO, 2014). 
42
 In 2010 the DWP announced that ‘Ofsted’, the independent regulator for most education and skills 
provision in England, would no longer undertake inspections of the DWP’s welfare to work 
programmes. Instead the remit of the DWP's own provider assurance teams was extended to cover, 
‘in a light touch way’, some of the quality issues that formed part of external inspections.  
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responsibilities, such as specialists who investigate allegations of fraud. DWP 
Performance Managers are the main point of contact at delivery level. They monitor 
administrative and performance data and undertake monthly reviews which can be 
face-to-face, by telephone or paper exercises. The intensity of the reviews is 
determined by a risk assessment. These managers use DWP’s ‘Performance 
Improvement Framework’, which sets out a process for assessing a range of factors 
including whether providers are delivering minimum standards and achieving 
contractual job outcomes. Significant underperformance may be tackled through a 
formal ‘Performance Improvement Notice’ indicating that the prime is at risk of 
breaching the contract and they are then monitored through a more rigorous process 
(CESI-NIESR, 2014). 
 
6.9 Work Programme Performance 
 
The implementation of the WP has attracted criticism and been punctuated by 
negative media coverage about poor performance, the poor quality of services for 
harder-to-place jobseekers and the negative impact of the PbR funding model on 
third sector and specialist subcontractors.  Much of the criticism of the WP 
concerned its failure to meet its first year targets. The position subsequently 
improved and by the end of 2015 job outcome and retention performance for the 
long term unemployed was above minimum targets, especially for young 
unemployed people aged 18 to 24 (see Figure 13).  
 
 
 
Figure 13: Work Programme Performance 2011-2015 
 
Performance data shows that between its launch in 2011 and December 2015 the 
WP recruited some 1.81 million participants. Some 503,160 (27.79%) of those who 
had been on the programme long enough to secure a sustained job outcome had 
done so. The data also show that: 
 
 Of the 314,510 JSA claimants aged between 18 and 24 who joined the programme 
115,490 (36.72%) found sustained employment; 
 Of the 767,810 JSA claimants aged over 25 who joined the programme 245,150 
(31.92%) found sustained employment; 
 Of the 397,850 early JSA entrants, JSA claimants migrated from a disability benefit, 
and JSA Prison Leavers who joined the programme 106,750 (26.83%) found 
sustained employment; 
 Of the 329,830 ESA claimants who joined the programme 35,790 (10.85%) found 
sustained employment; 
 The weakest performance is reported for claimants aged over 50 (15.4% of whom 
found sustained employment) and those with a disability (17.3%).    
Source: Quarterly Work Programme National Statistics to December 2015, Department for Work and 
Pensions, at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/work-programme-data-to-december-2015  
 
The DWP was also successful in its aim of driving consolidation in the contracted 
employment services market. The value of contracted out programmes was 
estimated at £800 million in 2014/15, nearly 70% of which was allocated to the WP, 
and the Department was now mainly dealing with 15 prime providers who were each 
earning in excess of £10 million a year (TWD, 2015). This consolidation has reduced 
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the DWP’s transaction costs and improved the efficiency of providers but the danger 
is that the delivery systems created by these organisations are now heavily reliant on 
DWP contracts, especially the WP. 
 
In 2015 the National Audit Office concluded that the WP was generating similar 
outcomes to the programmes it replaced but for half the cost. This efficiency was 
offset, however, by the low job outcomes secured for disability benefit claimants 
which has remained significantly below expectations. There was also geographical 
variation in WP performance with results often lowest in local authorities and areas 
within CPAs with the highest levels of unemployment (CESI, 2014; Davies and 
Raikes, 2014; NAO, 2014). Unemployed WP ‘graduates’ return to JCP provision 
when their participation ends and the DWP put in place an intensive mandatory job 
search regime for JSA returners but made little provision available for those on 
disability benefits. 
 
Varied assessments have now also highlighted what many consider to be the 
‘counter-productive’ WP PbR funding regime where, because of lower than expected 
performance, and less income from job outcomes, primes have fewer resources to 
invest in the hardest-to-help participants and in high unemployment areas (Riley et 
al, 2014; Davies and Raikes, 2014). Primes may be able to cross-subsidise their 
resources between such client groups and local areas but they have limited 
incentives to do so. By contrast, it was increasingly suggested that local government 
and local partnerships are better placed and motivated to tackle under-performance 
if they were given greater control of the WP and related resources. 
 
6.10 The Revised DWP Commissioning Strategy and the Devolution 
of Employment Programmes 
 
After a period of consultation in 2014 DWP published a revised Commissioning 
Strategy. This sets the broad framework within which it intends to design and 
procure future programmes. The strategy reaffirms the Department’s commitment to 
competitive tendering, longer term contracts and to working centrally with ‘top-tier’ 
providers who can deliver larger national PbR programmes. It also re-commits DWP 
to partnership working and to moving to more ‘integrated forms of commissioning at 
the national, sub-national and local level, especially to support those furthest from 
the labour market’ (DWP, 2014b, p.23).  
 
In 2015 the newly elected Conservative Government announced plans for further 
reductions in public expenditure including significant cuts in welfare benefits and 
employment programmes. In 2017, when the WP contracts finish, Jobcentres will 
become solely responsible for working with all unemployed claimants in their first two 
years of unemployment. A new and smaller ‘Work and Health Programme’, targeted 
in particular at people on disability-related benefits, will be commissioned and will be 
worth about 20% of the value of the programmes it replaces. This expenditure 
reduction is partly justified by reference to the marked fall in long term claimant 
unemployment but is mainly driven by the aim of reducing the deficit in general 
public finances.  
 
It is significant also that future employment services provision and the developing 
activities of Jobcentres will be shaped in the context of the devolution deals 
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discussed earlier with cities such as Manchester and London viewing the new 
arrangements now being implemented as pathways to greater devolution of all 
employment and skills programmes (Finn, 2015). The Government’s approach will 
become clearer in 2017.  
 
6.11 Private Employment Agencies and Jobcentre Plus  
 
In addition to the role that private agencies play in the direct delivery of employment 
and skills programmes, the British PES has since the 1980s had a formal partnership 
agreement with PE&TWAs.43 The most recent version of the partnership was agreed 
between the DWP and the ‘Recruitment and Employment Confederation’ (REC) in 
2010. The REC is the peak body for PE&TWAs and has about 3,500 member 
businesses, with more than 7,700 branches, representing 80% of the UK recruitment 
sector by turnover.44  
The aim of the national level partnership agreement is to drive engagement between 
recruitment agencies and Jobcentres both nationally and locally. The objectives in 
the agreement commit both parties to: 
 
 help people into work by giving them the right support and the best 
opportunities for training and jobs; 
 share expertise to create the best ways of helping people back into work; 
 deliver a professional service; 
 promote the benefits of a diverse workforce by offering employers clear 
guidance and support to attract and recruit the widest possible range of 
people seeking work; 
 act as champions against discrimination and challenge unfair employment 
policies. 
 
Amongst other commitments the REC and the DWP agreed to the following joint 
working arrangements:   
 
 to ensure claimants are aware of the benefits of working with recruitment 
agencies; 
 to communicate the objectives of the strategy to Jobcentres and agencies and 
provide support to enable delivery where appropriate; and 
 to prepare each other for changes to services and the welfare reform agenda. 
 
As part of the agreement, senior representatives from the REC and Jobcentres meet 
on a quarterly basis to share intelligence on the latest labour market trends and to 
identify policy challenges and where required, approach government about them. 
                                                     
43
 Both JCP and the agency association suggest that their activities now complement rather than 
compete with each other but in the early 1980s the situation was very different. Private agencies 
played a key role in successfully lobbying the then Government to end one objective of the PES which 
at that time was to increase its general share of the vacancy market (Price, 2000). Subsequently the 
PES has focused more on servicing employers that have vacancies relevant to benefit claimants, not 
all job seekers. 
44
 The REC was established in 2000 by the merger of the Institute of Employment Consultants, which 
was the professional association of individual members of the recruitment industry, and the 
Federation of Recruitment and Employment Services, which was a trade association for the corporate 
industry. The REC continues also to represent more than 5,700 individual members of what is now 
called the Institute of Recruitment Professionals. 
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DWP managers may also attend REC sector group meetings and regional policy 
forums (EJML, 2011). 
 
One practical example of collaboration concerned a short term programme 
introduced during the recent recession when there was increased unemployment 
amongst more experienced and higher skilled workers, including managers and 
professionals. These claimants had different needs from most Jobcentre clients. The 
DWP approached the REC in early 2009 to explore ways in which recruitment 
agencies could provide additional support to jobseekers in this ‘professional’ 
category.  
 
The ‘Job-search support for newly unemployed professionals’ programme ran from 
April 2009 until March 2011, and was aimed primarily at unemployed people who 
had recently left a professional or executive job. Interested agencies had to formally 
register their interest to the DWP, submit an application and be accepted as a 
supplier of support services through the initiative. The agencies’ role was to advise 
jobseekers referred by Jobcentre advisers about the best way to go about finding 
new employment. The agencies were paid a fee of £150 and provided a range of 
support which could include mentoring and coaching; motivational support; 
assistance in writing updated CVs; providing market information about job prospects 
and facilitating job matching. There was no formal evaluation or monitoring of 
outcomes but the programme assisted over 80,000 jobseekers.  
 
There is little detailed information on how Jobcentres handle vacancies notified to 
them by private employment agencies and TWAs but unemployed claimants can be 
encouraged to consider temporary jobs and registering with private agencies counts 
as one of the steps to be taken to show a claimant is actively seeking work. Non-
standard employment vacancies are now more prevalent and TWA and other 
temporary jobs constitute over one third of new job starts. Leaving a temporary job is 
also one reason why almost half the unemployed people who find jobs return to 
make a new benefit claim within twelve months.  
 
6.12 Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies in Britain 
 
Despite the increased significance of PE&TWAs there is only limited research on 
their operations and their impact on the employment prospects of particular groups in 
the UK. Moreover, as in the other case study countries, inconsistent definitions and 
methodologies mean that there is varied data available on the scale of TWA 
employment. 
 
The REC undertakes monthly monitoring supplemented by an annual assessment of 
conditions in the industry (based on findings from its own surveys and official data). 
The most recent annual assessment, for 2013/14, estimates that the sector helped 
more than 630,000 people find regular employment and on any given day 1.15 
million people were employed on a temporary or contract assignment secured via a 
PE&TWA (REC, 2014). An earlier analysis estimated that if one million TWA workers 
were deployed it was likely there were 1.5 million people registered as temporary 
workers with agencies. 
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The REC report for 2013/14 found that the industry had recovered from the effects of 
the recession with a total industry turnover for the year of £28.7 billion (an increase 
of 8.2% over the previous year). It was estimated that agencies directly employed 
96,397 staff. Over 90% of sector income was derived from TWA work, with direct job 
placements showing a weaker recovery. One significant factor explaining the slow 
recovery of regular placement activity was that employers were instead directly 
recruiting staff and increasingly making use of social media (especially Linkedin). 
 
Results from the national Labour Force Survey find lower numbers of TWA workers 
than the REC estimate. This data series shows that the number of TWA workers 
reached a peak of 275,500 in 2001 and was around that level before falling in the 
recent recession to a low of 245,000 in 2009. The recovery was initially slow but 
accelerated with the number of TWA workers reaching over 321,000 in Winter 2012 
when they comprised an estimated 1.27% of the employed workforce. Nearly 70% of 
these workers were paid by the agency, and just over 30% were paid by the user 
company (Forde and Slater, 2014). In Winter 2014 the total was slightly higher at 
328,000, with 88,000 indicating they were employed part time (Office for National 
Statistics, Table EMP07, accessed September, 2015). 
 
In 2015 the industry association estimated there were over 18,000 agency offices in 
the UK (CIETT, 2015). The sector is comprised of a small number of large, mainly 
national and international providers, complemented by a greater number of specialist 
and smaller agencies operating at a local or regional level (many of which employ 
less than ten employees).  
 
There is much debate about the merits of PE&TWAs and their relationship with poor 
employment practices and non-standard employment contracts (Maroukis, 2015). 
While many agencies adhere to good working practices, there have been problems 
with exploitative practices in some parts of the industry. Another significant 
development has been a marked increase in the number of other intermediaries 
which use ‘contrived contracts’ to disguise employment relationships. Common 
contrivances include disguising temporary employment as self-employment and/or 
devising contractual arrangements whereby agency workers do not pay their full tax 
liability or social insurance contributions. Self employed workers are not covered by 
the European Agency Worker Directive and these contrived employment 
relationships are the subject of much controversy (which is likely to result in further 
regulation in the near future: Seeley, 2015). 
 
6.12.1 The Regulation of Recruitment and Temporary Work Agencies 
 
The legal framework governing PE&TWAs in the UK dates from the Employment 
Agencies Act (1973). The legislation included the requirement to obtain a licence and 
established an ‘Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate’ (EASI) to monitor 
agency practice and enforce legal obligations. The licensing system was abolished in 
1994 and although the subsequent Labour Government did not reintroduce licensing 
it did more clearly define the responsibility of agencies in the ‘Conduct of 
Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations’ (2003). These 
regulations prohibit agencies from fee-charging and from other poor employment 
practices (see later).  
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Two sectors are regulated more strictly. The first concerns nursing and domiciliary 
care agencies where agencies may need to be registered with the Care Quality 
Commission in England (or equivalents in the other UK countries). The key principle 
is whether an agency is through the workers it supplies undertaking a ‘regulated 
activity’, such as assessing a service user’s needs or drawing up a social care or 
health plan. If the agency is involved in undertaking such activities it needs to meet 
registration requirements, but if the agency is simply supplying staff to organisations 
that carry on regulated activities, but do not provide any regulated activities 
themselves, they are exempt from registration.45 
 
The other registration requirement regulates agencies (commonly known as 
‘Gangmasters’) which supply labour in the farming, food processing and shellfish 
gathering sectors which together include some of the lowest-paid and most 
vulnerable workers in the UK (Maroukis, 2015). The Gangmasters Licensing Act 
(2004) was introduced in the wake of the death of 23 immigrant shellfish pickers in a 
tragedy earlier that year.46 The legislation established a non-departmental public 
body, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA), with its own inspectors, to ensure 
that regulated agencies meet minimum employment standards. The GLA (2015) also 
works closely with law enforcement bodies to identify, disrupt and dismantle serious 
and organised crime, including people trafficking and other related illegal exploitative 
employment practices associated with the sectors it is responsible for. 
 
In addition to civil penalties including denial or withdrawal of a licence the 
Gangmasters legislation created four criminal offences arising from the licensing 
system: 
 
 operating as an unlicenced Gangmaster;  
 entering into arrangements with an unlicenced Gangmaster;  
 obstructing GLA officers; and  
 having false documentation. 
 
To obtain a Gangmasters licence, the rules require payment of a fee linked to the 
agency's turnover ranging between £250 and £4,000 for businesses turning over 
under £1 million to over £10 million respectively. Agencies also have to pay for 
inspections of their work environment in order to obtain licensing approval, with fees 
charged ranging from £1,600 to £2,500, according to agency turnover. In 2014/15 
the GLA issued about 2,000 licences and it was estimated that the system was 
protecting some 550,000 workers in the sectors covered (GLA, 2015, p. 2). 
 
Other regulatory changes that shaped the agency industry concerned general 
legislation on employment rights including that derived from European Directives. In 
particular there was much controversy about the implementation of the Agency 
Workers Directive (2008). After much debate between the Government, PE&TWAs, 
employers and trade unions, an agreement was reached on how the equal treatment 
principle would be applied in the UK (Forde and Slater, 2014). The specific UK 
                                                     
45
 For more information see - http://www.cqc.org.uk/  
46
 The workers were Chinese immigrant labourers who were left to drown by their employers as a fast 
tide swept in around them at Morecombe Bay in Lancashire. The unregulated Gangmasters were 
subsequently convicted of manslaughter, and some deported back to China. 
92 
 
legislation came into force in October 2011 establishing the obligations of both 
agencies and user companies.  
 
In the UK the actual oversight of regulations and PE&TWA employment practices 
has been ‘light touch’. In particular the activity of the original inspectorate, EASI, 
diminished after the general agency licensing requirement was abolished. By 
September 2013 there were only eleven people working in EASI, including eight 
inspectors, nominally covering some 18,000 agency offices. At this point most of the 
inspectors were transferred to another department to work specifically on minimum 
wage enforcement in the agency sector. In November 2014 it was reported that only 
two inspectors, supported by one administrative officer, remained in the EASI 
(Hansard, WA, 11 November, 2014). 
 
In its last formal annual report for 2012/13 the EASI reported that it had received 858 
complaints and undertaken 229 targeted inspections (EASI, 2013). In that year 
inspectors had identified 1,479 infringements; issued 471 warning letters; recovered 
about £170,000 in unpaid wages; and carried through seven successful prosecutions 
and two prohibitions (preventing named individuals from running an agency for a 
period of years). Most of the complaints and infringements found during inspections 
related to non-compliance with issues related to record keeping and written 
notifications not being sent to user companies or work seekers.  
 
The resources of the GLA and the scope of its regulatory activity are more 
significant. At the time of its annual report for 2014/15 the authority employed 69 
staff undertaking the core functions of licensing, intelligence, compliance and 
enforcement. In that year the authority reported that more than 3,000 workers had 
been assisted to prevent them being subjected to exploitative practices, 222 
successful convictions had taken place and steps taken to recover £3.5m on behalf 
of workers. There had also been 104 licence application inspections and 103 
compliance inspections, which had resulted in 27 licence refusals and 23 revocations 
(GLA, 2015). 
 
The work of the two specific agency inspectorates overlaps with the remit of other 
regulatory and enforcement authorities, including officials enforcing the national 
minimum wage; health and safety at work; tax and social insurance obligations; as 
well as officials from criminal law enforcement and the UK Borders Agency. 
Individual workers, with or without the support of trade unions, may also pursue 
grievances on employment rights through a quasi-judicial system of Employment 
Tribunals.  
 
The UK’s ‘Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service’ offers advice and guidance 
to workers and employers on issues related to workplace disputes and grievances 
on pay and rights at work, including advice for temporary workers employed through 
TWAs. This service is now responsible for ‘one stop’ online and telephone support 
where advisers can give information and guidance about basic workplace rights 
covered by enforcement bodies.47 They can also put callers in touch with the 
                                                     
47
 Of the 900,000 calls to the Acas helpline in 2014 some 2,250 were about the Agency Workers 
Regulations. Analysis of the calls showed that agency workers were often unaware of, and afraid of 
asserting, their statutory rights (Acas, 2015). 
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relevant enforcement body, such as the GLA or EASI, who will investigate further 
and take enforcement action where necessary. 
 
There has been much debate about labour market regulation and the disparity 
between the weak regulation of most PE&TWAs compared to the stricter supervision 
of agencies in the sectors covered by the GLA. The UK Government has undertaken 
a review of the regulatory framework for the recruitment sector and after publication 
new legislation is expected to follow in 2016. In the meantime the DBIS announced 
the appointment of a new ‘Director of Labour Market Enforcement and Exploitation’ 
in 2015 who will align and oversee the work of the GLA, the EASI and minimum 
wage enforcement. There is concern, however, that a reduction in resources and a 
narrower, more targeted approach focused on ‘vulnerable workers’ and the minimum 
wage, will mean less regulation of most private employment intermediaries. By 
contrast trade unions and advocacy organisations have lobbied for the powers and 
resources of the GLA to be extended to cover other sectors, especially the 
construction industry.  
 
Self-regulation plays an important role in the sector and the REC has a code of 
practice which sets out ten principles that all members are expected to adhere to. 
Since 2012 member agencies have been to carry out a bi-annual compliance test. 
This is essentially a self-assessment exercise structured around 100 multiple-choice 
questions with a pass rate of 80% required for continued membership. REC can 
undertake spot checks on agencies, investigate complaints and refer cases to the 
EASI. The Association of Labour providers, which works specifically in the sectors 
covered by the GLA, also has a similar code of practice, as do some of the smaller 
agency organisations representing specialists, such as those covering services in 
modelling, entertainment and IT. Complaints can be made about agencies and if 
upheld members may be expelled from the associations but an agency can continue 
to operate unless action is taken by a statutory regulator.  
 
6.12.2 The Terms and Conditions of Employment of TWA workers 
 
Collective bargaining is less developed for agency workers in the UK, where no 
government approved system of labour agreements exists. Trade unions may 
negotiate provisions on temporary staff in their workplace agreements but there is 
little information available on these provisions. Most trade union activity concerns the 
role of the Trades Union Congress in raising awareness about and enforcing the 
legislative rights of agency workers, although some trade unions do directly organise 
TWA workers and have recognition agreements, especially with larger agencies. 
 
The ‘Agency Worker Regulations’ (2010) and the ‘Conduct of Employment Agencies 
and Employment Businesses Regulations’ (2003) together set out the rights of 
agency workers and the liabilities and duties of PE&TWAs. Agencies and user 
companies must also observe other general labour and health and safety at work 
regulations, including paying the national minimum wage, and must adhere to equal 
opportunities legislation. All agencies are required also to check that their workers 
have a legal right to work in the UK and where necessary undertake ‘criminal records 
checks’ to ensure that their temps are legally able to be employed in workplaces with 
specified service users (such as, children or vulnerable adults). 
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Under the conduct regulations the agency must record details of each vacancy they 
receive from a user company before they introduce or supply an agency worker to 
that user company. The agency must give the TWA worker information about the 
identity of the user company; the start date and duration of assignment; the job role, 
responsibilities and hours; the necessary skills and experience; the potential health 
risks; and the potential expenses that the agency worker would incur. The user 
company is responsible for supervising and directing the agency worker while they 
undertake the assignment. The user company must, under the conduct regulations, 
provide in writing information on the level of basic pay, overtime payments, bonus 
schemes, performance appraisal, annual pay increments, voucher schemes and 
annual leave entitlement. In special cases such as pregnancy, it is the user 
company’s responsibility to carry out a workplace risk assessment if required and to 
make adjustments to remove the risk if necessary or offer suitable alternative work. 
 
The conduct regulations further restricts agencies from: 
 
 charging a fee to a job seeker for job finding services (although fees are 
permissible for agencies in the entertainment and modelling businesses); 
 sharing the agency worker's personal details; 
 advertising jobs which do not exist; 
 withholding payments or wages due to TWA workers for work they have 
carried out, regardless of whether they have timesheets; 
 supplying a TWA worker to replace an individual taking part in industrial 
action; and 
 preventing a TWA worker from working elsewhere, from terminating their 
contract with the agency, or requiring them to tell the agency the identity of 
any future employer. 
 
Agencies themselves may hire workers, who they provide to businesses. In such 
cases, the TWAs may charge an additional fee to user companies for their services.  
 
The UK Agency Working Regulations (2010), which translate the European equal 
treatment principle into UK law, can be divided into rights which are available from 
day one of their employment on an assignment, and rights that come into force after 
twelve weeks (Forde and Slater, 2014, p. 13). The user company has liability for 
ensuring day one rights for agency workers which essentially comprise the same 
access to facilities such as staff canteens, childcare and transport as a comparable 
employee of the user company, and the right to be informed about job vacancies.  
 
After a 12-week qualifying period, agency workers are entitled to the same basic 
conditions of employment as if they had been directly employed by the hirer on day 
one of the assignment. This specifically covers pay, including any fee, bonus, 
commission, or holiday pay relating to the assignment. It does not include 
redundancy pay, contractual sick pay, and maternity, paternity or adoption pay. After 
twelve weeks the agency worker also acquires ‘duration of working time’ rights 
including, for example, any annual leave above what is required by law. Agency 
workers are also entitled to paid time off to attend ante-natal appointments during 
their working hours. 
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The regulations cover continuous assignments within a user company. In reality 
many agency workers are sent on assignment to many companies, often through 
multiple agencies (Forde, 2001). Some may therefore accrue twelve weeks of 
continuous employment but not with a single user company. The regulations 
stipulate that if an agency worker is working on more than one assignment the 
accrual to twelve weeks will occur separately across each assignment. The 
regulatory guidance also sets out a range of ‘anti-avoidance’ stipulations which are 
designed to prevent assignments being structured in such a way so as to prevent an 
agency worker completing a qualifying period. (DBIS, 2011).48  
 
The most significant regulation concerns the ‘Swedish Derogation’, which applies to 
the European legislation and has been used widely in the UK. The derogation 
applies when a TWA offers an agency worker an ongoing contract of employment 
and pays the agency worker between assignments. It effectively means that after 
twelve weeks with a user company the agency worker will not be entitled to the same 
pay as if they had been recruited directly. Workers covered by this exemption will, 
however, still be entitled to other provisions under the regulations, for example, 
annual leave after twelve weeks. For the derogation to apply, the TWA must offer an 
agency worker a permanent contract of employment and pay the worker some pay 
between assignments. Workers should be told that entering into the contract means 
giving up the entitlement to equal pay. 
 
There are rules about how much and for how long the agency must pay workers, 
under these derogation agreements. It must be at least half of pay received on 
assignment based on the highest rate during the previous twelve weeks and it 
cannot be below the national minimum wage (DBIS, 2011). The payment between 
assignments must also last for at least four weeks before the contract can be 
terminated (Acas, 2013). During non-working periods, the agency must take 
reasonable steps to find future assignments for the temp worker who in return may 
be obliged to demonstrate their continuing availability for work. 
 
It was expected that few TWAs would make use of this option, since it required 
agencies to find employment for temporary workers on a continuous basis, or pay 
workers whilst they were not on assignment. There is evidence, however, that after 
implementation employers, especially in the retail and food distribution sectors, 
required the agencies they used to switch their labour supply to workers employed 
under the Swedish derogation. Another survey found that other employers that 
regularly used agency workers sought to avoid equal treatment obligations and 
‘changed their working practices to avoid using agency workers for more than twelve 
weeks’ (Jordan et al, 2013, p.23). No evidence has been found to show that the 
2010 regulations reduced demand for agency workers (Forde and Slater, 2014, 
p.18). 
  
                                                     
48
 These regulations focus on what comprises the twelve week continuous employment period; the 
movement of agency workers around a series of roles within the same firm; and the movement of 
agency workers onto contracts with different subsidiaries within the same organisation. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This report has reviewed developments in the design and delivery of public and 
private employment services in four case study countries. Each country is 
characterised by distinctive institutional and service delivery systems. Responsibility 
for insurance based and means tested benefits and publicly financed employment 
services is often divided between different institutions and delivery agencies and 
these differences are complicated further where they overlap onto divisions of 
responsibility between levels of government. Despite these differences in each 
country the PES continues to play a central role in the delivery of employment 
services.  
 
The role of the PES has been shaped by different activation policies and changes in 
how people apply for and how employers recruit workers. Activation reforms have 
intensified work-based requirements and extended them to cover more diverse 
groups of working age benefit claimants. Job matching and placement has been 
transformed by the diffusion of online technologies and the spread of non-standard 
employment contracts in more flexible labour markets. In each of the countries the 
PES has been enabling and requiring more employable clients to use self-service 
channels to undertake their own job search whilst investing in a more personalised 
service targeted at priority groups, including the long term unemployed or those 
considered at risk of long term welfare dependency.  
 
In each country changes in benefit entitlement and eligibility rules have been coupled 
with organisational change. The reasons for the perceived inadequacies of earlier 
arrangements are contested, but at least part of the problem has been attributed to 
the ‘top down’ inflexible nature of national policy formation and implementation; to 
the fragmented structure and role of the traditional welfare bureaucracies and 
national employment services; and to the absence of competition and market forces. 
PES monopolies in labour intermediation have been dismantled, new service 
delivery models have been introduced and national agencies now have to work in 
new partnerships and different types of decentralised arrangements. 
 
In all four countries policy makers suggest that activation reforms have contributed to 
reducing benefit caseloads and improving employment rates. Whilst the net impacts 
specifically attributed to changes in activation requirements or service delivery 
reforms may appear small over time they are likely to have significant aggregate and 
cumulative employment and budgetary effects. When activation strategies and 
employment service reforms are effectively communicated and delivered they also 
may induce large motivational effects, which can prompt and assist those capable of 
working to take up employment and discourage benefit claims from those who are 
not genuinely seeking employment. 
 
It is difficult to disentangle the impacts of reconfigured service delivery systems from 
the wider work-based activation reforms within which the new arrangements are 
embedded. The findings from the case study countries confirm, however, that the 
design and delivery of benefit systems and the organisation, management and front 
line delivery of employment services are important influences on the level and 
persistence of unemployment and benefit dependency. There are a range of factors 
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that contribute to the relative effectiveness of service delivery reforms but some that 
may have contributed to improved employment outcomes include performance 
management, greater inter-agency collaboration, contracting out and 
decentralisation.  
 
7.1 Lessons for Policy Makers in Other Countries 
 
Despite differences in governance, labour market contexts and social security 
systems the service delivery reforms implemented in the case study countries may 
be of use to policy makers in other countries as they make choices about which 
policies and programmes to implement in the context of the distinctive national 
challenges they face. 
 
7.1.1 PES Performance Management 
 
The design of funding and performance reporting mechanisms is critical for 
accountability and for shaping the priorities and behaviour of the PES and contracted 
out service providers. In each country there has been change in performance 
management and the orientation of service delivery systems to focus on outcomes 
achieved rather than only on how budgets are spent. This has involved job 
placement targets for the PES and performance related payment systems for 
contracted providers. There is now much accumulated experience about how best to 
design and implement such systems in ways that improve outcomes and 
accountability whilst ensuring that service providers do not focus solely on those 
already closest to the labour market. 
 
7.1.2 Coordinated Service Delivery  
 
Another important trend concerns the integration and coordination of employment 
and benefit service delivery within ‘one stop’ or ‘one counter’ arrangements that 
require the PES, local government and other agencies to work together. Despite 
contextual differences findings from the comparator countries identify some design 
elements that can facilitate different approaches to coordinating and/or co-locating 
services. One important element concerns the development of local agreements 
outlining service protocols, working methods and respective organisational 
responsibilities. ‘Legacy’ IT systems and PES and local government data and service 
delivery protocols can facilitate (or hamper) coordination and ‘user journeys’. At its 
best, investment in more integrated information systems enables service providers to 
coordinate separate administrative data on clients, establish eligibility and referral 
mechanisms, track interventions and monitor subsequent progress.   
 
7.1.3 Contracting Out the Delivery of Employment Services  
 
Contracting out the delivery of employment services has proven to be a complex 
undertaking with public purchasing authorities in the case study countries having to 
make frequent adjustments to financial incentives and contract terms as delivery 
problems have arisen and external conditions have changed. Evaluations report 
mixed results with negative evaluation findings showing little evidence of increased 
efficiency or innovation. More positive findings suggest, however, that well-designed 
performance based contracts can reduce delivery costs, give access to skilled staff 
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and services unavailable in the public sector and bring innovation to service delivery. 
The common risks are that providers may service only the most job ready and ‘park’ 
the hardest to help and otherwise exploit weaknesses in contract design. Some key 
lessons from the case study countries include: 
 
 The development of an effective contracting system is likely to require an 
extended period of monitoring, evaluation and modification. It is important that 
when contracting for employment services the purchaser should design the 
process in ways which allow lessons to be learned rapidly and necessary 
adjustments to be made. 
 There are many choices to be made about contract design and how to 
organise procurement that will shape subsequent delivery and impacts. A key 
finding from the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, concerns the negative 
impact of contract selection processes that gave too much weight to the 
lowest priced bids which resulted in unviable contracts. The challenge for the 
purchaser is to balance a range of possible bid selection criteria in ways that 
secure value for money but do not undermine provider capacity to deliver 
effective services. 
 Contracting requires effective information systems that enable the purchaser 
to track participants, monitor provider performance and verify service delivery 
and outcomes. There is a need also for skilled contract managers to 
undertake procurement and performance management and for such expertise 
to be concentrated in regional or national offices and not directly connected 
with immediate local delivery. 
 
7.1.4 Decentralisation and the Delivery of Employment Services  
 
There is little specific evidence on the particular impact of decentralisation but 
positive evaluations from wider OECD experience suggest that giving lower tiers of 
government or partnerships responsibility for funding of services, benefit payments 
and responsibility for programmes has encouraged innovation and enabled local 
actors to design and provide more coordinated services better tailored to the needs 
of local communities and employers (Froy and Giguère, 2010). There is evidence 
also that devolved responsibility for financing benefit payments has given lower tiers 
of government stronger incentives to keep unemployment low (Finn, 2015). The 
development and design of ‘block grants’, which give local governments flexibility 
and incentives to increase efficiency, have been strongly associated with reductions 
in welfare caseloads but they also risk ‘under provision’ with harsher gatekeeping 
and budget cuts undermining poverty reduction. The Netherlands model illustrates 
how devolution and falling caseloads can be combined with common national benefit 
entitlements but that these national requirements need to be further enhanced by 
minimum standards for employment services. 
 
The challenge for policy makers is how best to structure their employment and 
welfare system to allow for the flexible delivery of localised strategies within a 
coherent and equitable national policy. Balancing national and local priorities 
requires an agreed and transparent performance framework where the central, 
national body has the authority and responsibility to analyse performance information 
through which it can assess and evaluate the effectiveness of local activation 
strategies and hold delivery agencies to account. National objectives often are the 
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basis for negotiated agreements and targets with lower tiers of government and, as 
in Germany and Denmark, may be monitored and managed through performance 
reporting systems; central or regional scrutiny and evaluation; and the incentives and 
sanctions embedded in conditional central funding. Such mechanisms are important 
to mitigate the potential for misaligned or conflicting incentives, especially the risk 
that in multi-tiered policy systems some levels may have strong incentives to shift 
costs and resist central reform. 
 
Implementing more decentralised arrangements has to take into account the 
personnel; organisational and fiscal capabilities of local government. It would not be 
feasible, for example, for local areas to acquire or replicate the expertise of national 
agencies so the central Ministry should facilitate capacity building, the collection of 
comparable information on service provision and outcomes, evaluation and the 
transfer of best practice. Central government can also sponsor a differentiated model 
where, as in the UK, lower tiers of government negotiate different levels of 
responsibility and test, evaluate and develop new approaches to local design and 
delivery before a possible move to fuller decentralisation.  
 
7.1.5 The Public Employment Service and Private Employment and 
Temporary Work Agencies 
 
In each of the case study countries the PES works alongside a more or less 
extensive network of PE&TWAs which has given the PES increased flexibility to 
adapt services and meet changes in demand. These agencies have also become an 
important source of employment opportunities for PES clients, although there was 
mixed evidence and views on whether the job opportunities and experience offered 
by TWAs in particular acted as ‘stepping stones’ to regular jobs or were precarious 
‘dead ends’. Increased temporary agency work was, however, a common feature in 
each country, although its prevalence varied and its buoyancy was highly sensitive to 
the economic cycle.  
 
Relationships between the PES and PE&TWAs varied with the closest working 
arrangements evident in the Netherlands and the UK where formal partnership 
agreements help structure the relationship between both sectors. There had been 
more or less success for the PES in learning from and adapting some intermediation 
practices of private agencies and attracting agencies to deliver contracted out 
services, but experiments with publicly financed TWAs servicing PES priority groups 
had mixed success. The successful Netherlands model was subsequently privatised 
and the unsuccessful German model was quickly abandoned. 
 
In each country the PE&TWA sector was characterised by a number of large 
international and national agencies complemented by many smaller specialist and 
local agencies, many of which operated in poorly regulated sectors of the labour 
market. National federations sought to promote best practice and the interests of the 
sector through self regulation and cooperation with statutory enforcement bodies. 
However, in each country there was criticism of agency involvement in exploitative 
and sometimes illegal working practices, often involving migrant workers, especially 
in sectors such as cleaning, agriculture and construction. Perceptions of agency 
employment practices were also tainted by the emergence of new arrangements, 
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such as contrived self-employment and umbrella agencies, which in the UK and the 
Netherlands evade regulatory and tax requirements. 
 
Agency regulation has been liberalised in each case study country but Ministries 
continue to regulate the commercial activities of PE&TWAs and the different ways in 
which they treat their clients and temp workers. These regulatory environments are 
affected by sector specific and wider labour market factors, including more general 
national regulation of employment conditions. Key principles specific to agencies 
included the prohibition of fee-charging for job placement and the extension of equal 
treatment requirements to TWA workers so that they may benefit from the same 
remuneration levels as comparable regular workers and/or qualify for more secure 
employment.  
 
National regulatory regimes have been shaped by EU Directives and ILO 
Conventions but each country had distinctive approaches to licensing, transparency 
and to enforcement. In Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands in particular 
negotiated collective labour agreements were used to vary national entitlements. 
Despite the diversity of practices the experience of the case study countries 
underlines the importance of supplementing collective and sectoral self-regulation 
with the activity of adequately resourced public agencies. Such regulatory agencies 
must have the capacity to undertake monitoring and enforcement activity and 
provide information and access to complaint procedures for employers and individual 
workers, especially those employed in sectors, such as food, hospitality and care 
work, where there is growing demand for cheap and flexible workers. 
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Annex A: Eurociett Code of Conduct (extracts) 
 
Principle 1 – Respect for Ethical and Professional Conduct  
 
Members shall observe the highest principles of ethics, integrity, professional 
conduct and fair practice in dealing with temporary agency workers and all other 
relevant stakeholders, and shall conduct their business in a manner designed to 
enhance the operation, image and reputation of the industry.  
 
Principle 2 – Respect for Laws  
 
Members and their staff shall comply with all relevant legislation, statutory and non-
statutory requirements and official guidance covering Private Employment Agencies.  
 
Principle 3 – Respect for Transparency of Terms of Engagement  
 
Members shall ensure that workers are given details of their working conditions, the 
nature of the work to be undertaken, rates of pay and pay arrangements and working 
hours.  
 
This principle complies with EU Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an 
employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the 
contract or employment relationship.  
 
Principle 4 – Respect for free-of-charge provision of services to jobseekers  
 
Members shall not charge directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs 
to jobseekers and workers, for the services directly related to temporary assignment 
or permanent placement.  
 
Principle 5 – Respect for Health and Safety at Work  
 
1. Members shall act diligently in assessing risks related to health and safety prior to 
the assignment of agency workers in their workplace.  
 
2. Members shall inform agency workers whenever they have reason to believe that 
any particular assignment causes an occupational health or safety risk.  
 
This principle complies with the EU Directive 91/383/EEC of 25 June 1991 
supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at 
work of workers with a fixed duration employment relationship or a temporary 
employment relationship.  
 
Principle 6 – Respect for Diversity  
 
Members shall establish working practices that safeguard against any unlawful or 
unethical discrimination.  
 
Principle 7 – Respect for the Worker’s Rights  
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1. Equitable, objective and transparent principles for the calculation of agency 
workers’ wages shall be promoted, considering national legislation and practices.  
 
2. Members shall not restrict agency workers’ right of freedom of association.  
 
3. Private employment agencies shall not make workers available to a user company 
to replace workers of that company who are legally on strike, except where such a 
provision is prohibited by national or local law.  
 
Principle 8 – Respect for Confidentiality  
 
1. Members shall ensure confidentiality in all of their dealings.  
 
2. Members and their staff shall ensure that permission has been given and 
documented before disclosing, displaying, submitting or seeking confidential or 
personal information.  
 
This principle complies with the EU Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data.  
 
Principle 9 – Respect for Professional Knowledge and Quality of Service  
 
1. Members shall work diligently to develop and maintain a satisfactory and up to 
date level of relevant professional knowledge.  
 
2. Members shall ensure that their staffs are adequately trained and skilled to 
undertake their responsibilities and assure a high quality service.  
 
Principle 10 – Respect for Fair Competition  
 
Members shall assure mutual relations based on fair competition.  
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